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1INTRODUCTION : ANTI-COMMUNISM IN AUSTRALIA 1945-1949
For the greater part of its history, the Communist 
Party of Australia has been a numerically tiny and politically 
ineffective organisation, isolated from the Labour Party by 
mutual animosity, and possessing only marginal influence in 
the Labour movement as a whole. Non-Labour parliamentarians 
seemed able to ignore these facts with impunity in their 
habitual utilisation of the Communist bogey at every Federal 
Election after 1925. But there was a period of years in the 
1940's when their public tirade on the dangers posed by the 
Communist Party bore a much closer relation than usual to the 
realities of Communist influence in Australian politics; 
a period when the Party itself seriously anticipated the 
advent of revolution in Australia within the space of a decade. 
In the light of the present status of the C.P.A., it is 
difficult to imagine that in the mid-1940's it had more than 
22 thousand members, and financial resources sufficient for 
the purchase of Marx House in Sydney at a sum of ^30,500; 
that Communists held executive control of most of the main 
transport, mining and heavy industry trade unions, and, with 
their sympathisers, a majority at the 1945 A.C.T.U. Congress; 
and that they were the guiding force behind a variety of 
prospering 'progressive' community organisations.^
The Party took advantage of post-Depression 
working-class militancy to make important advances in the 
unions in the late 1930's, but the upward swing in its 
fortunes was not consolidated until after Hitler's invasion 
of the Soviet Union. In 1943 the Party, newly released from 
a two-year ban imposed by the Menzies-Fadden Government, 
discovered that its connection with the Russian 'gallant ally' 
and its adoption of a policy of whole-hearted support for the 
Australian war-effort, brought a wave of public approbation.
1. My information on the position of the Communist Party 
1945-1949 throughout this introduction relies heavily 
on the work of John Playford, Doctrinal and Strategic 
Problems of the Communist Party of Australia 1945-62, 
(P.H.D. thesis, Australian National University), and 
of Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia 
(Stanford, 1969).
2Its recruiting rate soared with the new-found respectability, 
as did its success in joining with 'small 1' liberals and 
the Left Wing of the A.L.P. in 'united front' activities 
outside the Party. For the first time, Communists began to 
permeate the community at large. In the unions additional 
gains were made, the Communist officials using their 
position to encourage industrial production for war purposes 
and to discourage strikes. The Party's revolutionary 
programme, already much softened after the 1935 Comintern 
directive for a 'Peoples' Front' against war and fascism, 
was further modified to meet the changed circumstances arising 
from the fact that the Soviet Union was now an ally of Western 
Capitalist powers, and from the influx into the Party's ranks 
of considerable numbers of middle-class intellectuals unfitted 
to accept the rigours of a doctrinaire organisation. In 1944 
the C.P.A. changed its name to the Australian Communist Party 
to emphasise that it proposed a nationalist approach to 
socialism.
This high-tide of popularity ebbed quickly with the 
break-down in Soviet-Western relations in 1946. Many new 
recruits, who had joined the Party largely because of their 
admiration for the Soviet stand against the German armies, 
allowed their membership to lapse; others, objecting to the 
re-introduction of 'democratic centralism' after the flexible 
system of the war-time Party, added to the exodus. The 
general public, prompted by an increasingly anti-Communist 
news media, began to absorb the implications of the develop­
ing Cold War. Liberal-minded citizens severed their 
connections with Communists in the front organisations, while 
in non-Communist bodies such as the Returned Servicemen's 
League, there was established a practice of exposure and 
expulsion of Communists which later became fashionable 
throughout the community. By 1947 the A.C.P. was losing 
ground in all spheres except the trade unions, where rank- 
and-file recognition of the successful leadership qualities 
of Communist officials enabled the latter to stave off, 
temporarily, a growing challenge from the infant Industrial 
Groups. The Party reacted to the Cold War situation with a 
reversion to doctrinaire revolutionism, and used its sole
3but effective weapon - its hegemony in the unions - to strike 
a blow at Russia's opponents.
In 1947 Cominform formally declared the end of an 
era of Communist accommmodation with the forces of social 
reformism: a final, bitter confrontation with Capitalism was
the order of the day. The A.C.P., in a mood of revolutionary 
fervour and optimism resulting from the rapid strides it had 
made in the latter years of the war, probably believed that one 
last hearty shake would bring the edifice of Capitalist 
society tumbling down. Moreover, by the late 1940's 
Communists were feeling the pressure of the anti-Communist 
offensive: the fear that their newly-won advantage might
slip from their grasp added an element of urgency, if not 
desperation, to their onslaught. Thus the Party embarked upon 
a policy of 'adventurism', initiating a series of major 
strikes apparently motivated more by political considerations 
than genuine industrial grievances.
The effectiveness of these strikes was ensured by 
Australia's economy of shortages. The public, smarting 
under inflated prices and deprived of vital consumer goods, 
were easily convinced that their hardships were engineered by 
the Communist Party in its effort to retard the industrial 
potential of the Capitalist system. The seven week long 
Coal Strike by the Communist-led Miners' Federation in 1949, 
which cut off supplies of fuel and light in the middle of a 
bad winter, which closed down sections of industry and put 
thousands out of work, instanced the rude awakening of those 
who still needed to be persuaded that the Party was committed 
to a deliberate scheme to ruin Australia's chances for 
prosperity and affluence. Who could doubt it, when the 
Federal Labour Government, known for so long to be the stooge 
of the Communist union bosses, itself declared in a press 
advertisement that the Coal Strike represented an attempt by 
the Communist miners' leaders to 'climb to power over the 
ruins of industrial and social Australia.'
2. See L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley, (Melbourne, 1961) pp. 354- 
355.
3. Herald, 2 July 1949.
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The Party's utilisation of its industrial power for 
political ends was for many people evidence that for the 
first time it possessed the means to put into effect its 
revolutionary aims. The situation took on even more sinister 
under-tones in the light of the international scene. A 
drastic volte-face in the C.P.A.'s attitude to the war in 
both 1939 and 1941 had amply demonstrated its subservience to 
the dictates of the Soviet Union - a country with which 
Australia, by 1948, was on a virtual war footing, at least 
according to the public statements of Federal Opposition 
Leader R.G. Menzies. In the Report of the 1946 Canadian Royal 
Commission on Espionage, the Commissioners had expressed 
confidence in the evidence of Soviet defector Gouzenko that 
Cominform was actively engaged in transforming Communist 
Parties throughout the world into fifth-column agencies for 
Soviet Russia.^ The import of these findings was reinforced 
by the pronouncements of some leading American statesmen that 
Russia would not launch a frontal attack on the Western 
Democracies while it could rely on 'subversive infiltration' 
by local Communists, and the capture of under-developed 
countries through the fostering of nationalist uprisings.
The Australian anti-Communist press after 1947 saw 
Australia as lying directly in the path of a Soviet expanionist 
move in the Pacific. Journalist Denis Warner wrote a series 
of articles for the Melbourne Herald in mid-1949 claiming 
that the military victory of the Chinese Communists and the 
revolutionary situations in Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China 
were all part of a Russian design for the Sovietisation of East 
Asia. Press editorials warned that what had happened in 
China 'could happen here', and Country Party leader Arthur 
Fadden, who himself could clearly see the 'red glow' of 
Asia from Australian shores, told his Party conference in May 
1949 :
... So carefully has the strategy been planned that 
Soviet Russia need not appear openly in the conflict 
until the final blow is struck. It is hoped eventually 
to Sovietise Australia by using local Communists through 
the method developed and perfected in China and now being 
put into practice along the South-East Asian peninsular.^
4. Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Espionage 
(Ottawa, 1946) pT 33.
5. Argus, 20 May 1949.
5The existence of an international Communist conspiracy seemed 
proven when a major London Dockers' strike 'coincided' with 
the Australian Coal Strike, and when Communist leaders in 
the principal Western nations simultaneously declared that 
in the event of a Capitalist war against the Soviet Union, 
their Parties would fight on the side of the Soviet forces.
A deluge of anti-Communist propaganda prompted an 
attack on the Australian Communist Party on two levels: 
public and governmental, or 'illegal' and legal. During the 
two years preceding the 1949 Federal Election, the public 
developed a feverish anxiety about the internal Communist 
problem. Anti-Labour forces persuaded many people that the 
Federal Government's policies for bank nationalisation and a 
national health scheme were part of a programme designed to 
'soften up' the country for a Communist coup. Mr. Menzies 
traversed the nation after his return from Europe at the 
end of 1948 telling receptive public audiences that the A.C.P. 
was 'organised for high treason' and that it was attempting 
to weaken Australia industrially as a prelude to handing it 
over to Moscow. A Canberra political journal speculated 
in March 1948 that if the Federal Labour Government continued 
to avoid legislating against the Communists, 'there is 
certain to be a group of citizens who will take the law into 
its own hands as soon as the anti-Communist ferment reaches 
a ripe stage'.^
The Federal Government did adopt some stringent 
measures to curb Communist Party activities during 1949, but 
by that stage the public response to anti-Communist propaganda 
was in full swing, and governmental action merely underlined 
for the people the wisdom of their own efforts to make social 
and political outlaws of the Communists. Numerous 
organisations in the community expelled Communists from their 
ranks and adopted new constitutions to sanction expulsion on
6. See for example: Australian Country Party, Election
Pamphlet 1949, The Red Twins - Communism, Socialism.
This put the alternatives to Australian voters in the 
following terms: 'Is the Australian coat of arms to be
our symbol under free enterprise, or is the kangaroo to 
be bludgeoned to death by the hammer, and the emu hacked 
to pieces by the sickle?
7. Age 18 January 1949; 3 May 1949.
8. Inside Canberra 18 March 1948.
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political grounds. Others issued declarations denying 
that they operated under Communist influence, and avowing 
their loyalty to Australian 'democratic values.' Public 
accusation and denial became the medium through which was 
expressed a growing mood of intolerance, an aggressive 
assertion of Australianism. It was a mood expressed also in 
acts of violence. Visiting Communist evangelists were 
forcibly expelled from some country towns by local inhabitants 
imbued with an impulse to protect their fellow-men from 
exposure to alien political doctrine; Communist Party book­
shops were the object of vandalism. Political meetings 
convened by the A.C.P. were frequently the scene of clashes 
between Communist speakers - defended by a 'vigilance corps' - 
and organised groups of disrupters among whom ex-servicemen 
predominated. On one such occasion at Bourke, Western 
Australia, in March 1949 a Communist was admitted to hospital 
with serious concussion.^ In the unions, the most important 
venue of the anti-Communist offensive, both Communists and 
Industrial Groupers showed an increasing tendency in the late 
1940's to resort to tactics of physical force in an attempt 
to over-awe their opponents.
One contributor to the Australian Quarterly in June 
1948 described the prevailing political atmosphere as 'a 
period of decay of democratic sentiment', and another declared 
that 'political intolerance is raging in Australia'.
Melbourne's 'freedom of speech controversy' in the early 
months of 1949 showed their comments to be apt. During 
February and March numerous municipal councils, including the 
Melbourne City Council, voted to cancel bookings of their 
town halls by the director of Australia-Soviet House, John 
Rodgers, who intended to give a series of public lectures 
based on his impressions gained during a recent visit to the 
Soviet Union. The R.S.L., a major pressure group behind the 
moves to prevent the use of 'civic facilities for the spreading
9. See Playford, op. cit., p. 137.
10. Australian Quarterly, vol. 20 no. 2 (June 1948):
J. Anderson, 'The Politics of Proscription', p. 7 and 
N. Cowper, 'The Menace of Communism', p. 20.
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of subversive propaganda', expelled two of its own officials 
for appearing on the public platform with Rodgers. A group 
of prominent Melbourne clergymen incurred the disapproval of 
the Victorian R.S.L.'s journal Mufti when they signed a 
letter to the Press drawing public attention to 'the denial 
of city halls to the representatives of citizens and 
organisations, organised disruptions of legitimate meetings, 
repeated failure of the police to prevent disruption of the 
meetings, and economic and social reprisals against individuals 
who have stood to affirm the right of free association and 
free speech'.^
According to a report in the Age, when John Rodgers 
gave a lecture in the Victorian country town of Shepparton, 
he was opposed by a demonstration of 400 returned soldiers 
from R.S.L. branches over a wide area of the Goulburn valley, 
whose loud and continual heckling completely drowned out his 
speech. Replying to criticism of this incident, an 
editorial in Mufti quoted the words of the President of the 
Shepparton R.S.L. branch: 'I was proud of the way in which 
my members behaved; there was not a single action that could 
have been taken exception to by the police. In fact, the 
police were highly complimentary about the part played by 
the R.S.L.'13 The President went on to explain the basis 
of R.S.L. opposition to Mr. Rodgers. 'The League has a ... 
regard for decency and public safety, and has striven to 
check speeches designed to form cells in this country to 
undermine its security and to lessen its ability to defend 
itself.'
While political activists among the general public 
took the law into their own hands, the Federal Labour 
Government was prodded by a voracious Opposition campaign 
into adopting a number of anti-Communist measures. Official 
A.L.P. policy had been strongly opposed to Communism since 
the formative years of the C.P.A. During the late 1930's
11. Argus, 6 April 1949
12. Age, 24 March 1949
13. Mufti, May 1949.
14. Ibid.
8when Australian Communists were attempting to penetrate the 
Labour Party and to make common cause with its members in 
the anti-war movement, and again in the immediate post-war 
years, the Federal A.L.P. distinguished itself by the 
passage of a series of resolutions aimed at preventing Labour 
men from sharing the public platform with Communists, and 
from participating in Communist front organisations. Left- 
wing A.L.P. members who defied these resolutions were expelled
1 cfrom their Party.
But in the political environment of 1948-49, such 
a record was inadequate as proof of genuine anti-Communism: 
the Labour Government remained sensitive to charges from the 
Liberal and Country Parties that it was 'hamstrung' on the 
Communist issue because it relied on the goodwill of 
Communist-dominated trade unions for electoral support; that 
in fact it had no serious argument with Communism because 
its own Socialist Objective was so closely allied with 
Communist aims. With the advent of election year, the 
Government took the initiative. It organised a new 
intelligence body (the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation) and tightened security control over government 
research establishments. It gaoled Communist Party officials 
for 'seditious utterances' and Communist trade unionists for 
contempt of the Arbitration Court. As a measure against the 
possibility of Communist fraud in trade union elections, it 
amended the Arbitration Act to provide for an Arbitration 
Court-controlled ballot where an election was shown to have 
been manipulated. Branding the Coal Strike as a Communist 
plot to sabotage the nation, it introduced National Emergency 
legislation which operated to 'freeze' Miners' Union funds and 
to prevent other unions from using their funds to support the 
strike. Eight Communist union officials were gaoled for a 
period of weeks for contravening this law, and their unions
15. See L.F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the
Commonwealth of Australia" 2nd Edition (Adelaide 1954) 
p~i 84; L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party 
1901-1951 (London 1955) p. 178; Playford, op. cit., 
pp. 12, 123.
9were heavily fined. The emergency legislation enabled the
Government to use the army as a strike-breaking force, and
to authorise Security raids on Communist Party headquarters
1in which large numbers of documents were seized.
The Federal Cabinet's drastic methods of crushing 
the Coal Strike - while producing bitter divisions within 
the Labour Party - certainly disproved allegations that the 
Communist Union bosses 'ran the Government'. But they did
nothing to ease the pressure of the anti-Government campaign. 
The dramatic denunciations of Communist treachery in 
Government Press advertisements during the course of the 
strike were subsequently put to effective use by the Opposition 
as proof that Labour's efforts to deal with Communism fell 
far short of the correct solution to the problem. As the 
Australian Constitutional League pointed out to readers of 
the Herald,
.... If the supreme government of the Commonwealth
is really serious in its denouncement of the "Reds" 
why hasn't it promptly used the adequate power at 
its disposal to protect the people from the menacing 
threat of which it warned them? The Government 
cannot be excused from such callous inaction in the 
face of its admission of the existence of a plot to 
destroy the nation . . . . 7
In the latter part of the 1940's the increasing
use of the Communist issue as a weapon to embarrass the 
Government had compelled Labour to engage in the argument 
over what kind of action should be taken against the Communist 
Party. It was a debate on methods only, for none of the
opposing parties disputed the existence or nature of the 
problem. As early as 1946 the Country Party decided that the 
A.C.P. should be declared an illegal organisation, although 
it was not until 1948 that the Federal Liberal Party fell 
into line with this policy. Previously, Mr. Menzies' 
attitude had been closer to that of the Labour Party: in
time of peace, Communism could be effectively dealt with
16. For a fuller account of the Labour Government's anti­
communist action, see G. Sawer, Australian Federal 
Politics and Law 1929-1949, pp. 187 f£.; L.F. Crisp, 
Ben Chifley (Melbourne 1961) pp. 356 ff.
17. Herald, 30 July 1949.
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'in the open'. But in March 1948 he thought that 'the time 
for tolerance [had] gone'18 and his Party altered its 
platform *to provide for the banning of Communists in 
Australia. The Opposition Parties thus joined forces to 
attack the Labour Government for its allegedly unrealistic 
and dangerously unconcerned attitude to the Communist problem.
Labour politicians argued consistently throughout 
the period against the banning of Communism. Prime Minister 
Chifley told Parliament in March 1948: 'The Government does
not propose to place a ban on any class of political 
philosophy or thought'll and was thereafter damned by his 
anti-Communist opponents for having declared that Communism 
was 'just an ordinary political philosophy'. The basis of 
Labour's point of view was probably practical rather than 
libertarian. News-Weekly, putting the Industrial Grouper 
view, explained the effect of a ban thus: 'The Party would
go undergound, be publicly martyred, would win a lot of 
support from liberal humanitarians, and would flourish 
accordingly'.20 Generally, Labour men argued that the 
experience of the 1940-42 ban had demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness of governmental repression; that Communists 
should be allowed to operate in the open where Security would 
find it easier to keep a check on their activities; and that 
the best method to contain the growth of Communism in the 
unions was for responsible, moderate unionists to vote 
Communist officials out of office. They claimed that 
ultimately Communism would be defeated only when the 
conditions in which it thrived - social and economic 
deprivation - were eliminated.
The demand for an official inquiry into Communist 
activities in Australia became a persistent feature of this 
debate, both inside and outside Parliament. The idea of a 
Commission on Communism seems to have been raised in the first
18. Sun, 13 March 1948
19. c .P .D . ; vo|. 196  ^ 4  M arch  j 9 4 3  , p. 3 6d
20. News Weekly, 2 July 1947. It should be noted that 
with the outbreak of the Korean War, News Weekly 
changed its policy to favour banning.
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instance by extreme right-wing organisations like the League 
of Rights and the Sane Democracy League. Several of their 
pamphlets produced in 1946 and 1947 discussed the findings of 
the Canadian Royal Commission on Espionage, and suggested 
that a parallel inquiry in Australia would unearth evidence of 
an Australian section of an international Communist spy­
ring. The writers exhibited a pre-occupation with the link 
between the Australian Association of Scientific Workers and 
a similar organisation in Canada, the chairman of which was 
implicated in the Canadian Commission's f i n d i n g s . in 
Federal Parliament at about the same time, two Opposition 
members (J.P. Abbot, Country Party, and A.G. Cameron,
Liberal Party) voiced demands for a Royal Commission which 
they apparently envisaged as an instrument for ferretting out 
evidence of Communist espionage in government scientific 
establishments.
These early proposals for a Commission were thus 
based directly on the Canadian model, but between 1947 and 
1949 individual members of the Federal and Victorian State 
Liberal Parties began to make regular requests in Parliament 
for the institution of an inquiry into Communism in its 
broader aspects. While still quoting the Canadian Royal 
Commission as an example, their pre-occupation widened to 
concern about a Communist security risk in the public service 
as a whole; and it was not merely the possibility of 
espionage, but the whole spectrum of Communist Party affairs 
which required investigation. In May 1947 Harold Holt,
M.H.R., urged upon Prime Minister Chifley the need for a 
public inquiry into the 'objectives and activites' of the 
A.C.P., and he remained the most unflagging proponent of/th& 
idea in Federal Parliament during the next two years. At
21. E.D. Butler, The Real Communist Menace: The Canadian
Royal Commission's Report on Espionage and other 
Communist Activities in Canada (Melbourne 1947); 
Betrayal - A Short History of Australia's Fifth Column 
(Sane Democracy League, Sydney, 1946); Traitors in 
Canada! How Many Here? (Melbourne 1947).
2 2 . C.P.D., vol. 191 (15 May 1947) pp. 2448-2452.
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first the Liberals advocated a Royal Commission as part of 
their 'bring Communism into the open' policy, their 
assumption being that the influence of Communist ideology 
would collapse when 'seen through' by the people. Communism 
flourished only because the Party succeeded in disguising 
from the ordinary 'decent' Australian the reality of its 
aims. An inquiry was needed, not to furnish the Government 
or Security Service with facts about the A.C.P. - for these 
were already known to them - but to demonstrate to the public 
the anti-democratic, subversive and alien nature of the Party. 
Some Liberal politicians continued to press for a Royal 
Commission even after Menzies initiated his campaign to 
outlaw the A.C.P., apparently the purpose now being to use the 
inquiry to convince the electorate that Australian Communism 
ought to be banned.
Small sections of the Labour and Country Parties 
supported the demand for a Royal Commission on the Communist 
Party, but the official attitude of both was, for different 
reasons, against it. While the leader of the Country Party
2 4in N.S.W. proposed such an inquiry on two occasions in 1948,
the more usual stand of his colleagues was to argue that
enough information was already available to warrant the
banning of Communism, and that an inquiry would serve only
to give additional publicity to the Communist cause. From a
very different starting point, the A.L.P. »reached the same
conclusion. As a Labour Party official writing for the Sydney
Morning Herald in October 1947 explained:
The Communist Party is not a mystery to the Labour 
Government or the Labour movement even if it is to 
the Liberal Party. A Royal Commission would not tell 
Labour anything it does not already know. [it] would 
be a complete waste of public funds and would very 
probably increase Communist influence rather than 
lessen it. The Communist Party lives on the publicity 
it gets from people who are supposed to oppose it, 
and a Royal Commission would undoubtedly be a free 
advertisement. 5^
23. A g e, 19 January 1949.
24. Sydney Morning Herald, 6 April 1948; 11 August 1948.
25. ibid, 16 October 1947.
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Chifley always argued that the Security Police had their 
finger securely on the pulse of the A.C.P., and that a 
Commission would interfere with their operations. Thus the 
request for a Communist inquiry from the 1948 annual 
conference of the A.L.P. Industrial Groups was turned down 
by the Federal Labour Government with equal firmness as 
were those requests which came from Liberal politicians.^
The successful unearthing of a Russian-directed 
Communist spy-ring in Canada was a major inspiration behind 
the Australian demands to investigate Communism. Despite 
the assertions of Eric Butler, director of the League of 
Rights, that there had been a conspiracy by Australian
9 7newspapers to suppress the findings of the Canadian inquiry, 
the event did receive considerable Press coverage at the time, 
and afterwards politicians never tired of quoting the 
Commissioners' conclusions during Parliamentary debates on 
the Communist issue. The United States' version of a public 
inquiry into Communism was given far less attention by 
Australian proponents of the idea. This might be explained 
partly in terms of the inapplicability of the Congressional 
Investigation to the Australian political system, and partly 
because by the late 1940's the un-American Activities 
Committee had been discredited - even in the eyes of the 
Australian anti-Communist Press - by its witch-hunting 
techniques.^  ®
Leaving aside the fact that the Canadian Commission 
had demonstrated that this form of investigation could be 
highly effective in discovering and publicising evidence of 
Communist misdeeds, it remains to be pointed out that in the 
1940's in Australia, the Royal Commission had become a very 
common device for dealing with controversial public issues.
26. Ibid, 5 April 1948.
27. Butler, op. cit., pp. 1, 13.
28. See Chap. 1, p. 38.
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In the State of Victoria particularly, Commissions frequently 
had a strong political flavour: They seemed to be regarded
as a general panacea, both for Opposition politicians seeking 
to pressurise their Government, and for governing Parties 
seeking to ease themselves out of delicate political 
situations. Since the demand for a public inquiry was 
virtually an automatic response to any serious issue in 
political life, it is hardly surprising that it featured so 
prominently in the Communism debate.
For more than three years, the idea of a Royal 
Commission on Communism was bandied about by an enormous 
variety of anti-Communist groups in Australia. But it was 
in Melbourne, the 'ideological' city, home of the 'Red 
University', headquarters of almost one-third^1“* of Australia's 
Communist population, and stronghold of the Roman Catholic 
'Movement' and A.L.P. Industrial Groupers, that such an inquiry 
was finally appointed. It was the creation of a Liberal 
Government in a State where Communists were numerically and 
industrially more powerful than anywhere else in Australia, 
with the possible exception of New South Wales. But N.S.W. 
was governed by the Labour Party. The only other State 
Governments in 1949 whose Party favoured the use of a public 
investigation as an anti-Communist measure were those of
29. D.H. Borchardt, Checklist of Royal Commissions, Select 
Committees of Parliament and Boards of Inquiry, Part III, 
Victoria 1856-1960. (Sydney, 1970). Introduction 
x-xii. See also the Australian Law Journal, vol. 28
no. 5 (September, 1954) pp. 229-30.
The political nature of Royal Commissions was reflected 
in the Victorian Judiciary's traditional opposition to 
the practice of government's appointing Judges to 
conduct them. This tradition dated back to the so-called 
'Irvine Memorandum' of 1923, when the Victorian Chief 
Justice (Sir William Irvine) in a letter to the Premier 
of that State expressed the view that Judges should not 
be commissioned to act in inquiries whose subjects were 
likely to attract public or Parliamentary controversy, 
as the effect would be to lower the standing of the 
Judiciary in the eyes of the community. For a discussion 
of this whole issue, see the Australian Law Journal, 
vol. 29 no. 4 (August, 1955) pp. 253-272.
30. Report, Victorian Royal Commission on the Communist 
Party, p. 43.
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South and Western Australia, and in these States Communist 
trade union influence was negligible. So Melbourne was to 
be the venue for Australia's first exercise in a public 
trial of the Communist Party. Deep ideological divisions 
in the politically-conscious section of its community might 
lead one to predict that the trial was also to be Australia's 
first exercise in Communist witch-hunting.
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CHAPTER ONE : THE APPOINTMENT OF A ROYAL COMMISSION
Those persons troubled by the Communist presence in 
the trade unions saw their fears materialise during the 1949 
Easter weekend in Melbourne. Two events brought the issue 
into the headlines of the Australian Press at that time: the
Victorian A.L.P. Easter Conference, and a series of newspaper 
articles which came to be known as the 'Sharpley exposures'. 
As Labour's delegates to the Conference converged upon the 
Trades Hall, billboards in Melbourne's streets proclaimed to 
the passers-by that they could read in the Saturday edition 
of the Herald the 'inside' story of the A.C.P. written by a 
recently defected top-ranking Party member. Perusal of the 
first of his seven articles revealed the ex-Communist to be 
Cecil Herbert Sharpley, until January 1949 a member of the 
Victorian State Executive of the A.C.P., and its charge d' 
affaires in the unions. Sharpley's allegations of Communist- 
rigged union ballots and other nefarious Party practices gave 
the Herald Australia's 'most sensational Press scoop for 
years', at least according to News Weekly .  ^ For many months 
an increasingly large amount of space had been devoted in 
Herald editorial comment to the industrial aspect of 
Communist Party activites, and in particular, to applauding 
the Industrial Groupers' point of view on the matter. 
Sharpley, with his specialised knowledge of the Party's 
presence in the unions, gave much credible support to the 
Herald's campaign; indeed, its Management could hardly have 
found a more appropriate and saleable source of information 
had it handpicked the defector itself.
I
By Easter, Sharpley had been under contract to write
2his story for approximately two months. Probably seeing an
1. News W e e k l y, 27 April 1949.
2. C.H. Sharpley, The Great Delusion, (London 1952), p. 122. 
See also Royal Commission transcript, p. 1195.
17
opportunity to enhance the articles' public impact, the Herald 
timed their release to coincide with proceedings of the A.L.P. 
Conference, which proved to be, like its predecessor of 1948, 
a forum for bitter allegations of Communist-inspired ballot 
rigging in the unions and of Communist fellow-travelling in 
the A.L.P. The twin issues of ballot rigging and the 
influence of the A.C.P. in the trade union movement dominated 
the 1949 proceedings more than at any previous Conference; 
and out of the clamour of accusation and recrimination there 
came a resolution calling upon the Federal Government to 
legislate for 'clean' union ballots. But nothing which 
emerged from the Conference was in itself especially startling 
to the public: the A.L.P. had been squabbling about these
same matters for years. What transformed the events of that 
Easter into the material of political crisis was the fact 
that the allegations levelled against Communist unionists 
by Grouper delegates to the Conference were simultaneously 
given precise confirmation by Sharpley's articles. And the 
daily Press, in according enormous prominence to the affair, 
naturally pointed out that Sharpley was in a position to know 
the truth.
Hard upon the Press furore produced by these 
revelations of Communist Party malpractice came the announce­
ment (on Easter Monday, April 18) that the Victorian Government 
intended to appoint a Royal Commission on Communism. Premier 
Hollway had almost certainly known of the forthcoming Herald 
articles when he had, the previous week, responded 
sympathetically to the request from a Liberal backbencher 
for such an inquiry. In the Legislative Assembly on the 
evening of April 13, Mr. E.R. Reynolds (L.C.P., Toorak), 
a practicing barrister who frequently conducted legal work 
for the Herald's solicitor, told the House he believed that 
'evidence exists which can be collected and made available 
for such a tribunal, which will tend to show that the 
[Communist] activities to which I refer are disruptive, 
sinister and probably seditious'. In reply Mr. Hollway 
expressed the hope that 'as a result of inquiries already 
in course', sufficient evidence would be unearthed upon
'STANDBY TO WINDWARD"
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which to base a Commission. If this did not immediately
appear to be a 'set-up' exchange, it must surely have done
so the following afternoon, when the Herald notified its
readers that the first instalment of an exposure of
Communism coming 'from the inner councils' of the A.C.P.
would be published on Easter Saturday, April 16.^
The Press forecast that the appointment of a Royal
Commission would be speedy; but Hollway's determination that
the inquiry should be placed 'on the highest and very best
judicial plane' through the aquisition of a Supreme Court
5Judge as Commissioner, occasioned considerable delay. When 
approached by the Victorian Attorney-General, Chief Justice 
Sir Edmund Herring drew attention to the Victorian Judiciary's 
long-standing tradition of opposition to the participation 
of its members in 'political' inquiries. Sir Edmund expressed 
his reluctance to make a Judge available.^ Candidates were 
sought unsuccessfully in other States, the choice probably 
being limited to those under Liberal Governments, due to 
Labour's official policy of opposition to the appointment 
of the Royal Commission. The alternative of a County Court 
Judge was apparently rejected by the Victorian Cabinet as 
inadequate for its purpose.^
The Government also hesitated over the framing of 
the Commission's terms of reference because libel writs 
had been taken out in the Supreme Court by several members of
3
3. V.P.D., vo1. 229, 13 April 1949, p. 432.
4. Herald, 14 April 1949. Hollway had at least one source 
of information about the affairs of the Herald and 
Weekly Times Ltd. in his friendship with J.F. Williams, 
Editor-in-Chief of the Herald. Katherine West in 
Power in the Liberal Party, (Melbourne 1965). p. 19, 
describes Williams as one of Hollway's 'boon companions'.
5. Argus, 21 April 1949.
6. V.P.D., vol. 229, 11 May 1949, p. 937.
7. Western Australia and Tasmania were the only other 
Liberal States at the time.
8. Argus, 3 May 1949.
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the Communist Party against Sharpley and the Herald and 
Weekly Times Ltd.^ There was considerable speculation by 
the Press as to the possibility that these would make the 
all-embracing inquiry desired by the Premier sub-judice. 
Indeed, Attorney-General T.D. Oldham recommended to Cabinet 
on May 2 that the inquiry should be limited to specific 
charges against the Communist Party in order to avoid 
trespassing on the scope of any Supreme Court hearings that 
might have eventuated. But his report was over-ruled. Mr. 
Hollway's Ministers voted to legislate to 'overcome the 
technicalities put forward to prevent the Commission'.^
Thus for the first time in the history of Victoria a Royal 
Commission was set up under Act of Parliament.
The Act provided for the appointment of a Victorian 
Supreme Court Judge 'as sole Commissioner', with strengthened 
powers for combatting contempt; and set out the inquiry's 
terms of reference, giving Parliamentary sanction to their 
extraordinary width.^ The Legislative Assembly passed the 
Bill for the Commission with one amendment (an addition to 
the terms of reference) on May 11, and the Council followed 
suit on May 18. Finally, on May 19 the Act was proclaimed, 
accompanied by the announcement that Sir Charles Lowe had 
undertaken to conduct the inquiry.
9. Writs were taken out in the Victorian Supreme Court on 
29 April 1949 claiming unspecified damages for libel. 
Sharpley's allegations were to provide the framework for 
the terms of reference of the Commission, and thus the 
possibility was created that the Commission would be 
inquiring into similar matters and taking similar evidence 
to that which might be simultaneously presented to the 
Supreme Court in proceedings relating to the writs. It
is standard legal practice in this eventuality for the 
decision as to whether a Commission should temporarily 
suspend its hearings to be left to the discretion of the 
Commissioner.
In the event, the libel writs were withdrawn before 
they were considered by the Court - a fact which seemed 
to confirm the opinion shared by many anti-Communists 
that the writs had been simply an attempt to obstruct the 
the Royal Commission by restricting the scope of its 
inquiry.
10. Age, 3 May 1949; Press statement by the Premier, Argus,
3 May 1949.
11. Royal Commission (Communist Party) Act, 1949: Act of the
Victorian Parliament, no. 5366. A more detailed outline 
of its provisions is given on pp. 50-52 of this chapter. 
SEE APPENDIX (A) FOR A REPRODUCTION OF THE ACT.
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THE SHARPLEY STORY
II
Cecil Herbert Sharpley, the man largely responsible
for this frantic political activity, was the son of an
English clergyman, and a 'little brother' immigrant to
Australia in 1928 at the age of twenty. A political education
of Depression unemployment and a short spell in the Labour
Party led Sharpley in 1935 into the C.P.A. During the period
of war-time disruption he rose quite rapidly in the Party's
ranks, gaining election in 1946 to the Victorian State
Executive as head of its 'industrial' sub-committee, a position
12based on his quite extensive experience in the trade unions. 
Although not widely known by the Victorian public as a 
Communist, he was prominent in union circles throughout the 
1940's. In January 1949 , after a period of disillusionment 
with Communism which he claims in his autobiography had its 
origins as far back as 1937, Sharpley secretly left the 
Party. His exit passed unremarked in the Communist Press, 
and most rank and file Party members did not learn of it 
until April when the Herald advertised the forthcoming Sharpley 
articles.^ The Guardian then responded with the statement 
that Sharpley had been expelled from the Party the previous 
January for 'theft, lying, drunkness and gross immorality'.15
Soon after leaving the Party, Sharpley brought 
himself to the attention of the Chairman of the Herald and 
Weekly Times Ltd., Sir Keith Murdoch, in a letter 'setting 
forth certain proposals' on the grounds that he possessed an
12. Sharpley had been secretary of the Communist fraction 
in the Federated Clerks Union in 1936; Assistant 
Secretary of the Victorian Munition Workers' Union in 
1942; and later, Victorian Assistant Secretary of the 
Federated Ironworkers' Association. C.H. Sharpley, The 
Great Delusion, pp. 18, 32, 34.
13. Ibid, p. 24.
14. Interview, Rex Mortimer, Canberra 12 March 1971.
15. Guardian, 22 April 1949.
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abundance of information which could prove to be of interest
to the Herald .^  His former position in the Party was
probably in itself sufficient bait for an anti-Communist
newspaper. A Herald journalist was despatched forthwith to
meet Sharpley 'at 8 p.m. beneath the second street-light
west of the main pub in Shepparton', the Victorian country
town where Sharpley had gone into hiding from his past 
17comrades. In March 1949 Sharpley returned to Melbourne
with a contract to write a series of articles for the Herald
revealing the inside story of Communism as he knew it, with
emphasis on union ballot-rigging and industrial disruption.
He was promptly installed in an hotel at Brighton Beach with
the same journalist, R. Gilmore, to help him write his story
and an ex-Police Officer, also provided by the Herald, to
18act as bodyguard.
Sharpley's autobiography paints a drama-laden 
picture of his sojourn at the hotel. 'I lived quietly under 
an assumed name, going out only after dark', behaviour made 
necessary, he explained, by the danger of physical attack
19from Communists, should they have discovered his whereabouts. 
Despite these adverse conditions, the combined efforts of 
Sharpley and Gilmore produced seven articles ready for 
publication by the Easter weekend. According to Gilmore, 
they were the result of his 'reworking' of Sharpley's drafts 
to add 'squirts of local colour' and to transform them into
16. Sharpley in cross-examination to Hill, R.C.T. 1195.
17. R. Gilmore to V. Rastrick, 20 May 1971.
18. Sharpley, op. cit., p. 122..
19. ibid. According to Sharpley, after the Royal Commission 
commenced sitting, 'the authorities ... took the view that 
[one police-officer] was not enough, that the danger
with which I was threatened was sufficiently serious to 
make necessary the mounting of a guard of four armed 
detectives. Thus I had a small army to protect me, two 
units of which slept in the same room with me with loaded 
revolvers. I was never permitted to be alone.' (The 
Great Delusion, p. 127). The only concrete instances of 
'attache' however, other than threats in the Communist 
Press' and slogans painted on buildings, were those quoted 
later by Sharpley in evidence at the Royal Commission: 
two occasions when he had been approached by Communists 
in the street and vocally abused. (R.C.T. 2650-1).
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saleable journalese. The Herald's editorial policy apparently
did not contribute any political slant to the articles. He
states that 'the only directives that came to me from the
Editor of the Herald were to minimise the possibility of
factual error that might enable the A.C.P. to say "as he's
wrong in this verifiable fact, how can you believe anything
he writes?"'2® Subsequently, Herald solicitor B.K. Donaldson
checked the articles to safeguard against a possible libel
challenge, and caused certain passages to be re-worded in a
legally safer way. Much later, during the Royal Commission
proceedings, the barrister in charge of the case against the
Communist Party, R.R. Sholl, produced the original drafts
of Sharpley's story, revealing that a number of references to
21the names of people had been, as he called it, 'toned down'. 
Sharpley himself, in one of his published articles, drew 
attention to this procedure. 'I have omitted many names and 
details', he wrote, 'but I could give them to a Royal
22Commission or other properly-constituted legal authority.'
The articles were written in a sensational style 
appropriate to Sharpley's role as Australia's first real 
Communist defector on the pattern of those produced by the
20. R. Gilmore to V. Rastrick, 24 June 1971. The 'inside 
story' of the Herald's dealings with Sharpley is given 
in C. Edwards, The Editor Regrets (Melbourne 1972), pp. 
119-121. Edwards, who was assistant editor of the 
Herald at the time of Sharpley's defection, describes
a 'cloak and dagger assignment' involving secret meet­
ings with Sharpley and with the Managements of other 
major State newspapers in which the Herald wished to 
publish his 'memoirs'. The main problem, as indicated 
by Gilmore, was the potential libels they contained, 
and according to Edwards the chairman of directors of 
the Sydney Sun 'shied away in horror' when shown 
Sharpley's material. 'Too dangerous, was the verdict.' 
After a painstaking check on the factuality of the 
articles, the Herald made one serious slip in its 
publication of the first instalment on Easter Saturday.
A photograph of Australian Building on the corner of 
Elizabeth Street and Flinders Lane outlined the wrong set 
of windows as those of the Communist Party headquarters. 
Edwards writes: 'During the afternoon, an agitated dress­
maker rang to complain that the windows on the ninth floor 
facing Flinders Lane, that we had identified as the 
Communist Party's were hers; customers would think her 
business was a Communist front. Too late, I remembered .. 
[that the A.C.P. offices] faced Elizabeth Street, not 
Flinders Lane.'
21. R.C.T. 3575. 22. C.H. Sharpley, I was a Communist
Leader, (Melbourne 1949), p. 12.
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Cold War in America. Grouped together later by the Herald as
a booklet predictably entitled I Was a Communist Leader, they
appeared in the Press under captions such as "How Reds Call
Industrial Tune', 'Strike Action and Ballot Swindles' and
'How Moscow Cracks the Whip'. Sharpley described his story
in an introduction as one of 'perverted ideals, of dishonesty,
of rigged union ballots, of moral and physical pressure on
weak men'. He outlined a peculiar combination of ubiquitous
Party power and personally weak leaders. He endowed every
activity with a cloak and dagger aura, recounting the 'secret
deliberations' of the Party Executive as it plotted
revolution 'in the cold Party rooms high above Elizabeth 
23Street'.
As requested by the Herald management, the bulk 
of the articles were devoted to Communist activities in the 
industrial sphere. Sharpley affirmed that most Australian 
strikes during the 1940's had been initiated and directed 
not by the unions but by the leaders of the Communist Party, 
and that in pursuing these strikes the Party did not aim to 
better working-class conditions but to 'create poverty, 
unemployment and discontent' from which it could profit 
politically. All its operations within the trade unions, 
he said, were aimed at retarding industrial production, 
weakening Australia's defences and lowering the worker's real 
wage - being part of a plan to aid and abet the interests 
of Soviet Russia in its world-wide conspiratorial war against 
the forces of Democracy. Ultimately, 'my comrades wanted 
to see social reform instituted through an Australian Soviet 
police state.'
Sharpley's detailed evidence concerning the 
Communist Party's attempts to tamper with ballots in several 
Victorian trade unions (notably the Builders' Workers' 
Industrial Union, the Blacksmiths' Society and the Federated 
Engine-Drivers' and Firemen's Association) was quite 
impressive.^  Other allegations, while prefaced by very
23. I b i d , p. 2.
24. Sharpley alleged that the A.C.P. had contemplated or 
attempted rigging ballots (sometimes successfully) in the 
B.W.I.U., the Ironworkers' Union, Postal Workers' Union, 
Blacksmiths' Society, F.E.D.F.A., Amalgamated Engineering 
Union, Boiler-makers' Society and Waterside Workers' 
Federation.
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damaging statements about the Party's underlying motives, 
had less substance. For instance, much emphasis was placed 
on the claim that Communists in certain key industrial 
establishments were organised to sabotage Australia's 
industrial and defence potential in the event of war with 
Russia. A 'handful' of Communists at the R.A.N. Dockyard 
at Williamstown had 'infected hundreds of ordinary decent 
Australians' (their fellow workers) and were thus instituting 
a go-slow policy in the building of the destroyer Anzac.
The only fact offered as proof of the Communist presence in 
the Dockyard was that Sharpley himself obtained a job there 
for two weeks at the end of 1948, and left 'without the 
Navy knowing I was a Red'. Sharpley also described a Party 
plan to control the S.E.C. plant at Yallourn, from where 'we 
could turn out nearly every light in Melbourne'. The 
Communist sabotage in this case amounted to an unsuccessful 
attempt to get the Party's choice elected to the position of 
Victorian Secretary of the F.E.D.F.A., the major union at 
Yallourn.
In similar vein, Sharpley exposed some of the A.C.P.'s 
front organisations - the Eureka Youth League, Australia- 
Soviet House, and the New Housewives Association - and named 
leading Party members connected with these bodies. One 
article devoted a section to 'Party friends' and 'useful 
liberal-minded citizens' including an academic (Professor 
Woodruff, University of Melbourne) and two clergymen (Canon 
Maynard, St. Peter's Church, Eastern Hill, and the Rev.
William Bottomley, Unitarian Church, Melbourne). In another 
article dealing with Moscow's control of the A.C.P., Sharpley 
claimed that the Party received its directives via Cominform 
publications, Moscow Radio, and direct orders to Australian 
Communist leaders on visits to the Soviet. One of the 
Party's alleged 'Moscow-dictated' policies was to aid 
revolutionary bandits in Malaya and Indonesia. Sharpley's 
only proofs that it was 'working towards a Red Asia' 
consisted of the fact that an A.C.P. Congress had adopted 
a resolution urging Malayan Communists to wage a revolutionary 
struggle against British imperialist interests, and that 
Communist-led unions had imposed a ban on the use of 
Australian ports by Dutch ships. A discrepancy between
25
Sharpley's actual information on the Party's activities, 
and the sinister interpretation he placed upon them, ran 
through all of the articles. Nevertheless in most cases the 
weakness tended to be obscured by a confident tone and 
fluent style, giving rise to the impression that Sharpley 
possessed extensive knowledge of the workings of the Party.
To those readers already partially convinced of Communist 
treachery, his allegations must have seemed irrefutable. And 
of course Sharpley could always defend himself from the critics 
by pointing out that proof of the allegations could not be 
furnished within the confined scope of journalism.
With the publication of his articles, the Herald
launched Sharpley into a brief career of public prominence.
For his original seven articles, and several more which
appeared in subsequent weeks, he was paid a sum of money which,
as Mr. Justice Lowe later remarked, 'must have seemed to him 
2 5munificent'. The Herald's Chief-of-Staff interviewed 
Sharpley for a commercial radio broadcast which was trans­
mitted to stations in most Australian states and filmed for 
a Movietone newsreel. His talents as a public speaker were 
sought for a variety of functions including the annual 
dinner of the Overseas League, a monthly luncheon of the 
Victorian Institute of Advertising, and even the Melbourne 
Wesley Church's 'Pleasant Sunday Afternoon Service'.26 The 
public queued outside Melbourne's No. 1 High Court for his 
appearance as witness at the Royal Commission, and devoured 
articles such as Truth's front-page story on Mrs. Veronica 
Sharpley's maintenance case against her husband: 'The
Private Life of the Sharpleys - Even His Wife Doesn't Know
25. Royal Commission Report, p. 7. In an editorial note 
in August 1949 the Herald claimed that total payments 
(not then finalised) would not exceed ilOOO. (Herald 
5/8/49.) According to Sharpley, in the contract with 
the Herald the agreement was that he would be paid i 10 
for each of the seven articles. 'In October [1949] I 
was paid a very much larger sum because I had written 
additional articles for this newspaper, and because they 
considered them of a higher standard than they had 
earlier expected.' (The Great Delusion, p. 132).
26. Herald, 13 August 1949, and 6 June 1949;
Guardian, 17 June 1949.
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Ex-Red's Pay on Herald Stories'.^ Sharpley apparently enjoyed 
his newly-found notoriety. In his autobiography he describes 
the 'violent rush of abuse' from the Communist Party:
'factory walls proclaimed my ill-fame; and those Melbourne 
citizens dashing to work of mornings in their trams might see 
my character pithily outlined on railway bridges'. Of the 
numerous invitations he received to speak in public he writes,
'It was all wonderful while it lasted, and I was happy and
2 8exhilerated in the feeling that I was being of use to mankind'.
POLITICAL limelight also brought Sharpley a considerable 
amount of adverse criticism, the most vociferous of which 
came from his erst-while comrades. Counter-attacking their 
'renegade', the Communists asserted that Sharpley had left the 
Party not on a stand of political principle, but following his 
expulsion for various misdemeanours including the theft of J?175 
from Party funds, and also for leading a degenerate private 
life. As a witness at the Royal Commission, Sharpley 
admitted that his record with the Party had been 'in bad 
standing', but his description of the manner of his departure 
(which the Communist lawyers did not challenge) would seem to 
indicate that his 'expulsion' was simply confirmation of what 
was already fact. The Guardian dismissed Sharpley's most 
serious charge against the Party thus: 'During the latter
stages of his Party membership he on several occasions
27. Truth, 30 April 1949. The Sharpleys were separated after 
about May 1948. Mrs. Sharpley, a member of the Communist 
Party, was represented in the case by A.C.P. lawyers 
E.F. Hill and E.A.H. Laurie. In the light of the Party's 
reaction to the setting up of the Royal Commission (as 
evidenced in Guardian articles and the initiation of the 
Supreme Court writs) it is probable that the event of 
the maintenance case in April 1949 was part of the 
Party's campaign to discredit Sharpley as a potential 
Royal Commission witness.
28. Sharpley, The Great Delusion, pp. 123-5.
29. Guardian, 22 April 1949. One incident quoted by the 
Communist Press as evidence of Sharpley's moral 
degeneration was his conviction by a Melbourne magistrate 
of an offence 'committed in particularly disgusting 
circumstances'. The offence, not described by the 
Guardian, was in fact nothing more serious than urination 
in a public place late at night.
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proposed that union ballots be faked. These proposals were 
categorically rejected. Sharpley's attitude on this matter 
was one of the reasons for his expulsion'. His articles 
were supposed to have been 'ghosted' by a Herald journalist, 
known to be an agent of the secret police, so as to accord 
with the Herald's most sensationalist anti-Communist line. 
'Experience of Sharpley's latter period in the Communist 
Party reveals that he would do anything for money. He is now 
doing "anything" for Sir Keith Murdoch's money', said the
O 1
Guardian. The image of Sharpley which all Communist 
publications sought to project was that of a turncoat, 
symbolised in cartoons by the figure of a rat with malicious 
eye and venomous tooth.
Nor was this type of comment confined to Sharpley's
Communist opponents. In the House of Representatives, W.G.
Turnbull (Liberal, Victoria) described him as a man who 'rats
3 2on his cobbers' and is paid to do so; and T.W. White 
(Liberal, Victoria) expressed the opinion that since the 
Communist Party was made up of 'dupes, knaves and traitors', 
Sharpley must fall 'into one category or another'. But 
much of the anti-Communist opinion was pre-occupied with the 
idea that he might in reality still be a Communist. The 
Director of the Victorian League of Rights, Eric Butler, 
thought for instance that 'the most important aspect of ex- 
Communist Cecil Sharpley's recent series of articles on 
Communism is ... that Mr. Sharpley says that his Socialist 
views remain unmodified'.^  The response of the Federal 
Minister for the Navy echoed a common anti-Communist 
suspicion that the proclaimed ex-Communist merely pretends to 
renounce his Party as a ruse to dupe his political enemies.
In denying Sharpley's allegations about Communists at the 
Williamstown Dockyard, Mr. Riordan also took the opportunity
30. Guardian, 22 April 1949.
31. Ibid.
32. C.P.D. vol. 202, 26 May 1949, p. 223.
33. C.P.D. vol. 204, 23 September 1949, p. 559.
34. Argus, 3 May 1949.
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to equate Liberal political aims with those of the A.C.P. He 
told Federal Parliament:
A pertinent demonstration of the unholy alliance 
that exists between the Communists and the 
Opposition is provided by the publication in the 
Press of the articles supposed to have been 
written by an alleged ex-Communist named Sharpley ... 
Sharpley went to the Melbourne Herald as a 
Communist or self-confessed ex-Communist, first to 
support the attack of the Leader of the Opposition 
on the Government for its alleged failure to deal 
with the Communists ... and [second] to carry out 
an instruction from the Communist Party. 5^
But neither critics in Parliament nor the daily Press seemed
to carry their disapproval of Sharpley into their evaluation
of the worth of his writings. The Catholic Advocate alone
cast some doubts on the possible value of the articles because
of Sharpley's Communist past; it concluded, however, that his
personal character did not necessarily invalidate the 'first
rate importance of his revelations in the public interest'.
Political commentators were eager to point out that 
Sharpley's articles said nothing that had not been said many 
times in preceding years by anti-Communists on the public 
platform. The Advocate recorded triumphantly that the 
information they contained 'has been publicised by Catholic 
leaders and the Catholic Press when newspapers like the Herald 
were still printing Communist-slanted news, and even lauding 
the "gallant Russian ally"'. And Labour members in Federal 
Parliament claimed that 'any good Labour Party man' could have 
told the public what Sharpley had told them. Most commentators 
seemed to be in agreement, nevertheless, that Sharpley's 
story had real significance because it provided authoritative 
confirmation from within the Party itself of facts which until 
that time could always be dismissed as mere propaganda.
35. C.P.D., vol. 202, 1 June 1949, p. 371.
Comments in Federal Parliament about Sharpley as a person 
(as distinct from the 'public service' of his articles) 
were almost without exception adverse. In the Victorian 
Parliament there were very few personal comments of 
any kind made about Sharpley, debate showing far more 
pre-occupation with the issue of the Royal Commission.
36. Advocate, 28 April 1949.
37. Ibid.
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In addition, and just as importantly, the information had 
captured public attention through wide circulation in the news 
media. Virtually all the discussion about the articles 
kept within the context of Communist activities in the trade 
unions, urging the pressing need for legislation to curb 
these. Pressmen and politicians were unanimous in their 
expectation that the articles would help to dispel the apathy 
of 'unthinking' unionists, and spur them on towards a more 
hardened opposition to the Reds.
The major impact of Sharpley's allegations (in
conjunction with the similar but less precise revelations
of the Victorian A.L.P. Conference) was felt on trade union
politics. Sharpley heaped fresh fuel on the conflict which
had smouldered between the Melbourne Trades Hall Council and
the leadership of militant unions since the Essential
Services dispute of the previous November. Industrial Groups
found in Sharpley's articles additional substance for their
attack on Communist union executives, which they pursued
with renewed vigour. The Trades Hall Council enlisted the
services of Sharpley in an inquiry instituted to examine his
charges concerning affiliated unions, but some Communist-led
unions refused to co-operate with it. A joint statement issued
by militant unions denounced Sharpley's articles as 'figments
of a distorted mind' which aimed at dividing union leadership
39and furthering the policies of the Industrial Groups. The 
Secretary of the Painters' Union (D.D. Thomson) alleged that 
the Trades Hall investigation was loaded against one section 
of the trade union movement, having been initiated as an 
instrument to 'white-wash friends and smear e n e m i e s ' O n e  
union official, the Secretary of the Federated Engine-Drivers' 
and Firemen's Union, resigned from his position in response
38. News Weekly probably best summed-up the general Press 
attitude in its comment that 'The Sharpley story ... 
owes its importance not so much to what it tells as to 
its source and the time at which it has appeared'. News 
Weekly, 27 April 1949.
39. Tribune, 27 April 1949.
40. Argus, 13 May 1949.
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to Sharpley's allegation that he had been elected in a rigged 
ballot. He was subsequently reinstated after being cleared of 
complicity.^  ^
The turmoil affected an even wider spectrum of 
Melbourne society, with numerous people accused of harbouring 
Communist sympathies clamouring for the opportunity to make 
a public denial. Mr. John Rodgers, Director of Australia- 
Soviet House, wrote to each of the newspapers which had 
published the Sharpley articles stating his refutation of the 
allegation that the policy of his organisation was decided in 
concert with the Communist Party. The Reverend William 
Bottomley, another of Sharpley's fellow-travellers, assured 
the Herald 'I detest [the Communists'] cunning, their 
"technique", and their aims of violent revolution', and 
claimed that he was well-known as their opponent.^ Olympic 
athlete Shirley Strickland also felt it necessary to write 
to the Herald to deny that she had ever been a Communist, 
although Sharpley's reference to her had been as a 'non- 
Communist member' of the Eureka Youth League.^ Other people 
lost their jobs following 'exposure' by Sharpley, the Herald 
setting the trend by dismissing from its staff five journalists 
named as Communist Party associates/5 Mr. John Bennett 
(A.L.P. candidate for the Federal Elections) voluntarily 
resigned from his position as compere of a commercial radio 
programme, 'Labour's Views on the News' - until such time, 
he later told the Royal Commission, as he could clear himself
41. Argus, 29 April 1949.
42. Argus, 22 April 1949.
43. Herald, 23 April 1949.
44. Herald, 17 May 1949.
45. Herald, 6 July 1949. Herald Chairman Sir Keith Murdoch 
encouraged others in the publishing world to take similar 
action. According to Clem Christeson (Editor of Meanjin), 
Murdoch rang Specialty Press and informed the printer of 
Meanjin that it was 'an under-cover Communist rag'. As
a result Christeson was told by his printer that Specialty 
Press would no longer print his magazine, 'and what's 
more, son, I'll make certain, as President of the 
Master Printers' Association, that you don't get your 
magazine printed anywhere else in Melbourne'. (C. 
Christeson to H. McQueen, 8 October 1971).
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of Sharpley's charge that he put forward propaganda 'applauded' 
by the Communist Party.^ in yet another case, the State 
Council of the Shop Assistants' Union suspended Mrs. E. Morley 
from her post as union organiser 'pending further investigations' 
into the allegation that she had been helpful to the Party. ^
In the R.S.L. and other organisations named as Communist 
spheres of influence, Sharpley reinforced a purge-mentality.
The Secretary of the Victorian Police Association, for 
instance, suggested that the Police Department should search
4 8the Force for Communists and 'appropriately deal with them'.
Prominent figures in Federal politics also joined 
in the melee. Sharpley's allegation concerning Communist 
sabotage of Australia's defence installations, and a vague 
reference to the organisation of Communists in the C.S.I.R.O., 
were all that were needed to focus attention on national 
security, the lack of which the Opposition had been lamenting 
for the last two years. The Director-General of Labour's 
newly-formed A.S.I.O. recommended to the Government that 
action should be taken against Communists and fellow- 
travellers in the Commonwealth Public Service.^ H.E. Holt, 
M.H.R., commented on the obvious need for an urgent review of 
safeguards in Commonwealth civil offices, research and 
defence departments if a leading Communist could walk into a 
naval dockyard and obtain employment without being challenged.^  
But Sharpley's story about Williamstown was energetically 
denied by the Minister for the Navy. Mr. Riordan told the 
House of Representatives that the Navy Department had been 
aware of the presence and identity of Sharpley while he worked 
there, and that the Government had no evidence of Communist 
sabotage at Williamstown. In Victoria the chairman of the 
State Electricity Commission also felt obliged to make a
46. RCT. 2301.
47. Age, 5 May 1949.
48. A g e, 1 June 1949.
49. Argus, 25 April 1949.
50. Herald, 26 April 1949.
51. C .P .D ., vol. 202, 24 May 1949 p.
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Statement: the S.E.C. had always taken adequate precautions
to prevent 'subversive influences' from sabotaging power 
stations.
WHAT can be said about the real character of the man behind 
this barrage of accusation and counter-accusation? A 
tentative attempt to define Sharpley's psychological make-up 
is worthwhile not only because of its intrinsic interest, but 
particularly because the case against the Communist Party 
pursued in the Royal Commission came to rely so heavily upon 
his capabilities as a witness. Sharpley's autobiographical 
work, The Great Delusion, published by Heinemann in 1952 
after he had returned to England, is the most revealing source 
of information about him. Even more pronouncedly than his 
newspaper articles, it displays at many points a neurotic and 
paranoid mentality typical of the ex-Communist public 
informant.
Studies by Richard Hofstadter and H.L. Packer of 
the ex-Communist witness have noted their tendency to 
substitute .one set of moral absolutes for another, a process 
by which the old gods are converted into demons while losing 
none of their original potency. ^ 3 sharpley's new God was 
shown at the close of The Great Delusion to be the Christian 
God, and thus his career had enscribed a full circle from the 
time when, at the age of 19, he abandoned an intention to 
take Holy Orders.^ jn his newspaper articles and in 
evidence at the Royal Commission, Sharpley's reunion with 
religion was not made explicit. Rather, he expressed a 
generalised moral fervour, his period in the Communist Party 
being represented as an error - an 'evil' in fact - from 
which he had finally escaped to embrace the virtues of 
Democracy and Humanity as the guiding lights of his new life.
52. Argus, 22 April 1949.
53. R. Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, 
and Other Essays (London, 1966) p. 35;
H.L. Packer, Ex-Communist Witnesses, (California 1962)
p. 216.
54. Sharpley, The Great Delusion, p. 147. Sharpley's closing
sentence reads 'There remains only the return to God', 
curiously similar to the last line in Heinemann's earlier 
publication of the autobiography of British ex-Communist 
Douglas Hyde: 'But one thing is certain: my God has
not failed'. D. Hyde, I Believed, (London, 1950) p. 285.
Cecil Herbert Sharpley, 1949.
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Sharpley's picture of the Communist Party showed it as the
very antithesis of such ideals. He claimed that his
disenchantment with the organisation followed a gradual,
painful realisation that the leaders in whom he had put his
faith sought nothing better than the negation of human rights,
the disruption of the Australian labor movement, and a
'victorious Russian war'; in short, the Party rejected by
Sharpley was 'evil, undemocratic, and conspicuously un-
Australian'.^ The most immediate cause of his decision to
leave the Party, Sharpley told the Royal Commission, was the
approbation by its officials - in particular, Ted Hill - of
tactics of violence, intimidation and ballot rigging in trade
5 6union affairs, with which Sharpley claimed he disagreed.
His writings exhibited a further characteristic 
common to the ex-Communist witness, that of attributing to 
himself a prominent part in Party malpractices. In portraying 
an all-powerful and malevolent leadership, he took care to 
place himself at the centre of its operations. The anti­
communist mentality tends to reason that the statements of 
an ex-Communist must surely be candid if he is willing to 
thereby blacken his own name; and yet the subtle psychological 
benefits which accrue to him from this style of confession 
ought not to be overlooked. The more 'evil' he admits to 
having practised in the past, the better enhanced is his 
present virtue. Once having opted for the straight and narrow 
path of Christian morality, then the fact that he is unafraid 
to confess openly to heinous misdeeds makes him all the more 
admirable a figure. At the same time, the image of himself 
as one of the centre-pieces in a potent revolutionary plot 
gives added glory. Finally, there is the undeniable fact 
that the blacker he makes his story, the more valuable it 
becomes to his market, the anti-Communist Press. It is 
difficult to avoid the suspicion that these factors were 
operative at least to some degree in Sharpley's confessions.
In The Great Delusion, he explained his motives for testifying
Sharpley, I Was a Communist Leader, pp. 3, 6.55.
56. R.C.T. 762, (Sharpley to R.R. Sholl in examination-in- 
chief) .
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publicly about the Communist Party as a 'duty to make amends'
for past misdeeds, and a desire to protect mankind from the
5 7disaster which could be wrought by the Party if unchecked.
To have remained silent would have been 'the easy and selfish 
way', he declared. Instead, 'I have chosen to lose friendships, 
invite enmity, and socially cut myself adrift', all of which
indeed occurred as a result of Sharpley's exposure of
5 8Communism; but one suspects that his constant emphasis on 
such hardships was intended as a means of evoking sympathy, 
and to prove that his motives were disinterested.
The Guardian's version of Sharpley's character was 
certainly highly exaggerated. Its attack was in any case 
considerably weakened by the fact that the Party had appointed 
him to a leading position on the State Executive, maintaining 
him in charge of their most important area of activity for 
many months after the occurrence of some of the 'unseemly 
incidents' in which he had allegedly been involved. There 
can be little doubt that their charges were distorted by an 
effort to discredit a man who knew a great deal about the 
Party, and who thus stood in a position to do it considerable 
harm. On the other hand, there is much to suggest that 
Sharpley, if not guilty of the criminal acts (such as theft 
of Party funds) alleged by the Communists, was nevertheless 
a weak and insecure person, with paranoid tendencies perhaps 
nurtured by his experience in the Party. These were indicated 
in his story by a compulsive self-inflation, an obsession 
with the personal danger to his life posed by his ex-comrades, 
and an intense pre-occupation with having returned to the 
path of moral righteousness by outwitting the machinations 
of the Communists and surviving to expose them. The Herald 
journalist Robert Gilmore, who worked on Sharpley's articles, 
and who is described by Sharpley as an anti-Communist, 
confirms the weakness in his personality. 'Sharpley was 
pleasant to work with, and very orderly in memory and in 
committing his memories to writing. But he was an inadequate
57. Sharpley, The Great Delusion, pp. 122-23. 
58 . Ibid. , p. 24.
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person and, without uncharity I hope, I wondered at the State
5 9Committee having room for a person so limited'.
One suspects that Sharpley's justification for
leaving the Party - his disillusionment with its bureaucratic,
undemocratic and dishonest practices - bears little relation
to his real motives. The Guardian at times implied that he
sold himself to the Herald because he could not withstand
personal poverty, but Sharpley had suffered this condition
for a term of membership of 14 years, so it seems unlikely
that it was a pressing factor. A more plausible explanation
has been provided by former Communist Party members R.
Mortimer and E.A.H. Laurie. They suggest that Sharpley was
an intensely ambitious man who came to resent his lack of
continuing advancement and recognition in the Party.
Shortly before his defection, it had become apparent to
Sharpley that his Party standing was slipping, reflected in
the fact that he was being overtaken in the hierarchy by
Communists who were his junior both in age and experience.
Ted Hill, for instance, an original recruit of Sharpley's,
was appointed to the position of Victorian State Secretary
very soon after Sharpley defected. According to both Mortimer
and Laurie, there was a good deal of veiled animosity between
these two Communists during the latter stages of Sharpley's
association with the Party, and Sharpley had shown some
6 0jealousy of Hill's rapid success. Once again, Robert
Gilmore's comments add to the picture:
... I did not form a clear conclusion on why C.H.S. 
quit the Party. I do not think it was political 
change of heart. I had the impression he felt he 
was undervalued by his mates and that he wanted to 
punish them by exposure, especially in the matter of 
union ballot rigging. 1
Brian Fitzpatrick, who as Director of the Australian Council 
for Civil Liberties had had considerable personal contact with 
Sharpley, gives a somewhat kinder interpretation of his
59. R. Gilmore to V. Rastrick, 24 June 1971.
60. Interview, R. Mortimer, Sydney 19 December 1971; E.A.H. 
Laurie, 1 June 1971, Melbourne.
61. R. Gilmore to V. Rastrick, 24 June 1971.
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psychological motivations. In a Civil Liberties pamphlet
of 1955 on the Petrov Commission, Fitzpatrick wrote,
Sharpley ... was a person who at most times suffered 
from a basic want of self-confidence. He fell readily 
into personal difficulties, incidents perhaps of the 
waywardness of a nervous, maladjusted man whose party 
comrades may have loaded more on him, in work and 
responsibility, than his backbone could bear. When 
his alienation from his party left him unfriended and, 
economically, cast upon his own resources, he sold ... 
his most vendible wares.
Ill
POLITICS OF THE APPOINTMENT
Premier Hollway did not wait to fathom the direction 
of the public reaction to the events of the Easter weekend 
before he announced his intention to appoint a Royal Commission, 
and thus it cannot be known whether a demand for such an 
inquiry would have featured in it. As it was, public comment 
geared itself to the expectation that an inquiry would be 
appointed, and not all of it applauded Mr. Hollway's action.
On 18 May, at the first sitting of the House of Representatives 
after Easter, the Federal Opposition reiterated its request 
for the institution of an Australia-wide Royal Commission on 
Communism, but it is difficult to believe that this was 
anything more substantial than an attempt to embarrass Labour 
by pressing home the point that the first State Government 
to take a positive stand on the Communist issue was a Liberal
r Oone. In fact the immediate reaction to the proposed inquiry
as evidenced by the comments of Press and politicians was
little more than lukewarm, and Mr. Chifley was not the only
4one to suggest that it would be 'futile'. At one point
62. Brian Fitzpatrick, The Royal Commission on Espionage, 
(Melbourne 1955) p. 8.
63. The official A.L.P. attitude on this matter was that a 
Royal Commission on a Federal basis would only hamper 
work already being done by the Security Service. See 
C.P.D., vol. 202, 18 May 1949, p. 2 ff.
64. C.P.D., vol. 202, 18 May 1949, p. 3. Premier Hollway 
was apparently annoyed by Chifley's remark. 'I cannot 
imagine anything more futile where Communism is 
concerned than Mr. Chifley', he responded to the Press. 
{Sun, 20 May 1949).
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even the Herald suggested that a Royal Commission was the
'wrong model' to use in dealing with Communists: 'We have
at least two bodies of Federal agents ... who, if they are
efficient, presumably already have far more information
about the Communist Party than is likely to be elicited
from hostile witnesses before a Commission. The testimony
of willing witnesses can be obtained without this machinery'.^
A section of back-benchers in Hollway's own Party expressed
a similar view about the value of testimony obtained from
unwilling witnesses. They urged the Government to by-pass
an inquiry in favour of the introduction of anti-Communist
legislation prepared in 1948, arguing that there was a risk
the Commission would drag on indefinitely without reaching
any conclusions. 'By the time its findings were announced,
Communism might have ceased to be a white-hot public issue
and the Federal Elections would probably be imminent'.66
The Communist Press was eager to picture the Royal
Commission as the brain-child of Sir Keith Murdoch, who, it
alleged, 'suggested' the idea to the Hollway Government
7through the agency of E.R. Reynolds, M.L.A. It was an 
interpretation implied at several points during the course 
of the Commission itself by Communist Party Counsel and some 
'accused' witnesses. The Herald certainly did indicate its 
interest in the proceedings: Mr. Reynolds applied to the
Commissioner for leave to appear in his capacity as a 
barrister to represent the Herald and Weekly Times Ltd. and 
Cecil Sharpley;68 and Herald solicitor B.K. Donaldson attended 
a large part of the sittings. Moreover, on at least two
65. Herald, 23 April 1949.
66. Herald, 26 April 1949.
67. Guardian, 24 June 1949. When the Commission's first 
witness (Malcolm Ellis) had given evidence, the Guardian 
went off on another tack, declaring that the plot for the 
Royal Commission was 'hatched' by Hollway in the Sydney 
Bulletin Office. (Guardian, 2 July 1949).
68. See following chapter, p. 63. In August 1949 in the 
Victorian Legislative Assembly, the Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition (Mr. Dodgshun) described Reynold's behaviour 
in asking the Premier for a Royal Commission and then 
acting as Counsel in it, as 'unethical'. {Age, 1 
September 1949).
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occasions Sharpley mentioned the idea of a Commission. As
already noted, in his articles he expressed willingness to
give 'names and details' to a Royal Commission or similar
body, and in a commercial radio broadcast on 24 April, while
discussions on the appointment of an inquiry were taking
place in Government circles, he pledged to make his information
6 9fully available, should one be set up. But there is no
reason to suppose that Sharpley was acting under orders from
the Herald. In the months preceding the release of Sharpley's
articles, its editorials did not exhibit any pre-occupation
with a public inquiry as a method of approaching the problem
of Communism; comments on the import of the articles, like
those of the rest of the daily Press, turned on their
demonstration of the need for action to oust Communists from
the unions. The value of the proposed Royal Commission
appeared to be judged almost solely on its probable efficacy
in achieving such an aim. Several newspapers, including the
Herald, pointed out that since most of the key Communist-led
unions were organised under Federal jurisdiction, the use of
an inquiry within the boundaries of one State was minimal.^
Generally speaking, the response to the Commission
was governed by the idea that in the absence of any legislative
action against the Communists by the Federal Government, the
institution of an inquiry was a necessary, if limited step.
Any action to curb Communism was better than nothing, and the
inquiry was welcomed as a means of forcing the Party 'into
the light of day'. Some sections of the Press tempered their
approval with the hope that it would manage to avoid the
witch-hunting excesses of the un-American Activities 
71Committee. But as with the response to the Sharpley articles,
69. Sun, 25 April 1949.
70. Herald, 21 April 1949.
71. The Age declared: 'What should be avoided is anything
in the nature of a witch-hunt, or of such stultifying 
excesses as brought the Committee of un-American Activities 
into disrepute among level-headed observers anxious to 
preserve civil liberties'. (22 April 1949). The Herald 
said 'If the Commission were to become a local equivalent 
of the Committee on un-American Activities, dealing in 
hearsay, gossip, or the personal malice of persons who ... 
hope to "smear" their opponents by wild statements, then
we should be better off without such a nine-days' wonder'. 
(Herald, 23 April 1949).
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nobody seemed to think that the inquiry would produce 
information not already known: its value lay in other
directions.72 At best, it would publicise the reality of 
the Communist danger and educate, in particular, that 
section of the public who stood in a position to challenge 
unionists. News Weekly, which claimed to be an authority 
on Communism in the unions, agreed with the daily Press in
7 ^seeing this as the possible achievement of the Commission.
News Weekly was one spokesman of anti-Communism which at this
stage did not favour a ban on the Communist Party, but even
those who did, felt obliged to give grudging approbation of
the proposal for an inquiry. Country Party leader Arthur
Fadden said in measured tones that he welcomed 'any action
to expose and curb' the P a r t y , a n d  the Sydney Morning
Herald, after initial hesitation, concluded that whereas
the proscribing of Communism in a single State would
obviously be ineffective, 'an official investigation, even
though confined to Victoria, can turn a searching light
on the Party's nation-wide activities and aims'. The
Commission's Report, it hoped, would force the hand of the
Federal Government, and provide a basis for action with
7 Sstrengthened public support.
Initially, opposition from the Communist Party and 
the leaders of some left-wing unions was clamorous. The 
Combined Unions Committee (a group of militant unions at war 
with the leaders of the Trades Hall Council) declared in a 
Press statement: 'We will not tolerate the questioning by a
Royal Commission of the political beliefs and affiliations of
72. A striking aspect of the many remarks made about the 
Commission was in fact the utter certainty with which 
they assumed that its findings would vindicate the anti­
communist standpoint. Archbishop Mannix at a breakfast 
Mass for Catholic tramways employees in St. Patrick's 
Cathedral, Melbourne, declared that the inquiry would be 
of some benefit as a preliminary to direct action against 
the Communists. 'For myself, I don't want any inquiry.
I know all I want to know.' (Advocate, 19 May 1949 .)
73. News Weekly, 27 April 1949.
74. Argus, 21 April 1949.
75. Sydney Morning Herald, 13 May 1949.
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our members, of their workmates, or of other citizens'.
This was reinforced with the threat of industrial reprisals.
The Guardian, more doctrinaire, described the Commission as
a tool in the hands of the employing class, to be used against
the workers and all progressive interests. The Government
had copied the idea of a 'smear Commission' from its 'Yankee
Imperialist masters', and it would use as witnesses 'not only
the professional Labour-haters in the Liberal Party, but also
the dregs of the working class - the renegades, the cowards,
the corrupt Right-wing officials'. Ted Hill, in his new
capacity of Victorian Party Secretary, concluded in a speech
at the Yarra Bank that the inquiry should not even be allowed 
7 8to open. To meet the threat, propaganda was stepped up: 
factory gate meetings protested, pamphlets were scattered wide, 
and for several months an extra issue of the Guardian appeared 
weekly.
Communist opposition delighted the anti-Communist 
Press, and probably helped to convince it of the propriety of 
the Hollway Government's action. Several newspapers quoted 
the Party's comments as fresh confirmation of the need for an 
investigation. News Weekly, for instance, considered that 
'if properly handled', the Commission would do a lot of good, 
and the 'best proof of that is the terror of local Communist 
leaders at the prospect of being questioned on oath'.™ The 
Herald produced another angle when it declared that since 'no 
honest political philosophy' had anything to fear from a Royal 
Commission, 'any protests which now come against the fact­
finding drive in Victoria will not be Australian in origin'.80 
But the Communist Party did not continue to present its 
opponents with ammunition of this kind. When the Government's 
determination to go ahead with the inquiry became obvious, the 
Party finally realised that its abuse was merely prejudicing
76. Tribune, 11 May 1949.
77. Guardian, 29 April 1949.
78. Argus, 2 May 1949.
79. News Weekly, 18 May 1949.
80. Herald, 3 May 1949.
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its position vis-ä-vis the Royal Commission before proceedings 
had even opened. Failure of their efforts to obstruct the 
setting up of the inquiry forced the Communists to accept the 
unpalateable fact that their activities were to be subjected 
to full public scrutiny. Thereafter, the tone of the Guardian's 
comments altered appreciably. By the time the Bill for the 
Commission had passed the Legislative Assembly, the Guardian 
was telling the world that 'unlike other political parties, 
the Communists disdain to conceal their aims'; it called upon 
its readers to make the Commission a 'triumph for the working 
class ' . ®
AN examination of the Victorian political situation would seem 
to suggest that Mr. Hollway's hasty appointment of a Royal 
Commission on Communism was the product of his own political 
insecurity more than his anticipation of public demand. In 
December 1948 the Essential Services dispute had precipitated 
the collapse of the 12-month-old Liberal-Country Party 
Coalition Government, C.P. leader J.B. McDonald objecting to 
Hollway's solution of the strike negotiations on the basis of 
terms proposed by the Trades Hall Council. McDonald 
represented it as a defeatist settlement in the face of black­
mail from the Communist transport unions. The Party vacated 
the Government benches, leaving Hollway to form a single­
party Cabinet with only a bare Liberal majority in the 
Legislative Assembly. The ensuing months saw the development 
of open warfare between the two parties, punctuated at 
intervals by Hollway's overtures for the healing of the rift
81. Guardianf 13 May 1949; 3 June 1949.
82. The Essential Services Act was a drastic law (to operate 
only by proclamation) governing the procedure to be 
undertaken in the event of a Victorian strike disrupting 
services considered by the Government to be essential to 
the life of the Community. It was proclaimed by McDonald 
(then Acting Premier) in response to a strike of Gas 
Company workers in November 1948. Hollway returned from 
an absence overseas to take over the strike negotiations; 
after a threat of a blockade of the Port of Melbourne by 
the Seamen's Union, and sympathy stoppages by militant 
transport unions, the Premier agreed to withdraw the 
proclamation. Negotiations were settled on the basis 
(put forward by T.H.C. leaders) that if the seamen 
lifted the Port blockade and the transport unions promised 
to submit future disputes to the Trades Hall Council, the 
Government would adjourn the cases pending as a result of 
prosecutions launched against militant union leaders at
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in the form of a merger, and the Country Party's increasingly 
determined stand in opposition. Eventually, several Country 
Party dissidents were attracted into Liberal ranks to permit 
the formation in March 1949 of a new Liberal and Country 
Party. The old Country Party in conjunction with Labour 
became Hollway's parliamentary Opposition under the leadership 
of McDonald. The tenure of the Hollway Government remained 
unstable, however; so much so that until the State Election of 
May 1950, it was kept in power by two Country Party members
O Qwho absented themselves from crucial parliamentary decisions.00
Hollway's insecurity was exacerbated by a savage
stream of criticism from the Country Party designed to convince
Victorian electors that he was 'soft' on the Communists. In
the State version of the controversy over Communist Party
power in the trade unions, Hollway was plagued by charges that
he had allowed himself to suffer a defeat at the hands of
Communist-controlled unions during the Essential Services
crisis. Cecil Sharpley himself confirmed the Country Party's
viewpoint in his Herald articles, where he described the
Victorian Government as having 'yielded' to the Communist
8 4Party's show of force. Hollway stoutly denied these 
allegations, but found a further source of discomfort in 
McDonald's revelation to the 1949 Victorian Country Party 
Conference that he (Hollway) had been responsible for the 
shelving of legislation prepared in 1948 by the composite 
Liberal-Country Party Government to outlaw Communists in the 
State. McDonald told Conference and the Press that under the 
provisions of legislation devised in April 1948, it would have
82. cont.
the height of the dispute.
83. Katherine West, op. cit., p. 12. According to West, 
'During this period the parliamentary balance was so 
precarious that the Liberal Premier was reluctant to 
expel from his Parliamentary Party ... F.L. Edmunds
and ... J.S. Lechte, both of whom, in the course of 1949, 
were becoming more and more outspoken about the defects 
of the Government'.
84. Sharpley, I Was a Communist Leader, p. 14.
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been a criminal offence for a Communist to hold office in any 
organisation in Victoria, and he issued a challenge to the 
Premier to reintroduce it.^ ~* According to one Country Party 
member of the former Government, speaking in a subsequent 
parliamentary debate, Mr. Hollway had considered the proposed 
law to be 'too drastic'. 6^ Hollway was considerably 
embarrassed by what he described as McDonald's 'untimely' 
divulgence of the nature of legislation which until that time 
had been 'on the highly secret and confidential list'. He 
declared that McDonald had thus done a great disservice to 
the cause of industrial peace, and had jeopardised the 
Government's position in dealing with any future disruption. ' 
But in reality there was some substance to the 
Country Party's claim that the Government lacked the inclination 
to tackle the Communist Party, at least in terms of a 
legislative curb on their activities. A conventional politician 
in the sense that like most of his fellow-Parliamentarians he 
made full use of the Communist bogey in his speech-making, 
Hollway was not, however, a conventional Liberal.^ It seems 
that he did not share the Federal Liberal leader's commitment 
to the 'ultimate' solution to the problem of Communism. In 
fact, judging from his public statements, his viewpoint stood 
much closer to that of the Labour Party: that the real problem
lay in the unions, and the only way it could be dealt with was 
by moderate, 'decent' trade unionists taking the initiative in
85. Age, 17 March 1949. The legislation provided that a 
Communist, or any person practicing subversive actions, 
would be debarred from holding any office in any 
organisation (political, business or sporting). It would 
also make it an offence for any organisation to elect a 
Communist or person engaged in subversive activities
to an executive position.
86. Age, 19 May 1949.
87. Age, 19 March 1949.
88. Described by Katherine West as a 'bon-viveur', Hollway 
had a reputation among his critics as one whose primary 
concern as Premier was government office rather than 
government policy. He tended to view the Country Party 
as his main political opponent, and made no secret of a 
strong personal friendship with Labour Party leader John 
Cain. See West, Power in the Liberal Party, pps. 18, 38; 
P. Blazey, Bolte (Brisbane 1972) pp. 49-53.
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voting Communist officials out of office. Hollway made it 
quite plain on a number of occasions that his Government would 
not initiate legislation to ban the Party within Victorian 
boundaries or to eliminate Communist control of key unions, 
because he believed such action on a State basis alone could 
not be effective. Outlawed Communists would migrate to other 
States; and in the industrial sphere, most of the important 
Communist-led unions were Federally-organised and hence not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the State Government. After 
January 1949, when Mr. Menzies declared a ban on the Communist 
Party to be a major plank in his Federal Election platform, 
Hollway could have added to this argument a further one. State 
action was no longer a significant consideration until the 
outcome of the Election was decided, for if the Liberal Party 
formed the next Federal Government, any State law against 
Communists would probably be rendered superfluous.
Hollway1s attitude against drastic action by his own 
Government, at least after 1948, may have been dictated by 
considerations of self-preservation. In the very fluid 
political situation existing between the two non-Labour 
parties and threatening the actual survival of the Government, 
he might understandably have baulked at the prospect of 
introducing legislation which would be productive of serious 
public controversy. Trade union reaction to the Essential 
Services Act had been more than the Victorian Cabinet could 
handle; and Hollway's political security had been considerably 
undermined since that time.
THE alternative of a Royal Commission was a logical one. The 
year of 1949 was a most appropriate time for the appointment 
of a public inquiry by a State Liberal Government anxious to 
disprove claims that it lacked the inclination or courage to 
tackle the Communists. A Royal Commission could be presented 
as the only sensible approach to the problem which in the 
circumstances could be adopted by a single State. It might be
89. See the Age, 19 January 1949; 23 February 1949; 17 March 
1949.
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an added cost to the Government in financial terms, but it 
was unlikely to produce any embarrassing public opposition.
And while Mr. Menzies continued to make the problem of dealing 
with Communism a Federal issue, there was little danger that 
the Government would be forced to act upon the Commission's 
findings. The appointment of a Commission of Inquiry, 
while inevitably open to criticism by hard-line opponents of 
Communism on the grounds that it did not really come to grips 
with the problem, was a step ultimately beyond reproach from 
the genuine anti-Communist. There could be no legitimate 
objection to the gathering of facts by an independent inquiry, 
despite the oft-repeated assertion that enough was already 
known about the Communist Party to justify any governmental 
measures against it. A Royal Commission in 1949 could, from 
the point of view of the Victorian Government, have additional 
political advantages. It might be expected to focus public 
attention squarely on the danger presented by Communist 
activities, and highlight the Federal Labour Government's 
failure to act decisively in this area at a time when its past 
record was under public review. It could thus give a real 
boost to the electoral chances of Federal Liberal and Country 
Parties campaigning strongly on the Communist issue, and 
perhaps provide a new L.C.P. Government with un-challengeable 
information with which to justify its anti-Communist legislative 
programme.
Whether the political value of a Royal Commission 
beyond its effect upon the standing of his own Government, 
was a factor in Hollway's decision to appoint such an inquiry 
is a debatable question. But it can be assumed that these 
wider implications did not escape him. In fact he drew 
attention to some of them in statements to the Press, and 
later during his Second Reading Speech on the Parliamentary 
Bill for the Commission. The disclosures of Communist activity 
to be made to the Royal Commission should provide the 
Commonwealth Government with ample incentive to take action for 
secret union ballots, the Age reported him as saying.^ And 
again: 'With unquestioned authority and a suitable charter
90. Age, 22 April 1949.
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[the inquiry] will produce material which will be essential
to any further treatment of the problem, and which will be
of great value to any Commonwealth Administration which
proposed strenuous action against Communism'.91
It was left to others to draw the conclusion that
the Commission was set up purely as a Liberal Party
electoral device to help Menzies into power. Though the
daily Press in general chose not to see the inquiry in these
terms, the Melbourne Argus predicted that its findings would
probably be used as strong Liberal and Country Party
propaganda against the A.L.P. if the Federal Government failed
92to take heed of them. Hollway's parliamentary Opposition, 
too, made the most of the Commission's political aspects, 
finding a useful launching point for attack in the fact that 
the Government's knowledge of the Sharpley disclosures and 
its decision to appoint an inquiry had apparently pre-dated 
the actual public release of the articles. Labour Party 
leader John Cain asserted that the Herald newspaper in 
reality ran the Victorian Government, and that Hollway's 
announcement of the forthcoming inquiry had been in accordance 
with a pre-arranged plan in which the Herald had been 
involved.9 3 w.P. Barry (Labour, Carlton) summed up his 
Party's viewpoint when he declared that the Royal Commission 
had been set up as 'a political inquiry into the activities 
of the Communist Party in an attempt to prove that its 
continued existence lies at the feet of the Federal Government. 
It is an effort to use the Communist Party to political 
advantage in an election'.94
The anti-Labour side of the Opposition naturally
91. V.P.D., vol. 229, 10 May 1949, p. 837.
92. Argus, 26 April 1949. News Weekly agreed with this 
interpretation. It had a 'strong suspicion' that the 
Government's move for a Royal Commission was largely 
inspired by the hope that it might thereby discredit 
Labour. (4 May 1949).
93. V.P.D., vol. 229, 11 May 1949, p. 922.
94. Ibid., p. 941.
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enough did not utilise the same interpretation. But the 
Country Party was in complete agreement with Labour speakers 
that the appointment of the Commission did not represent a 
genuine attempt on the part of the Victorian Liberals to 
deal with the Communists; that it was nothing more than a 
political manoeuvre, by a Government under pressure from its 
erst-while colleagues, to permit further procrastination. It 
echoed the usual charge that the Commission would be a futile 
investigation of a subject, the facts of which were already 
well known. That the Government had no intention of acting 
upon its findings was clearly shown by its deliberate omission 
from the Act of appointment of any request for recommendations 
to be made by the Royal Commissioner. The Country Party also 
appeared to be concerned that Communist witnesses would use 
the Commission as a forum for their own purposes. 'Before 
the Commission |Communistsj could say anything about any 
decent citizen or anyone else. jTheyJ will be in a very
Q (Zstrong position', said the Leader of the Opposition,
The Premier's own explanation of why his Government 
wanted the Commission was not elaborate. He told Parliament 
that he considered the appointment was 'justified' by the 
Sharpley articles, disclosures about Communist ballot-rigging 
in the unions made at the A.L.P. Easter Conference, and a 
pamphlet issued by the Melbourne Trades Hall Council in 
March 1949 setting out the 'true facts' of attacks made 
upon it by several Communist-led unions. The role he 
envisaged for the Commission was that of an instrument for 
public education in the dangers which threatened. 'It. is 
idle for honourable members opposite to say they know all about 
Communism and ballot-rigging ... they cannot fight Communism
95. The Opposition could not press these and other objections 
(see later) to their full extent because of the danger of 
appearing to hinder action against Communism. Its 
subsequent agreement to pass the Bill weakened the impact of many of its complaints.
96. Ibid., p. 918. Sir Albert Dunstan, leader of the Country 
Party in Victoria, even suggested that the Communist 
Party favoured the idea of the Royal Commission. 'Because 
they are saying that they do not want jthe Commission],
I am led to believe that they do. If the Communists did 
not desire the appointment of the Royal Commission they would say nothing.' (p. 935).
97. The pamphlet represented the T.H.C. version of the 
Essential Services dispute.
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Q owithout an educated public behind them.1 ° Speakers on the 
Government side of the House resented Opposition charges that 
they had no intention of acting upon the findings, and Mr. 
Hollway went so far as to promise that 'if [the Commission] 
leads to the ascertainment of facts which render it desirable 
that the strongest action be taken, even by one State acting
9 9alone, the Government will not hesitate to take such action'.
But it is difficult to understand what he meant, when he had 
already made plain his antipathy to the idea of banning the 
Party. And the Attorney-General re-affirmed to Mr. Keon 
(Labour, Richmond) later in the debate the impracticability 
of any attempt by the State Government to legislate for 
compulsory secret ballots in the unions as a measure against 
the Communist Party.
The appearance of the Sharpley story provided the 
Government with an opportunity to appoint a Royal Commission 
which, if we are to believe Hollway, it had been 'contemplating' 
for some time. The Premier explained to Parliament why it 
was that in the past he had not acceded to requests for a 
public inquiry into Communist activities: '... on those
occasions only vague allegations were made which could not 
have been sustained in a court of law'.10  ^ Sharpley had 
radically altered the situation. His articles created a 
favourable public climate, a pretext for action, and 
demonstrated the existence of an authoritative source of 
evidence upon which to base a Commission. Unfortunately for 
Mr. Hollway, the process of setting it up proved to be a more 
protracted affair than he could have desired if he was to
98. V.P.D. vol. 229, 10 May 1949, p. 838. One of Hollway's 
Press statements is perhaps revealing of his idea of the 
purpose of the Royal Commission. Referring to the inquiry 
into trade union ballot-rigging set up by the Melbourne 
T.H.C. after the publication of Sharpley's articles, 
Hollway remarked, 'If this alertness had been shown 10 years ago, there would have been no need for the 
Government's Commission'. (Argus, 30 April 1949).
99. V.P.D., vol. 229 , O •—1 May 1949 , P* 840.
100. V.P.D., vol. 229 , 11 May 1949 , P- 954 .
101. V.P.D., vol. 229 , oi”H May 1949 , P- 840 .
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make the most of the crisis engendered by the articles. It 
took a full two weeks of Cabinet and intra-Party discussion, 
with the Press daily predicting the imminence of a new and 
contradictory decision on the matter, before it was finally 
announced that the Commission would be appointed by Act of 
Parliament. Not only did the Government have to face the 
difficulties of getting a Judge to act as Commissioner, and 
of framing the terms of reference when Supreme Court writs 
threatened to make a full-scale inquiry sub judice; but the 
Parliamentary Opposition was determined to make political 
capital from the unusual and controversial features of the 
appointment represented in the Bill. Hollway appealed to 
the Legislative Assembly for an approach 'above' party- 
politics, but he was not to be let off so easily.
The debate on the Bill (occupying 10 and 11 May)
provoked considerable outside interest. The Leader of the
Opposition noted that 'the Press [wasj in full array in the
galleries, with cameras clicking, and everyone anticipating
that some disclosures of a far-reaching nature would be 
10 2made'. Newspapers described the session as 'stormy',
and most congratulated Mr. Hollway upon his courageous effort 
in bringing in the Bill in the face of 'abuse, criticism and 
objection'. But at least one paper was unimpressed with the 
Government's performance. Its handling of the business, 
said News Weekly, 'gave the impression of uncertainty and 
weakness, and by no means pleased its own supporters'. The 
determination of all parties to play politics 'resulted in 
an unholy Parliamentary row ... with nearly everybody ... 
trying to use the Bill as a club to belt the other side ... 
and [Communism] forgotten'.^^
THE Royal Commission was set up under the provisions of two
102. V.P.D., vol. 229, 11 May 1949, p. 931. McDonald finished 
his statement in characteristic fashion with the charge 
that, contrary to these expectations, the Government had 
'laboured and brought forth a miserable little mouse in 
the shape of this measure'.
103. News Weekly, 18 May 1949.
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separate Acts of Parliament: the Royal Commission (Communist
Party) Act, passed on 19 May 1949; and the Royal Commission 
(Communist Party) Amendment Act, passed on 27 September 1949 to 
amend certain procedural aspects of the principal Act.
The principal Act set down that a single Commissioner 
should be appointed and that he be a Victorian Supreme Court 
Judge. It defined his powers and (by outlining the terms of 
reference) the scope of his inquiry. The Commissioner was to 
exercise all the powers and privileges that are vested in the 
Victorian Supreme Court 'or any Judge thereof, in, or in 
relation to, any action or trial', particularly, it was stated, 
in relation to compulsion or punishment. In effect this did 
not amount to a substantial modification of the provisions of 
the 1928 Evidence Act governing inquiries appointed directly 
by the Executive. The Commissioner's power was extended only 
in his capacity to deal with contempt. Instead of the normal, 
indirect method of punishing this offence - whereby the 
Commissioner refers it to an officer of the law, and it is 
then dealt with by another Judge - the Act stipulated that the 
Commissioner should be able to deal with contempt summarily 
himself. In presenting the Bill for the Commission to 
Parliament, the Premier explained the section concerning this 
new procedure for punishment of contempt as a simple corollary 
of the status of the Commissioner. 'As the Commissioner under 
the Bill will be a Supreme Court Judge, it seems sensible to 
allow him to enforce his own orders directly.' But it
became apparent from the subsequent comments of Government 
speakers that the procedure had been devised because of their 
anticipation that the Commission would have to cope with 
truculent witnesses. As one Liberal member pointed out, 'You 
will be dealing with a different type of person in this 
inquiry ' . ^ 5
In August, after the Commission had been sitting for 
3 months, an Amendment Bill was introduced into Parliament 
allowing for contempt cases to be heard by a Supreme Court
104. V.P.D., vol. 229, 9 August 1949, p. 1487.
105. V.P,D., vol. 229, 11 May 1949, p. 915.
51
Judge other than the Commissioner, and thus effecting a 
reversion back to standard Royal Commission practice. Its 
purpose was probably to relieve the Commissioner of 
responsibility for dealing with contempt in cases which might 
be personally embarrassing to him (such as contempt which 
questioned his impartiality in the conduct of the inquiry) 
or cases which might interrupt seriously the continuity of 
the proceedings. The Act was made retrospective to the date 
of passage of the Principle Act, but only in a procedural 
sense: it did not create any new offence or alter the rules
of contempt, but merely changed the method for dealing with 
an offence. It would seem certain that the new provisions 
were formulated to facilitate prosecution for a specific
I A Coffence. Immediately after Parliament had approved the
Bill, contempt charges were laid against the Guardian with 
regard to several articles, dating back to July 1949, which 
allegedly cast aspersions upon the Commissioner and chief 
witness Cecil Sharpley.^ 7
The Commission's terms of reference were extra­
ordinarily broad, limited only by the territorial considerations 
imposed by the State boundaries of Victoria. They comprised 
two main sections. The first was a general clause which asked 
the Commissioner to investigate the 'origins, aims, objects
106. During the debate on the Bill, Hollway told the Opposition 
that the request for the new legislation had been sent to 
the Department of Law by Counsel assisting the Commission. 
Mr. Cain suggested that the request must have originated 
with the Commissioner himself, but Hollway gave his 
'personal assurance' that it did not. (V.P.D,, vol.
229, 9 August 1949, pp. 1486-1488.)
107. The case was heard in October 1949. Mr. Justice Dean
found that articles in four separate issues of the 
Guardian constituted contempt - they involved statements 
imputing to Mr. Justice Lowe improper motives and 
unfairness in the conduct of his Commission and 
criticising Sharpley's character as witness. {Guardian,
July 1, 2, 12 and 19). The Judge ordered that the 
publishers file a formal apology, withdrawing their 
imputations and undertaking that no further such 
imputations would be made - the apology was duly made.
In February 1950 while the Royal Commission was still 
in progress, a further article in the Guardian, 'Mr. 
Justice Sholl, Diehard Tory' (27 January 1950), was the 
subject of a contempt charge. It concerned the former 
leading Counsel assisting the Commissioner (R.R. Sholl) 
who in January 1950 departed the Commission to take up 
the position of Victorian Supreme Court Judge. Mr.
Justice Barry dismissed the charge.
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IQ Qand funds' of the Victorian Communist Party, its activities 
and operations, and the persons and organisations associated 
with it. The second section asked him to determine whether 
the Party engaged in particular subversive activities, which 
it l i s t e d . T h e r e  was no reason why the terms of reference 
should have formed part of the Bill setting up the Commission, 
but the Government may have felt that with Parliamentary 
sanction for its very wide scope, the inquiry would be in a 
stronger position if any legal proceedings eventuated with 
regard to the Communist Party's libel writs. Mr. Hollway told 
the Press before the Bill was presented to Parliament that the 
inclusion of the terms would enable members to express their 
opinion on them.-111* But in fact discussion of this section 
of the Bill was negligible. W.P. Barry (Labour, Carlton) 
wanted to know why the Commission was not directed to 
investigate the source of Communist Party funds. 'Has that 
point been deliberately omitted because the Government is 
afraid to discover that some of its supporters are the largest 
contributors to the Communist Party?'1'1'1' G. Reid (Liberal,
Box Hill) subsequently moved an amendment to remedy the 
omission, and it was incorporated in the Bill in its final 
form. An Opposition amendment to remove the stipulation that 
the Commissioner should be a Supreme Court Judge failed.
There was no real quibble with the provision for 
strengthened powers to deal with contempt, but the Government 
had to meet solid criticism of what the Opposition described 
as the political 'conscription' of the Judiciary affected by 
the Bill. The attack was based on two counts: that the
108. In the original Bill before amendments were added, 
'funds' were not included.
109. The whole Act is reproduced in the Appendices of this 
thesis. It is interesting to note that espionage 
activities were not included in the terms of reference, 
and no politician expressed a wish to have the subject investigated.
110. Age, 6 May 1949.
111. V.P.D., vol. 229, 11 May 1949, p. 940.
53
Supreme Court was being asked to involve itself in the arena 
of party politics, and that it was being compelled to do 
so against its own express wish. The sole raison d'etre of 
the Bill, alleged the Opposition, was an attempt to resort to 
Parliament as a means of overcoming the difficulties presented 
by the Judiciary's traditional reluctance to participate in 
political inquiries. A display of concern lest the prestige 
of the Supreme Court should suffer through being dragged 
into the 'mire' of politics lent some moral elevation to the
1 I oOpposition's standard game of embarrassing the Government.
But the defensive attitude of some of the apologists for the 
Bill perhaps indicated that the Opposition's charges were well- 
founded .
Attorney-General Oldham explained his Government's 
wish to have Parliamentary sanction for the Royal Commission 
in terms of the 'supreme national importance' of the matter 
to be investigated. In cases of this kind, he said, it was 
undesirable that action should be taken directly under 
Executive authority. Considering the controversial nature 
of the Communist issue, as well as the fact that an inquiry
112. Much of the debate concerned argument as to whether the 
subject of the inquiry was political, and predictably, 
it seemed to reduce itself to the standard question of 
whether or not the Communist Party was a political 
party. One Liberal argued that it was not, because 'it 
consists of revolutionaries'. The Country and Labour 
Parties for the purposes of their argument held that it 
was, although the Country Party on most other occasions 
took the opposite view. The Government's stand in the 
debate was that the problem was 'not political in the 
party-political sense [because] it involves the safety 
of the State and the continuance of its democratic 
institutions'. (V.P.D., vol. 229, 11 May 1949, p. 928).
113. S. Keon (Labour, Richmond) had a practical reason for his 
concern. The Government, he said, was handing the 
Communist Party a weapon with which to attack the 
Commission. 'The outcome of this grave departure from 
the normal protection that Supreme Court Judges have 
always enjoyed from being involved in political inquiries 
will be that Communist propaganda will damn the findings 
of the Commission as ... biassed.' (V.P.D., vol. 229,
11 May 1949, p. 952).
114. Ibid. , p. 937.
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into the activities of a perfectly legal political party 
created somewhat of a precedent, it. is indeed probable 
that Mr. Hollway's Cabinet saw a distinct advantage in placing 
the responsibility for the setting up of the Commission in 
the hands of Parliament. It may have seen an additional 
benefit in the extra publicity which would accrue to the 
inquiry if its features were to be the subject of a 
Parliamentary debate. But while these factors may have 
recommended an Act of Parliament, all the evidence suggests 
that the chief reason which induced the Government to break 
with the established practice of appointing a Royal Commission 
under Executive authority was its difficulties in procuring a 
Supreme Court Judge to act as investigator.
PRESS speculation during the fortnight following the release
of Sharpley's articles indicates that until it became clear
that a Judge was not forthcoming, Hollway had every intention
of setting up the Commission in the normal way. Under
pressure from the Opposition benches during the debate on the
Commission, the Attorney-General revealed the nature of his
negotiations with the Victorian Chief Justice. Apparently
Sir Edmund Herring had drawn attention to the Irvine
memorandum when asked by Mr. Oldham 'whether it would be
possible to make available the services of a senior Supreme
Court Judge'. Said Oldham in Parliament:
It was then put to him that the matters seem to go 
to the root of representative government and 
democratic institutions, and even to threaten the 
security and existence of the State itself, and 
were not a mere matter of politics. It was suggested 
that the national importance of the matter could best be made clear by Parliament itself intervening 
and providing for the setting up of a Royal Commission 
to be presided over by a Supreme Court Judge ... the 
very fact that in this special case a Bill has been
115. Sir Albert Dunstan complained that it was a precedent 
of an undesirable and dangerous kind 'which could be 
used by Governments for the purpose of dealing with 
anyone with whom it fsic] had a political quarrel'. 
ibid., p. 932.
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introduced indicates that this Government does not 
challenge the principles laid down by the Irvine 
memorandum of 1923, which are designed to safeguard 
the Judges from being drawn into political controversy 
at the behest of the Executive.
Oldham 'refused to be cross-examined' as to whether the
suggestion to introduce the Bill came initially from the
Government or the Chief Justice.
It seems evident from the foregoing that the 
Supreme Court did regard the Royal Commission on Communism 
as politically 'coloured', and that it was not anxious to 
participate in it. Moreover, it would have been impossible 
for the Bench to have refused to comply with the Government's 
request after the Act had made special provision for it. In 
a letter to the present writer, Sir Edmund Herring said: 'The
intervention of the Legislative ... introduced an entirely 
different element [to that of conventional practice in the 
appointment of a Commission] which left the Supreme Court,
117Judges with no alternative but to make a Judge available'.
But the Victorian Opposition's phrase 'conscription of the 
Judiciary' is probably an inappropriately emotive one, Sir 
Edmund Herring is unlikely to have had a strong personal 
objection to the appointment of a Royal Commission on
1 I oCommunism, and it is probable that the introduction of a 
Parliamentary Bill represented a convenient way out for both 
sides. The Courts could not ignore a command from the people's 
own representative institution. Thus the Bill would enable 
the Judiciary to avoid the appearance that it was voluntarily 
betraying its own principles and the Government to avoid the 
appearance of being dictatorial.
116. Ibid., ppo 937-9.
117. Sir Edmund Herring to V. Rastrick, 13 October 1970,
118. Herring was strongly, and publicly, anti-Communist. For 
instance, in July 1949 he addressed the annual conference 
of the Victorian R.S.L. on the subject of the Coal Strike, 
which, he said, was 'playing a real part in unmasking the 
Communist conspiracy to the man in the street, who was 
now beginning to realise its worldwide implications ...
As soldiers we dealt with a foreign foe in the war. We 
will have to do the same thing again by dealing with this 
foreign theory in peace'. Herald, 28 July 1949,
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None of major daily newspapers shared the Opposition's
concern about the possibility that a Judge might be forced
against his better judgement to become the Commissioner. The
Argus thought that a Judge was the ideal choice, as he would
bring 'so many controversial questions ... out of the
ideological labyrinth into the calm judicial atmosphere of the
11 QSupreme Court'. When it was announced on 19 May that Mr.
Justice Lowe had 'after some serious consideration' agreed to 
act as the Commissioner, enthusiasm was even more marked, 
and it came not only from the Press. The Argus spoke for almost 
all the non-Communist Press when it declared that Sir Charles 
Lowe 'brincpto the inquiry the advantage of his outstanding 
qualifications as one of our most eminent jurists'.121 Brian 
Fitzpatrick (Secretary of the Australian Council for Civil 
Liberties) was bitterly critical of the Act which set up the 
Commission, but on this point he agreed with the Argus:
'... one of the few re-assuring features of the whole sorry 
business is the high standing and twenty-two years judicial
TO Oexperience of Sir Charles Lowe, the Royal Commissioner'.
Support for Charles Lowe's acceptance of the Commission came 
also from powerful quarters. The Chief Justice of Australia,
Sir John Latham, wrote personally to Lowe congratulating him 
on his decision, and indicating his concurrence with the view
119. Argus, 11 May 1949. See also the Age, 11 May 1949; 
Sydney Morning Herald, 13 May 1949.
120. Joint statement issued by the Chief Secretary, Premier 
and Attorney-General of Victoria, 19 May 1949, quoted 
in the Age, 20 May 1949.
121. Argus, 20 May 1949.
122. B.C. Fitzpatrick, Constitutional Aspects of the Royal 
Commission on the Communist Party, Australian Council 
for Civil Liberties, Melbourne 1949, p. 13. In the 
pamphlet Fitzpatrick described the Royal Commission
Act as 'a grave abuse of the powers of Parliament at the 
expense of the independence of the Judiciary'. He went 
on to question the whole concept of a Royal Commission 
investigation into the subjects defined by the terms of 
reference. These, he claimed, were either matters for 
experts such as political scientists and philosophers 
and thus inappropriate for judicial inquiry, or they 
were matters capable of being investigated, under 
existing laws, in the law courts according to ordinary 
principles of justice'. (p. 6)
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that the Commission concerned a matter of vital public 
interest, for which task of investigation a Judge was eminently 
suitable. ^-22
The available information does not show whether Lowe 
was chosen at the specific request of the Victorian Government. 
The formal procedure for the appointment of a Royal Commissioner 
if he is to be a Judge is that the Attorney-General issues a 
general request to the Chief Justice to make one of his fellow 
Judges available, and the choice is then made by the Bench 
itself. There is no reason to assume that such a procedure 
was not carried out in the case of the Royal Commission on 
Communism. Sir Edmund Herring, in a letter to the present 
writer, said he 'should have thought' the choice was made by 
the Hollway Government on the basis of Lowe's past experience 
on Royal Commissions. 'I feel sure the Government felt that 
Sir Charles was the best man they could get in the 
circumstances', Herring concluded. But in a later interview
he was unable to give any definite information on the matter, 
beyond making the suggestion that Lowe was the obvious, if not 
'the only' Judge on the Victorian Supreme Court Bench at that 
time suited to undertake the task. As he pointed out, Lowe 
was not only experienced in the conduct of Royal Commissions 
(and the ones he had dealt with had concerned delicate and
1 o ccontroversial war-time m a t t e r s ) b u t  he was also 'qualified' 
in terms of the Government's request by his seniority on the 
Bench.126
123. Sir John Latham to Sir Charles Lowe, 19 May 1949, quoted 
by N. Rosenthal, Sir Charles Lowe, (Melbourne 1968), p. 92.
124. Sir Edmund Herring to V. Rastrick, 13 October 1970.
125. Lowe had presided over 3 Commonwealth-appointed Royal 
Commissions. In 1940 he was asked by the Menzies-Fadden 
Government to investigate the circumstances of an RAAF 
plane crash which killed a number of high-ranking army 
officers and members of Cabinet. He subsequently 
conducted 2 inquiries for the Federal Labour Government: 
in 1942 into the effects upon Darwin of the Japanese air­
raid, and the following year into the 'Brisbane-line' 
controversy. Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 95-6.
126. Interview with Sir Edmund Herring, Melbourne, 28 December 
1971. The senior puisne Judge in 1949 (Sir James 
Macfarlan) was ill and shortly to retire. Lowe was next 
in line of seniority. The only other information which 
adds anything to the picture is that provided by Sir 
Reginald Sholl in an interview in Melbourne, 23 December 
1971. Sholl, who was senior Counsel assisting the 
Commission, claimed that the Hollway Government knew Lowe
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Another aspect of Lowe's appointment has been
revealed by Mr. E.W. Lawn, who was Lowe's legal associate
in 1949. Lawn recalls that in the discussion within judicial
circles about who was to be Royal Commissioner, Mr. Justice
Dean, a recent appointment to the Bench, was mentioned as a
probable choice. But apparently Lowe considered that the
Communist Party inquiry would have been an unfair imposition
on a Judge of such inexperience, and in the circumstances felt
obliged to offer to the Chief Justice to undertake the
127Commission himself. There is at least partial confirmation
of Lawn's recollection in the fact that the Press mentioned
by name only two Supreme Court Judges as possible Royal
Commissioners during the weeks preceding the appointment: they
17 8were Mr. Justice Lowe and Mr. Justice Dean.
The Hollway Government sought the services of a Judge 
for the prestige and authority he could impart to the 
Commission. In the Supreme Court contempt proceedings which 
arose out of the Royal Commission in November 1949, Mr. Justice 
Dean (presiding) stated that the Government had conferred upon 
its inquiry by Act of Parliament all the rights, powers and 
privileges of the Court, because of its desire 'that the report 
of the Commission shall command all the respect of the 
community and all the authority commonly attributed to decisions 
of this court'. 129 Hollway had put it to the Press much
earlier that 'this Commission is of tremendous importance. It 
must be placed on the highest and very best judicial plane'.1^0
126. cont.
was to be the Commissioner before the Royal Commission 
Bill was presented to Parliament, but he had nothing 
definite to offer as to who made the choice. Mr. T.D. 
Oldham (then Attorney-General) is no longer alive.
127. Interview with E. Lawn, Melbourne, 21 June 1971.
128. See Argus, 26 April 1949; Inside Canberra, vol. 2 no. 17, 
5 May 1949.
129. Rex v. Arrowsmith and others [1950] V.L.R. p. 92.
130. Argus, 21 April 1949.
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By vesting it with the aura of a judicial proceeding, he 
was ensuring that the public would not doubt its importance.
And whatever motives lay behind the setting up of 
the Commission, the Government's purpose could not fail to be 
enhanced by bringing the weight of the Judiciary behind it.
If the Government wanted, as it claimed, some unchallengeable 
facts about Communism with which to 'educate the public' and 
arm a future Federal Liberal Government, then it also wanted 
a Report with the credentials of judicial 'objectivity' and 
a Judge's experience in the weighing of evidence. If the 
Commission was to be merely an instrument to publicise the 
Communist issue for the advantage of the non-Labour forces in 
the coming elections, then again there was obvious value in 
the prestige that a high-ranking Judge could lend to the 
proceedings. Even if the Government did not intend to use 
the emerging facts as a basis for legislative action, it 
wanted them to carry weight. Their value would be negligible 
if they could be dismissed by opponents as the work of a 
politically-biassed Royal Commission.
If the members of Hollway's Cabinet gave any 
consideration to the nature of the Report which the Commission 
would produce, they must have realised that it would be 
determined chiefly by the attitudes of the Commissioner himself, 
as would be the 'tone' of the proceedings. Did the Government 
hope for strongly anti-Communist findings with which to 
embarrass the A.L.P. at election time? Or would it have 
preferred a moderate, non-committal Report, enabling it to 
avoid the responsibility of translating the findings into 
anti-Communist legislation, and even to vindicate its own 
record of non-activity in the field? Speculation about the 
political considerations which might have influenced the 
choice of the Commissioner would take on a greater significance 
if it could be ascertained whether Sir Charles Lowe was the 
Government's own appointment.
Lowe was conservative in his ideas, but he was a 
Judge whose respect for the law and the judicial process 
would always be weighted against any personal political 
inclination. If he was a 'political' choice by the Government, 
then the latter could not seriously have hoped for an American- 
style Communist witch-hunt, and a Report to match. Lowe's most
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outstanding qualifications for acting in the inquiry were his 
long experience and high reputation on the Supreme Court 
Bench, and his earlier conduct of three important Royal 
Commissions. if the Government knew Lowe's reputation 
in the courts, they would have known him as a strict man of 
the law, who would be guided in making his findings not by 
his anticipation of the kind of Report the Government might 
want, but by a careful evaluation of the facts presented to 
him. There can be little doubt that if he was the Government's 
choice, he was wanted simply because he was a highly respected 
Judge.
Shortly after Lowe's formal acceptance of the 
Commission, the Government appointed three Melbourne barristers 
to assist him in the proceedings. They comprised two King's 
Counsel (R.R. Sholl and S. Lewis) and a junior Counsel (M.V. 
Mclnerney).133 Preparation for the case against the Communist
131. Lowe's prestige did not derive exclusively from his 
judicial standing, however. He was also Chancellor of 
Melbourne University at the time of the Commission, 
and was involved in a leading capacity in a number of 
other public organisations. See following chapter, p. 65.
132. Public statements made by the Premier and other members 
of his Cabinet at the time of the Commission's 
appointment clearly indicate that they entertained no 
doubts that the inquiry would make findings confirming 
the general anti-Communist viewpoint. They probably 
believed that any Judge could not fail to turn out a 
report unfavourable to the Communist Party.
133. R.R. Sholl, K.C., former Victorian Rhodes Scholar (1924), 
was at the peak of a highly successful career as a 
barrister, and shortly to be promoted to the Supreme 
Court Bench. During the 1940's he had conducted a 
considerable amount of legal work for the Attorney- 
General's Department, and according to Mr. Justice 
Mclnerney (interview, Melbourne, 15 October 1971) he was 
an 'automatic' choice for the position of leading Counsel 
assisting the Commission. S. Lewis, K.C. was 71 years 
old in 1949, which made him Lowe's senior by 2 years, 
and one of the oldest practising barristers in Melbourne. 
According to the Age, he had specialised for a number
of years in Arbitration Court work, and he was probably 
selected for this reason. {Age, 5 March 1949). M.V. 
Mclnerney was the only Catholic in the team, and a close 
friend of B.A. Santamaria. As a founding member of the 
Campion Society in the 1930's he had made a detailed 
documentary study of Communism. He was probably a useful 
aquisition for Sholl and Lewis, having sufficient 
expertise to provide the guidelines for the structure of 
their case. (Interview, Mr. Justice Mclnerney). All 
three barristers were strongly anti-Communist.
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Party began: assisting Counsel went into conference with
Cecil Sharpley and officials of the Crown Law Department; ^ 4  
Press notices advertised for witnesses; and Mr. Hollway wrote 
to Prime Minister Chifley requesting the Federal Government to 
make officers of A.S.I.O. available to testify at the 
Commission. Chifley told the House of Representatives that he 
was personally against the proposal, because if these officers 
became known to the public, the value of their work would be 
jeopardised. No security witnesses appeared at the inquiry.
Meanwhile, charges of Communist malpractice featured with 
increasing prominence in the speeches of Federal politicians and 
of campaigners for the imminent Victorian Legislative Council 
Election. L.G. Norman, M.L.A., (Liberal, Glen Iris) predicted 
to a meeting of Melbourne University students with remarkable 
foresight that the Royal Commission would probably be 'the 
prelude to Australian spy trials '.136 The Leader of the Federal 
Opposition, touring Victoria for the commencement of his own 
election campaign, congratulated his Victorian Liberal 
colleagues on making the right choice between a limited State 
ban on the Communist Party and the appointment of a Commission 
of inquiry, because 'the findings would be of great value to
13 7any Government that wanted to tackle the menace of Communism'.
Not one commentator appeared to doubt that the Commission would 
damn the Party. The Royal Commissioner-elect could scarcely 
have been blamed if he did not relish the prospect of the task 
ahead of him.
134. Sharpley, The Great Delusion, p. 133.
135. C.P.D., vol. 203, 22 June 1949, p. 1299.
136. Sun, 13 July 1949.
137. Age, 24 May 1949.
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CHAPTER TWO : SIR CHARLES LOWE, ROYAL COMMISSIONER
As the year 1949 slipped into its first month of 
winter, the Federal Elections loomed closer, and the 
politicians' debate on the fate of the Australian Communist 
Party gathered an inevitable momentum. But in Melbourne's 
First Civil Court, the Royal Commission on Communism opened 
for its preliminary hearing on June 6 with disappointingly 
little drama. The Victorian constabulary were conspicuous 
in their numbers, but the hostile Communist demonstration 
expected by the Press did not eventuate, and most of the 
crowd which collected in the precincts of the court were 
ordinary Melbourne citizens probably hoping to glimpse the 
arrival of the Communist Party's 'bosses'.-*- For most of 
them, the interest of the moment did not extend to pro­
ceedings inside the court, and there were few present other 
than men of the law when Sir Charles Lowe took his seat for 
the first time as the Victorian Government's appointed 
investigator of Communism.
The business of the preliminary hearing was not in 
fact the stuff of public sensation. It was concerned largely 
with matters of legal representation, and Reginald Sholl 
K.C., leading the team of Counsel Assisting the Commission, 
gave only an intimation of the 'revelations' which the 
inquiry would bring when it opened in earnest on June 20.
The Commissioner rejected the Communists' request for an 
adjournment of at least one month to enable them to prepare 
their defence. The terms of the Commission indicated that he 
should proceed as soon as possible, said Lowe. 'There are some 
limits to this inquiry, and I can assure you that I am going 
to keep within [them! if I can.' (RCT 4). But he did grant 
the Communist Party leave to appear by Counsel, 'as a matter 
of course', and he thereupon accepted the appearances of 
four Communist barristers: Fred Paterson, member of the
Queensland Legislative Assembly and the senior member of the
1. Herald, 6 June 1949.
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group; E.F. Hill, Secretary of the Victorian Communist Party; 
E.A.H. Laurie, a practising barrister at the Victorian Bar; 
and Max Julius, of the Queensland Bar.
Another barrister, E.R. Reynolds K.C., who sought 
leave to represent Cecil Sharpley and the Melbourne Herald, 
discovered that Lowe was not dispensing his favours easily.
Mr. Reynolds: ... I suggest that we have a
real interest in supporting the allegations 
which have been made. Sharpley and the Herald 
practically stand in the role of accusers.
The Commissioner: They do not stand in the
role of accusers before me. My authority comes 
from my Commission.
With these words Lowe deferred his decision upon appearance 
for Sharpley until such time as he might be called as a 
witness. As for the Herald, Lowe saw 'no more reason for 
allowing them to be represented by Counsel than any other 
individual or corporation in the community', and the 
application was refused. (RCT 7-8).
On the whole, it was a subdued beginning to what 
was later to be described by the Press as an event 'unique 
in Australian legal history.'2 34 Those present at the 
preliminary hearing could not have anticipated that before 
it reached an end nine months later, the Commission would 
have heard the testimony of 159 witnesses, examined 1083 
documents and other exhibits, and produced a transcribed 
record of proceedings which covered almost 10,000 pages.
The Victorian Government was ultimately compelled to find 
£ 35,000 to meet the cost of its 'creation', a sum more than 
three times in excess of its original estimate.^ And those 
Press-men responsible for the blaze of sensationalism which 
marked the early stages of the inquiry were not to know that 
there was to come a time when they would find more cause for 
comment in its extraordinary longevity than in its revelations.
2. Argus, 7 March 1950.
3. Report, p. 6.
4. See VPD, Vol. 230 (11 October 1949) p. 2672; VPD, Vol. 
S3<2. (28 June 1950) p. 142.
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5From 'one of the places to look in at' in July 1949, the 
courtroom which housed the Commission eventually became the 
preserve of only the lawyers and the hardy 'stayers'. Like 
a visiting relative, said the Herald, it had 'outstayed its 
welcome'.^
PART (i) SIR CHARLES LOWE
In appearance Sir Charles Lowe was almost a 
caricature of the austere, stern-faced Judge, able to strike 
fear in the heart of an accused person before him, and a 
sense of futility in a barrister seeking to impress. But 
in many ways that 'granite countenance'^  belied the wit and 
real humanity of the personality beneath it. In the Supreme 
Court Lowe carried an air of immense authority and legal 
wisdom, and when certain of the guilt of those whom he was 
called upon to judge, he did not baulk at calling for the 
full punishment that the law demanded. On the other hand, 
he observed scrupulously the maxim that in a court of law an 
accused person should be given the benefit of the doubt until 
proven guilty, gaining the reputation not merely for a strict 
impartiality, but for being a good defendants' Judge because 
of his unwillingness to convict on the basis of 'reasonable
osuspicion' of guilt. Neither was he a slave to precedent.
As his biographer Newman Rosenthal writes, '... where the 
prior authority seemed to operate harshly or unjustly in 
relation to the facts with which he was dealing, he was astute 
to look for differentiating features which enabled him to say 
it really furnished no precedent'.^
Nevertheless, Lowe held a deep conviction in the 
sanctity of the law and constituted authority, which probably 
weighed more strongly with him than any political persuasion, 
including anti-Communism. His political outlook could 
perhaps be best described as liberal-conservative in the
5. Sun, 12 July 1949.
6. Herald, 6 March 1950.
7. Australian, 22 March 1969.
8. Based on information given to me by E.W. Lawn in an 
interview in Melbourne, 4 August 1971.
9. N. Rosenthal, Sir Charles Lowe (Melbourne, 1968), p. 33.
Mr. Justice Lowe, as Supreme Court Judge.
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nineteenth-century tradition. He avoided any personal 
identification with a political party, and indeed, exhibited 
a positive distaste for the 'intrusion' of politics into 
activities outside the parliamentary sphere. A University, 
he believed, should be a place for objective discussion, 
a 'forum in which all views can be discussed, but never a 
machine for propoganda. ' It should avoid any appearance 
of being partisan in connection with controversial political 
issues, Chancellor Lowe told the Melbourne University Council 
at the time of the 1951 Communist Party Referendum; in a 
political debate all sides of the issue should be represented. 
This viewpoint prompted him to express disapproval of the 
action of three professors during the Referendum campaign 
when they spoke publicly in favour of a 'No' vote.H 
According to Rosenthal, Lowe was also personally opposed to 
the active participation of students in political movements, 
and to the setting up of University clubs with external 
political affiliations. And yet he would firmly defend the 
students' right to have these clubs, if they wanted them. 2^ 
As President of the English-Speaking Union from 
1939 until 1946, and of the Australian-Asian Association 
after 1956, Lowe was adamant that both these organisations 
should divorce themselves from involvement in current 
political questions, and exist simply as 'good-will 
associations'. 'We know nothing of politics, religion does
not concern us, and we are indifferent to the "isms" of
1 ^members', Lowe said of the English-Speaking Union.
Likewise, he would have nothing to do with agitation by a
section of the Australian-Asian Association against the
White-Australia policy, even when, as his biographer points
out, it was having a detrimental effect upon Australian-
14Asian relations. He was prepared to do his utmost to 
soften the effect of the law where he saw that it might lead
10. Sir Charles Lowe, Statement to Melbourne University 
Council, 12 November 1951; quoted in Rosenthal, op. 
cit. , p.168.
11. See Rosenthal, op.cit., pp.161-9.
12. Ibid., p.171.
13. Ibid., p.194.
14. Ibid., p.183.
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to unwarranted hardship. But if the law was faulty it must 
be altered by Parliament, not challenged by the individual.
In the light of these attitudes, one is bound to 
assume that the methods and aims of Communism would have 
been repugnant to Lowe. How well informed he was about the 
Communist Party before he undertook the Royal Commission, 
and to what extent he had absorbed current notions concerning 
the nature of Communism, can only be conjectured; but a 
Party which chose to work outside the parliamentary 
democratic system for the overthrow of lawfully-constituted 
government must surely have been an anathema to him.
Equally, one suspects he would have been repelled by Communist 
invective and written propoganda against the higher echelons 
of the government and business worlds, the rights of private 
property, and the 'Capitalist' laws. In Communist eyes Lowe 
was part of a judicial system set up to operate the law on 
behalf of, and in the interests of, the capitalist bureaucracy. 
Lowe would have found this idea distasteful: not only did
he strive to ensure that his work in the Supreme Court was 
kept detached from politics and from his non-judicial 
activities, but he also possessed a profound faith in the 
objective reality of justice, and confidence in his own ability 
to see it done. If he was aware of any bias against 
Communism, he would have made every effort to see that it did 
not affect his decisions when he was asked to deal with 
Communists in the courts.
There is no doubt that Lowe's conduct of the war­
time Royal Commissions had contributed significantly to his 
high standing as a Judge. When writing of him in later years, 
the Australian Press always made special mention of his work 
as a Royal Commissioner. 'His sense of the liberty of the 
subject is keen', said the Age in 1959, 'and he discharged 
these tasks with firmness and justice. His reports were 
models of temperance and wisdom.'15 Melbourne University's 
Farrago in his obituary opined that Lowe had emerged from 
the Royal Commissions 'with an enhanced reputation for sagacity
15. Age, 24 January 1959.
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1 cand fair-mindedness'.
Lowe had accepted the Commissions despite the
Victorian Supreme Court's traditional opposition to
allowing its Judges to participate in Executive inquiries
17of a political nature. According to E.W. Lawn , and as
evidenced by Lowe's own record, he had no objection in
principle to conducting a Royal Commission, even one
investigating a subject with the obvious political overtones
of the 'Brisbane Line' controversy. He believed that
Commissions of Inquiry had a very positive value, both in
the education of the public and in the informing of the
Executive. Essentially he belonged to the school of thought
which held that the advantage of having a Royal Commission
on a controversial topic conducted by a person who possessed
both a large measure of public respect and considerable
experience in the sifting and evaluation of evidence, far
outweighed any possible detrimental effects upon the
prestige of the Judiciary as a result of one of its members
18'stepping into the political arena'. His single criticism 
of such inquiries is a significant one: Lowe's biographer
implies that he regarded the propensity of governments to 
avoid acting upon the findings of their Royal Commissions 
with a displeasure all the more sharp because it derived from 
his personal experience.^
The Victorian Government's carefully-worded state­
ment informing the public that their appointee to the 
inquiry into Communism had accepted his Commission after 
'serious consideration' was no doubt in part motivated by 
a desire to protect Lowe's judicial reputation. Nevertheless, 
there is independent evidence to suggest that in this 
particular case he did undertake the task with some 
reservations, and that his impulse derived from a sense of
16. Farrago 1969 (From Herald cuttings file).
17. Interviews with E.W. Lawn, Melbourne, 21 June 1971, 
4 August 1971.
18. Lawn's information on this point was confirmed by 
Newman Rosenthal in an interview in Melbourne, 22 
June 1971.
19. Rosenthal, op.cit., pp.101-2.
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2 0duty rather than any more positive inclination. The 
impression is borne out by a number of remarks Lowe made 
during the proceedings, and particularly, by his response 
to the requests of Communist Counsel for his resignation 
from the Commission.
On the first day of formal hearings, E.F. Hill
suggested that Lowe should refuse to act as Royal
Commissioner because he was a shareholder in the Herald
and Weekly Times Ltd., a company which, he alleged, had
direct interests in the proceedings. Moreover, the terms
of reference were such that the Commission would necessarily
traverse the same subjects as the libel proceedings
initiated in the Supreme Court by the Communist Party.
'It is submitted', said Hill, 'that Your Honour should
return the Commission in this matter on the ground, to use
the words of Lord Chief Justice Hewitt, that "it is not
merely of some importance, but it is of fundamental
importance that justice should not only be done, but should
manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done"' (RCT 8) Hill
claimed that the allegations made by Sharpley and the Herald
were 'notorious facts' in the setting up of the Commission.
'No facts will be notorious facts except when they are proved
before me', was Lowe's sharp rejoinder.
... The Herald and Weekly Times is no party to 
the proceedings before this Commission. My duty 
is to inquire in accordance with the Commission 
which has been issued to me and in accordance with 
the evidence which is brought before me. I see 
no embarrassment whatever in doing that, and I 
think that the application which is made has no 
ground to support it. (RCT 9)
Two days later F. Paterson made his first appearance
at the hearings after conducting Lawrence Sharkey's criminal
defence in Sydney. He repeated Hill's objection, to which
Lowe replied at length and with obvious annoyance:
Nothing would please me better than to be free of 
the almost infinite labour which this Commission 
involves. But it is not a question of my personal 
pleasure, it is a question of the duty which has 
been imposed upon me to carry out this Commission.
20. See Chapter 1, p. 58.
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... If I thought there was the slightest ground 
upon which suspicion might rest that justice was 
not being done or not being seen to be done, I 
should be prepared to accede to the application 
which has been made before me ... I do not think 
any fair-minded person in the community could, 
for one instant, think that the holding of these 
shares in any way affected my decision in matters 
which are committed to me ... I cannot see the 
slightest ground for the suggestion which is 
made, and I do not accede to it, although as I 
said at the beginning I very willingly would be 
free of the duties which have been imposed upon 
me.
(RCT 687)
In the event, Lowe conducted the Commission with
a patience and interest which contradicted the antipathy
expressed in these words; one wonders if they were more a
product of irritation at the Communists' implication that
he was biassed in his attitude to the proceedings, than a
true indication of his feelings. But there were two aspects
of the Commission which undoubtedly gave him cause for
misgivings - its highly charged political atmosphere, and
the size of the investigations dictated by the terms of
reference. On several occasions he expressed displeasure
at the amount of outside publicity being given to the
evidence, and by implication, at the way it was being utilised
in the current political controversy over the Communist issue.
He recognised, too, the transference of this same controversy
into the hearings of the Commission, and made every effort
2 ]to exclude it where he could.
The extraordinary breadth of the terms of reference 
affected Lowe in a more personal way. He was probably 
anticipating the size of the task ahead when he determined 
from the beginning to hold sittings on every available Court 
day. As the inquiry extended from weeks into months, and 
the transcribed record into thousands of pages, he must have 
felt increasingly apprehensive about the vast amount of work 
which was to face him at the end in collating and analysing 
the evidence for the purposes of his Report. His constant
21. These matters of publicity and propaganda are dealt 
with at a later point in this Chapter.
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aim was to keep the investigation within limits commensurate 
with the self-imposed requirement that he form just 
conclusions about its subject matter and provide accused 
persons with scope for an adequate defence. Thus he was 
willing to admit only so much evidence as he considered 
necessary to enable him to fulfil that requirement. 'I do 
not want to spread the net any wider than I am bound to 
spread it', commented Lowe on one occasion during proceedings. 
(RCT 3522). The same sentiment lay behind many of his 
procedural rulings and personal attitudes.
PART (ii) PROCEDURE
Lowe never hesitated to point out to Counsel that 
as Royal Commissioner he had wide discretionary powers in 
deciding upon procedure and the kinds of evidence he would 
accept. And while he afforded assisting Counsel 
considerable freedom to determine the nature and presentation 
of their case, he made it plain from the outset that control
2 Oof proceedings was to remain firmly in his own hands.
To all intents and purposes, the inquiry was conducted in the 
manner of a litigation between parties in a court of law, 
and Lowe usually adhered to the normal rules of evidence. But 
he reserved the right to vary this approach where he 
considered it necessary, and Counsel who questioned his 
tendency to discard legal precedent were sharply over-ruled. 
Such was the case when Stanley Lewis objected to the request 
of an independent lawyer (J. Lazarus) for leave to appear 
on behalf of the Federated Clerks' Union to refute a
22. Lowe was adamant in his enforcement of the Royal
Commission procedure that persons could appear before 
him by his leave only, and not by right. When one 
Counsel inadvertently overlooked that fact and opened 
his remarks with the words, 'If Your Honour pleases,
... I appear with my learned friend Mr. -- .', he was
at once corrected by Lowe: 'I do not think you do'. 
Counsel thereupon rephrased them: 'I beg Your Honour's
pardon. I appear here with my learned friend Mr. -- .
to ask Your Honour for leave to appear before Your 
Honour' Lowe then granted leave, as he did in almost 
every other case. (RCT 939)
I shall hereafter refer to all Counsel appearing at 
the Commission other than Communist and assisting 
Counsel as independent Counsel.
23.
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particular section of evidence, when that same union was
being represented on other matters at the Commission by
another lawyer. Lewis submitted that the application of
Mr. Lazarus was a misrepresentation of the proper legal rules.
The Commissioner: What you say, Mr. Lewis, is
unchallengeable if I were dealing in a Court of 
law. But I am dealing in a proceeding in which 
I can mould the procedure in the way I think 
best calculated to deal justice.
Mr. Lewis: I submit to Your Honour that what
has been put to you is to do something that has 
never been heard of before.
The Commissioner: It may be heard of after this
case. ~ .
(RCT 5931)
In the same vein, Lowe dispensed with the normal 
practice of having Counsel make tneir final submissions at 
the end of the investigation in. verbal form. He required 
instead that they should present them in writing, a novelty 
which had its origins in Lowers desire to shorten the length 
of the Commission as far as possible, and to enforce a greater 
degree of .conciseness than was the general rule in oral 
submissions. But it was symptomatic of his whole attitude 
to the investigation. Whilst never for a moment abandoning 
an air of strict authoritv his conduct of the proceedings 
was characterised by a very marked flexibility of approach, 
which, in conjunction with his efforts to remain impartial 
in the treatment of both 'sides', resulted in a Commission
24. Lowe considered the application overnight, and refused 
it. On another occasion, Lewis objected to Lowe's 
decision in allowing Communist Counsel Ted Laurie 
to postpone his cross-examination of a witness whom 
assisting Counsel had put into the box without notice^ . 
Mr. Lewis: I think this idea that you must be given •
a chance to rehearse for some time- before you can cross- 
examine a witness who is suddenly put into the box is 
quite foreign to all the procedure of the Court.
The Commissioner: It may be, but I am trying to get at
the truth of the various matters which are alleged 
before me, and if, by Mr. Laurie cross-examining at 
the moment, some matters are over-looked which would 
be cross-examined about if he were given a little 
further time, then I may be handicapped in getting at 
what the truth is. (RCT 5748) .
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of Inquiry which was in a real sense 'objective'. 
Representation and rights of parties
In a court of law the presentation of evidence is 
accomplished by contending parties through an adversary 
process, but in a Royal Commission it is the usual practice 
(because there are no formally defined charges) for all 
evidence which has any relevance to its subject to be 
gathered and presented by Counsel assisting the Commission.
Any individual or group with information which could be of 
use to the Commission customarily provides that information 
to assisting Counsel, who then decide if and how it will be 
made available to the inquiry.
Lowe's decision to grant separate representation 
to the Communist Party was, as he pointed out, a departure 
from this practice, for it sanctioned a proceeding which 
was in effect a litigation inter partes. But he did place 
certain limitations on the Communist Counsel's rights to 
operate as ordinary defence Counsel. Lowe explained his 
purpose thus: '[The Communists] are, in some sense, in the
position of an accused party, and naturally, as a matter of 
fairness, I have given them leave to appear, but that leave 
... does not put them in any sense in a parallel position to 
those assisting the Commission'. He went on to define the 
role he was allowing the Communist Counsel to play. In 
general the scope of the evidence to be placed before him 
would be determined by Counsel assisting him, 'but if the 
evidence adduced ... is in any way an imperfect picture or 
in any way a false picture, then those who have been given 
leave to appear may show, either by cross-examination or by 
evidence, that it is a false or an incomplete picture.'
(RCT 617). In other words, the Communists were able to cross- 
examine any witness called by assisting Counsel, and to 
adduce evidence themselves by producing witnesses and 
submitting documentary material as exhibits, but in the 
coverage of subject matter they were restricted to only that 
evidence which rebutted, amplified or varied evidence 
adduced by assisting Counsel. Thus the Communist Party's
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case was to be determined essentially by the kinds of 
evidence upon which assisting Counsel chose to concentrate 
in the presentation of their own case.
On several occasions Lowe saw fit to remind the 
Communist Counsel of the limitations on their leave to 
appear, but within the framework he had set down he 
generally treated them on an equitable basis with assisting 
Counsel, and allowed them to operate in a fashion akin to 
that of defence Counsel in a court litigation inter p artes .
At the commencement of the Party's case he assured Ted 
Laurie: 'I shall give you the fullest opportunity of meeting
anything which has been said against you. You need have 
no fear about that'. (RCT 6296) And he was true to his word.
Assisting Counsel's privilege to direct the course 
of the inquiry was enhanced by Lowe's evident wish to keep 
his own interference in proceedings to a minimum. He often 
expressed the view that he must have confidence in assisting 
Counsel's judgement as to what material would be useful to 
him, and that he did not feel inclined to shut out a 
particular matter until he had heard the whole of the evidence 
and could see for himself where it was leading. 5^ That 
assisting Counsel fully appreciated the strength of their 
position was apparent when Mclnerney expressed his view of 
an objection by J.M. Cullity^ to the political nature of 
the evidence given by one of assisting Counsel's witnesses.
'I consider Mr. Cullity's objections most improper. Counsel 
assisting Your Honour in this inquiry is determining what 
evidence to place before you', protested Mclnerney. (RCT 4553)
Strictly speaking, there are no accused parties 
before an Executive inquiry, and there is no formal 
prosecution, but in granting the Communist Party the right 
to conduct their own case, Lowe in effect left assisting
25. This attitude was in conflict with his desire to keep 
the length of the inquiry within practical limits, 
but at times it prevailed.
26. Independent Counsel appearing for a group of Communist- 
dominated trade unions.
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Counsel free to present the evidence against the Party in the 
form of a 'case for the Crown'. He reprimanded one barrister 
who referred to assisting Counsel as 'Counsel assisting the 
prosecution' , and Mr. Sholl, too, was very loathe to allow 
himself to be described thus. 'I intend to conduct this 
examination as Counsel assisting Your Honour for the purpose 
of getting information to place before the Commission and 
without any intention of conducting it as a prosecution', he 
said. (RCT 940). But Sholl had already indicated that his 
case would 'concern itself rather naturally more with those 
activities which transcend the proper bounds and are directed 
by improper means towards the achievement of those objectives 
(RCT 104). And while the Communist Party would probably have 
regarded a great deal of the Communist literature read at 
the Commission and submitted as exhibits by assisting 
Counsel as demonstrating its advocacy of worthy causes, it 
can be doubted that Sholl's intention was to portray the 
Party in such a light.
At an early stage in the proceedings it became 
evident that in a further and important respect the rights 
of assisting Counsel were to be more extensive than those of 
the Communists. Fred Paterson complained about assisting 
Counsel's tendency to 'lead' the evidence of their witnesses 
in other words, that in their questions they were leading 
the witness about subject matter which was challenged by the 
Communist Party, instead of restricting themselves to 
introductory or undisputed evidence, as is the rule in 
litigation in the courts. On this point, Lowe ruled in 
favour of assisting Counsel, The terms of the Commission 
indicated that it was inquisitorial in nature, he said, and 
he saw no reason why assisting Counsel should not present 
the evidence 'in any convenient way to elicit the truth'.
(RCT 69) .
Somewhat later, argument again developed between 
counsel on the same issue, and Sholl was prompted to make
27. 'Perhaps truth comes out even by inadvertence', 
remarked the barrister in withdrawing his words.
75
a lengthy submission to Lowe. He emphasised that the 
Commission was not bound to operate in the same fashion as 
a litigation between parties, since there were 'no issues 
defined by pleadings and ... no parties as such'. He 
submitted that the duty of assisting Counsel was to enable 
'the correct ascertainment of the facts into which the 
Commissioner is directed to inquire', and that they should 
be entitled to proceed in any manner which would best achieve 
that result. (RCT 691). In expressing agreement, Lowe drew 
attention to the powers of compulsion granted to him by the 
Royal Commission Act, powers which indicated the likelihood 
that he would have to deal with hostile witnesses. In 
those circumstances, he declared, it would be 'absurd' to 
restrict assisting Counsel to only those questions which 
could legitimately be asked if he were calling a witness 
in court litigation. (RCT 692).
Appearances other than those of the Communist 
Party and Counsel assisting the Commission were on the basis 
of very limited rights. Numerous individuals and organisations 
who considered themselves implicated by the evidence sought 
leave to appear in an effort to clear their reputations.
For the most part they were people who wished to deny that 
they had connections with the Communist Party, or 
Communist trade union officials who wished to deny allegations 
of ballot rigging and other misdeeds. Lowe showed the same 
concern for their welfare as 'accused' persons as he had for 
the Communist Party itself, although naturally he did not 
give them the same freedom of operation in the proceedings. 
Where the allegation against them had been made under oath, 
he required their own testimony to be given under oath.
They were able to cross-examine their accuser on matters 
which affected themselves, but they could not duplicate by 
cross-examination evidence already given; nor were they given 
leave to call other witnesses to support their defence.
And in general they were not permitted to address the 
Commissioner at the end of inquiry. (RCT 684).
These limitations had their source partly in 
Lowe's attempt to curtail the length of proceedings, and
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partly in the fact that he considered he was not called upon 
to make any findings on what he regarded as matters 
'incidental' to his main inquiry. In the Report he pointed 
out that Press attention to the proceedings had ensured 
publicity for both accusation and denial. Consequently he 
felt it was not incumbent upon him to do more than provide 
an opportunity for the denial to be made. 'Any other course 
would, I think, have rendered the inquiry well-nigh 
interminable.' Lowe made an exception in a few instances 
where he saw that the evidence was liable to damage the 
accused person in a public or professional capacity; and 
about these he gave specific findings in his Report.
Two barristers became important protagonists in 
the inquiry as a result of the interests they represented. 
The first, E.R. Reynolds K.C., was given leave to appear for 
Cecil Sharpley after he had convinced Lowe that an attack 
on Sharpley's credit and character was likely to be made 
by persons implicated by his evidence. (RCT 684) . Reynolds 
accordingly cross-examined all those who came forward 
to deny Sharpley's allegations, but he did so within the 
rules laid down by Lowe, and he was not permitted to make a 
final address on Sharpley's behalf. The other was J.M. 
Cullity,-^0 for whom Lowe eventually bent the rules, 
allowing him a role in the proceedings scarcely less 
prominent than that of assisting and Communist Counsel. 
Cullity represented a number of trade unions and individual 
officers within them who were implicated in Sharpley's 
ballot-rigging allegations. Since the allegations were in 
substance part of the general case against the Communist
28. Perhaps this was a case of wishful thinking on Lowe's 
part. In practice, while the daily Press usually gave 
prominence to allegations made at the Commission, the 
denials were frequently neglected altogether.
29. Report, p.6.
30. J.M. Cullity was (according to Mr. Justice Mclnerney, 
interview, Melbourne, 15 October 1971) one of the most 
brilliant cross-examiners at the Victorian Bar at that 
time. His 'brilliance' was amply demonstrated during 
the course of his participation in the proceedings; 
and he had a quick wit which matched Lowe's own.
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Party, Cullity stood in a rather different position to that 
of other 'interveners'. Lowe allowed him to call his own 
witnesses, and, after some hesitation, to make a final 
submission.  ^^
Interpretation of the terms of reference
Apart from the rulings determining the Communist
Counsel's rights to appear, those which most crucially
affected their legal position at the Commission were concerned
with Lowe's definition of how the terms of reference should
be interpreted. Argument on this matter was extensive,
involving several related points: to what extent the
investigation should be a general one, as distinct from
an examination of the subversive actions particularised in
the terms of reference; how far it could range in territorial
terms and in time span; and how those 'persons and
organisations associated' with the Party should be defined.
In following the course of the argument through the
proceedings it becomes apparent that Lowe's decisions were
the product of a very real sense of dilemma. Time and again
he found that an attempt to limit the length of the inquiry
conflicted with other considerations such as his desire to
hear the 'whole truth' of the matters before him, and to
give 'accused' persons an opportunity to reply to the
evidence which affected them. Usually his rulings on the
scope of evidence he was willing to admit were a compromise
solution. In the Report Lowe writes:
Much but not all of this mass of evidence is 
attributable to the extreme width of the 
investigation committed to me. A good deal 
of it, however, is due to my desire not to 
shut out any relevant evidence which the 
Communist Party or its members or any person 
affected by the evidence desired to submit.
And the record will show, I think, that wherever 
I have checked the giving of evidence it has 
been because the ground had already been covered 
or the evidence only affected the credit of the 
witness - of which I was the sole judge - or I ^  
thought that a fact had been sufficiently tested.
31. Report, p.6.
32. Ibid.
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Within the boundaries Lowe laid down in his interpretation 
of the terms of reference, this is an accurate description 
of the basis of his rulings.
Assisting Counsel's stated preoccupation with the 
evidence of Communist 'misdeeds' called forth much opposition 
from the Party's Counsel. They consistently pressed upon 
the Commission their view that a correct reading of the 
inquiry's terms demanded that the aims and activities of 
the Communist Party be looked at in their totality; the 
particular charges against it could not be understood as 
circumscribing the general clause which asked for an 
investigation of 'origins, aims, objects and funds'. 'I 
cannot see how you can limit it and prevent us from going 
into the whole of our activities - otherwise we might as 
well be put on trial, and then at least we would have the 
right to trial by jury', argued Paterson. (RCT 253-4).
During the course of his first ruling on the matter 
Lowe admitted that the general clause was not necessarily 
limited by the allegations which followed. (RCT 256). But 
an appreciation of the enormity of the task involved in 
an exhaustive investigation of the Party meant that in 
practice he was disinclined to apply a broad interpretation, 
and as the proceedings wore on he made increasingly clear 
his concurrence with the view of Mr. Sholl. The general 
words in the terms of reference, Lowe declared at one point, 
had been included so as to enable the Commission to look at 
matters outside Victoria and thus to place State Communist 
activities in their proper setting. 'Beyond that, in my 
view, those general words do not enable this Commission to 
go' (RCT 616). In accepting assisting Counsel's decision 
to concentrate on subversive aspects of the Party he stressed 
that the Communists would have a full opportunity to answer 
the evidence against them; but '... I do not concede this 
Commission to be a roving Commission on every aspect of 
political activity in this Party', he told Paterson. (RCT 247).
The Communists did not lightly abandon their 
argument for a full-scale inquiry since their freedom to 
demonstrate the Party's 'good works' was at stake. Paterson
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quoted the High Court judgement of Evatt J. in the 1932 
Devanny Case^ to illustrate the extent of subject matter 
necessarily involved in a determination of whether the 
Communist Party worked towards the forceful overthrow of 
established government. He claimed that in order to comply 
with its terms of reference the Commission would have to 
refer to the writings of socialist thinkers as far back in 
history as Engels. The whole inquiry, he thought, would 
(and should) last for at least twelve months. (RCT 389).
Ted Hill took up the same point during his cross-
examination of Sharpley, when he complained to Lowe that
if the Party was only able to meet the picture presented by
Counsel assisting the Commission, the result would
necessarily be one-sided.
Mr. Hill: We can only present a clear picture
of our position by referring not only to the 
conditions in every part of the world, but also 
to the whole of history; and that is precisely 
the point which Mr. Paterson had in mind when 
he was referring to Devanny's case.
The Commissioner: It is a point of view that I
am not going to allow to be developed.
(RCT 1205)
At the beginning of the Party's own case, Lowe re-affirmed 
his attitude. '... It may be that the Communist Party has 
many benevolent activities, if I may put it that way, but 
I do not think I am called upon in this Commission to 
investigate them.' (RCT 6616).
Lowe's rulings on the reading of documents was 
another cause for disputation. It first became an issue 
when Paterson wanted to read the Communist Manifesto in full, 
as part of his attempt to counter what he considered to be 
an anti-Communist witness's biassed selection of Party 
literature. ^  Lowe objected that he would be there 'until 
the crack of doom' if he allowed full reading of historical 
documents. 'I don't propose to listen to it', he said.
'I will read it myself as I will all documents put in.'
33. The King v. Hush; ex parte Devanny, Vol. 48 CLR 516 ff.
34. The witness was M.H. Ellis; see Chapter 3, p. 128 ff.
80
Subsequently Lowe elaborated the point. Counsel could 
submit as exhibits relevant documents in their entirety, but 
in their reading they should operate selectively.
Communist Counsel should refer to those parts of the document 
that modified the evidence already given, where they 
considered that the picture suggested by that evidence was 
insufficient or inaccurate. (RCT 549-50).^5
The Communists were obliged to abide by this 
ruling, but they continued periodically to voice their 
dissatisfaction with the way it disadvantaged them. They 
drew attention to the fact that because assisting Counsel 
were using Communist literature to prove a case against 
the Party, the public were receiving a distorted image of its 
true nature. Documents ought to be read in full for a proper 
appreciation of their meaning, and they should never be 
regarded in isolation from the historical events which 
produced them. (RCT 550). To be fair, Lowe's limitation on 
the reading of documents appeared to be based purely on his 
wish to control the length of the inquiry. He was not 
unsympathetic to the point of view of Communist Counsel, and 
on a number of occasions during the proceedings he did, 
upon their request, direct assisting Counsel to give a more 
extensive reading of material than they had intended.
(RCT 3163; 3225).
The Communist Party Counsel wanted to be able to 
range widely in their efforts to explain the origin and 
meanings of their ideology; but with regard to the particular 
subversive acts of which the Party was allegedly guilty, 
they tended to press for a narrow interpretation of the 
inquiry's territorial limits and time span. The evidence of 
several ex-Communist witnesses called in support of assisting 
Counsel's case concerned allegations about the Party's 
activities in New South Wales and South Australia, and often 
about events which had taken place in the 1930's. As Ted 
Laurie pointed out to the Commission, Communist Counsel
Lowe's ruling on selectivity was quite acceptable to 
assisting Counsel, since by choice they used only those 
parts of Communist texts which they thought evidenced 
subversive aims.
35.
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faced great difficulties in meeting charges of this kind, 
because the defence was forced to rely on what records 
there were available to them from a past decade of the 
Party's existence, and from other State branches of the 
Party. Objecting to a section of evidence from an inter­
state witness, Laurie complained that if he restricted 
himself to calling evidence to show that what happened in 
New South Wales did not happen in Victoria, the position 
still remained that a particular charge against the Party 
had gone unanswered. (RCT 3118).
Lowe, as we have seen, considered it necessary 
to accept evidence from outside the territorial bounds of 
Victoria in a limited way where such evidence could throw 
some light on 'the real situation of the body in Victoria 
and the purpose of its activities'. (RCT 616). But he was 
consistent throughout in only allowing testimony of events 
in other States if it related to Constitutional and 
organisational matters, and where assisting Counsel could 
give a reasonable indication that the same rules were likely 
to have applied also in the Victorian branch.
The most revealing argument on this question arose 
while J.N. Rawling was in the witness box.^ Rawling was 
an ex-Communist who had been a Party-member in New South 
Wales until 1939, and virtually all of his evidence related 
to the Communist activities in that State. From the 
beginning of his evidence-in-chief, Communist Counsel had 
made intermittent objections to the far-ranging nature of 
his material, which, they claimed, carried no proof of 
connection with Victorian activities, and sometimes these 
had been upheld by Lowe. (RCT 2600; 2813). At one particular 
stage in the evidence, Laurie protested that the internal 
practices of the New South Wales Communist Party could have 
no relevance to the way the Party's Constitution was carried 
out in practice by Victorian Communist organisations. 
Mclnerney, who was conducting the questioning of Rawling, 
justified his approach by drawing attention to the fact that
36. See Chapter 3, p. 144 ff.
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a great deal of the evidence which had been placed before
the Commission clearly showed that the Constitution was
uniform throughout Australia. The ruling with which Lowe
concluded argument on the matter represents very well his
attitude to an interpretative problem which obviously
presented him with difficulties:
I propose to admit this evidence, but I am not 
at all sure that in the final analysis of the 
evidence upon which I have to report I will pay 
any attention to it. From the very nature of the 
inquiry which I have to conduct, I think that 
at times I must take evidence that is submitted 
by those assisting the Commission as helping me 
in some aspect of the matters upon which I have 
to report, but as to which at the moment I 
cannot see a clear connection, and if it turns 
out ultimately that I am still in the position 
that I cannot see a clear connection with the 
evidence when I come to my report, then I shall 
disregard it ....
(RCT 3110)
The Commission's terms of reference asked Lowe 
to make findings as to whether the Party's activities 'are 
or have been' directed at the ends listed, and he was 
unwilling to impose a precise definition on the extent to 
which he considered the inquiry would range in time. In 
response to Ted Hill's objections, he said 'I do not see any 
limitation I can put upon it, Mr. Hill, except a reasonable 
time before the issue of the Commission, and "reasonable" 
of course must depend on what the circumstances are.'
(RCT 1639).37
The inclusion within the terms of reference of 
the phrase 'organisations and persons associated' with the 
Communist Party was the source of protracted debate between 
Counsel and Commissioner, turning not only upon the meaning 
of 'association', but also on problems of evidence. For it 
was within this context that Lowe was called upon to make 
most of his decisions as to the admissibility of extra-legal 
forms of evidence. The Communist lawyers objected a great
37. Evidence given at the Commission, even apart from
that relating to the origins and history of the Party, 
covered the two decades before 1949. On no occasion 
did Lowe refuse to admit evidence on the grounds that 
it concerned past events.
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many times during the course of assisting Counsel's case on 
the grounds that matters relating to 'associated' 
organisations and persons were being introduced into the 
inquiry in an irresponsible fashion. They claimed that 
anti-Communist witnesses were being encouraged to make 
accusations that certain persons were Communists or 
'fellow travellers' on the basis of the most meagre 
circumstantial evidence or even pure hearsay; and they 
claimed that the alleged 'association' was often of such 
a tenuous nature as to make its admissibility very dubious, 
(see RCT 1634-7).
Some independent lawyers appearing at the 
Commission to represent accused individuals, held a similar 
view. Australia-Soviet House was an allegedly 'associated' 
organisation which attracted a considerable amount of 
interest from assisting Counsel, and it was during their 
investigation of this body that the Commission's right to 
concern itself with matters lying outside the Communist 
Party's proven field of operations was most strongly 
challenged. Counsel for John Rodgers (the director of A.S.H.) 
protested to Lowe that the allegations against his 
organisation (which formed the basis of assisting Counsel's
O Oprobe) were of such a nebulous kind that they did not 
justify an investigation at all. Counsel did not dispute 
Lowe's jurisdiction to permit such an inquiry, but they 
submitted that he had a discretion in the matter, and that 
if only for the purpose of curtailing the length of pro­
ceedings, he should exercise it in order to prevent a 
'fishing' expedition into an organisation which had no proven 
connection with the Communist Party. They agreed with Lowe's 
reminder that his inquiry was legitimately inquisitorial 
in nature; but 'there are still some factors which circum­
scribe the limits to which a Royal Commission should 
infringe the normal privacy of the affairs of individuals and
38. Sharpley charged that A.S.H. was controlled by Rodgers 
in conjunction with the Communist Party, and that it 
functioned as a propoganda organisation in the Party's 
interests. See Chapter 3/ p. 163 ff.
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institutions'. (RCT 3640).
Lowe rejected their application on the grounds 
that he had some 'definite' evidence of a connection 
between A.S.H. and the Communist Party, 9^ and that he was 
obliged by the terms of his Commission to pursue it.  ^ He 
had in some earlier comments made clear that his view of 
the meaning of 'association' in the context of the inquiry 
into Communism was not without its boundaries. 'It must 
mean association which indicates a willingness to help or 
a co-operation with [the Party] ... otherwise the inquiry 
will be limitless and it may do infinite harm to a number 
of people who have no real Communist sympathies at all'.
(RCT 1638). And again: '... where the [Royal Commission]
Act refers to persons associated with the Communist Party, 
it is not referring to casual associations ... [but] to 
something much more substantial and permanent in its nature.' 
(RCT 392). In practice, though, Lowe rarely checked the 
tendency of assisting Counsel's witnesses to indulge in the 
'naming of names' even when the basis of their allegations 
of Comminist association was apparently flimsy. He usually 
justified this in terms of his right as Royal Commissioner 
to accept evidence of a kind which was strictly non- 
admissible in ordinary court proceedings, while taking care 
to stress that if the allegations ultimately were not
39. In the course of his contribution to the argument, 
Mr. Sholl asserted that the suspicious circumstances 
surrounding certain financial dealings of A.S.H. in 
themselves warranted the investigation. 'If people 
like to have secret funds and go to some pains to 
conceal them, even to the extent of creating and 
putting about false documents, then they can hardly 
complain if other people apply to them the old maxim 
that secrecy is the badge of fraud.' (RCT 3642).
40. Lowe's hearing of their application was by no means 
cursory. His patient treatment of their objections 
to a procedure that he was fully authorised to 
undertake is very typical of his whole approach to 
the conduct of the Commission.
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supported by any more substantial evidence, he would 
disregard them as a basis for his findings. (RCT 2890).^
PART (iii) LOWE'S PERSONAL ATTITUDES
Publicity and Propaganda
It became evident quite early that Lowe regarded 
with distaste the public controversy about Communism 
which provided the setting for his inquiry. 'The attitude 
that has been taken at several stages of this inquiry has 
been to assume that the people who would judge of this matter 
would be the outside public. That, of course, is completely 
wrong. I am the person appointed to inquire into this, and 
... I am the person to be convinced.' (RCT 1994). But his 
efforts to ignore the amount of publicity accorded to 
proceedings could not be entirely successful while his 
attention was constantly being drawn to the daily Press 
reports of the evidence given at the Commission. One of the 
over-riding concerns of the Communist barristers was the 
fact that the evidence adduced by assisting Counsel in making 
their case against the Party was prominently displayed by the 
news media, usually through the filter of its own anti­
communist bias. As a result, they alleged, the community 
necessarily absorbed a distorted view of the nature of 
Communism. (RCT 1699, 2961). Mr. Sholl also pointed out 
faulty newspaper reporting of proceedings, but he was 
concerned with mis-statements of fact rather than general 
bias; in any case, the latter almost invariably operated in 
support of his own standpoint.
Lowe was in fact fully aware of the propensity of 
the public to utilise the evidence in the current political 
debate. 'It is one of the great embarrassments of this
41. Lowe showed the same sense of dilemma in his rulings on 
hearsay evidence as he did in his interpretation of 
the scope of the inquiry. Due to the extraordinary 
breadth of his Commission, he seemed unwilling to shut 
out any testimony even where he could not see its 
direct relevance, because of the possibility that it 
might connect with evidence at a later stage. Ted 
Laurie was not in agreement with this procedure: 'The
difficulty about that', he said, 'is that you have all 
sorts of things put in in this way that may come to 
nothing or may come to something, and it goes out to the 
public c.. j and! all sorts of people get ideas in their 
minds which in fact are completely erroneous'. (RCT 2961).
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trial', he observed, 'that ... the evidence is getting wide 
publicity indeed, and people are drawing their own 
inferences'. (RCT 2503). He recognised, too, the damage 
which personal careers and reputations were liable to suffer 
where publicity was given to individuals implicated by the 
evidence, and it was this recognition which lay behind his 
provision for accused persons to come before the Commission 
and clear their names if they could. He was in accord with 
the application of one Counsel that denials of allegations 
should be made speedily, since the public tended to accept 
as factual, Press reports of what was mere accusation. On 
this occasion, as on others, Lowe directed Mr. Sholl to 
arrange an opportunity for the individual concerned to give 
evidence at the earliest convenient moment. (RCT 939-40).
His concern to protect people from the ill effects 
of publicity prompted Lowe to encourage assisting Counsel 
to obtain 'names' from their witnesses in written form rather 
than oral testimony. It led him also to conduct a hearing 
in camera during the investigation of the financial affairs 
of Australia-Soviet House. (see RCT 3648 ff.). But he 
refused to take any action in relation to the numerous 
instances of misreporting or biassed reporting in the 
newspapers brought to his notice by Counsel; what the Press 
stated was not his responsibility, he said. (RCT 3890)42
Propaganda in the Press did not concern Lowe; 
propaganda within the bounds of his court-room very clearly 
did, and he made every effort to eliminate it. There were 
numerous allegations made during the course of the 
Commission that it was being used for political purposes. 
Some Communist witnesses and other accused persons declared 
it had been set up to discredit 'progressive' elements in 
the community; Counsel assisting the Commission thought it
42. At a later point, Lowe declared: 'I have made no
comments on the Press's action during the course of 
this inquiry, and I do not intend to. If the Press 
over-steps the permissible limits, those assisting 
the Commission will no doubt take action before an 
appropriate tribunal, and then I shall have to deal 
with the matter in a judicial capacity, or some other 
Judge will.' (RCT 4047).
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might be used as a forum for Communist propaganda. Counsel 
on both sides did not hesitate to lay charges that politics 
were colouring the slant of questioning pursued by their 
'learned friends' at the opposite end of the bar table, or 
that certain witnesses called by opposing counsel were 
digressing from factual statements into the realm of 
political propaganda. When Ted Hill gave evidence as a 
witness for the Communist Party, he was particularly volatile 
in his remarks about the political nature of the Commission. 
He told Mr. Sholl that he continued to stand by his public 
description of the proceedings as a Communist witch hunt.
'I do not think this Commission can possibly be impartial', 
he declared. 'You might as well ask [the Commissioner] to 
investigate the existence of capitalism.' (RCT 7 3 6 8 ).^
There was inevitably a considerable amount of 
Communist political propaganda in the documentary material 
read at the Commission by Counsel in the cases both for and 
against the Party, to which Lowe made no objection: he was 
of course compelled to examine it in fulfilling the terms of 
his Commission. His task of excluding propaganda of other 
kinds must have been difficult in an inquiry dealing with a 
subject so intrinsically political. Lowe was committed to 
examine among other things the ideas advocated by the 
Communist Party, and the disputes between Communists and 
their opponents in the trade unions; here the line to be 
drawn between matters which came legitimately within the 
terms of the inquiry, and those which were mere expressions 
of a current political controversy, was an arbitrary one.
For the most part Lowe's anti-propaganda rulings were 
directed at politically-motivated criticism of individuals 
and organisations unrelated to the subject of the inquiry.
43. Lowe made no comment upon Hill's statement, but his 
retort at an earlier stage in the proceedings to 
Counsel for John Rodgers, who seemed by implication 
to be criticising Lowe's conduct of the Commission, 
is perhaps indicative of his attitude. 'If you 
think there are grounds for that recognition of 
fairness not having characterised this inquiry', he 
said, 'I should like to see the evidence of it.' 
(RCT 3639).
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He did, for instance, show real antagonism
towards the efforts of Communist and independent Counsel to
introduce into their cross-examination of assisting Counsel's
witnesses the idea that the Commission had been set up for
political purposes - that it was linked with the Melbourne
Herald's anti-Communist campaign, and that witnesses
brought forward by assisting Counsel were giving evidence in
a conscious effort to further that campaign. Ted Laurie
was quickly curtailed by Lowe when he began asking an anti-
Communist witness if he agreed with Mr. Chifley's comment
that the Commission was a 'Liberal Party stunt' (RCT 3007);
and several witnesses who came forward to refute Sharpley's
allegations were given little opportunity to elaborate upon
their theories that they were the victims of a Herald-
Liberal Party plot to discredit the Left Wing. (RCT 1736;
3623). Lowe showed a particular aversion to the naming of
prominent politicians in the course of the evidence,and
when Laurie questioned a witness about the nature of an
anti-Communist organisation to which he belonged, he was
cautioned against any attempt to plunge into 'this maelstrom
4 Rof current politics.' (RCT 5247).
With a tone of anger and embarrassment, Lowe 
checked the witness John Rodgers from reading a list of the 
original patrons of Australia-Soviet House headed by Lowe's 
own name, in an effort to prove the 'respectability' of the 
organisation. 'I am not going to allow this', Lowe ruled.
'... when the war was finished my patronage was withdrawn ...
44. The witness was T.C. McGillick, a member of the People's 
Union in Sydney. See Chapter 3, p. 151 ff.
45. When Ted Hill, during cross-examination of Sharpley, 
mentioned A.A. Calwell, M.H.R. as a moderate Labour man 
who was attacked in Herald editorials, Lowe warned him 
against the introduction of names which could be 
construed in a damaging way, unless the matter had a 
substantial connection with one of the heads of the 
inquiry. (RCT 1973). Later, he directed that a witness's 
allegations about the Communist sympathies of E.J. Ward, 
M.H.R. be struck from the record. (RCT 5058).
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any attempt to suggest that I ever had any sympathy with 
any Communist aspirations is something entirely devoid of 
foundation, and I am not going to sit here and hear such 
nonsense'. (RCT 2363).
Charges from assisting Counsel that the Communist 
Party Counsel were allowing their questions to become 'a 
vehicle for political propaganda' (RCT 1213) were usually 
accorded a receptive hearing. As he saw occasion to remind 
Ted Hill during cross-examination of Sharpley, Lowe was 
fully aware of the emphasis in Communist teaching upon the 
importance of utilising the capitalist courts as a platform 
from which to promulgate the Party's views. (RCT 1276). 
Nevertheless, he adopted an equally stern demeanour towards 
Counsel assisting him when they encouraged their witnesses 
to 'politicise' their testimony. During the investigation 
of the affairs of Actors' Equity, for example, J.M. Cullity 
(representing certain officials of that union) took 
objection to the style of Mclnerney's examination of several 
anti-Communist Equity members. 'I suspect very strongly 
that certain gentlemen in the Actors' Equity have found a 
public forum to repeat arguments and disputes which seem to 
have not the slightest or remotest connection with this 
inquiry.' Lowe agreed that the matter upon which Mclnerney 
was questioning was of no use to him. 'I have done my utmost 
to prevent anyone from making this a forum for the 
dissemination of views, and I shall still try, with I hope 
some success, to prevent it.' (RCT 4543- 4).46
The subject
Ralph Gibson's claim in his autobiography that Lowe
46. In the Report, Lowe comments that this effort was not 
always met with success. He draws attention to a 
Communist pamphlet setting out tactics for political 
propaganda in the courts. 'Nor was the attempt to 
use the proceedings for purposes of propaganda limited 
to the Communist Party'. (Report, p.6).
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'displayed a certain genuine interest in Communist theory 
and a certain respect for the evidence' ^  is supported by 
E.W. Lawn, who suggests that Lowe's wide-ranging intellectual 
interests would have prompted him to welcome the opportunity, 
provided by the Commission, to become an 'expert' on 
Communism.^ During the proceedings Lowe did not display 
this interest in a very positive fashion, but his apt 
comments and questions, even when progress was at its most 
laborious and tedious, perhaps indicate that he felt some 
natural curiosity about the subject. Certainly at no stage 
did he reveal a serious antipathy towards the ideas and 
activities of the Communist Party; and usually the only 
attitude of a personal kind to which he permitted himself to 
give expression was one of light-hearted and ironic humour.
'I suppose somebody will explain to me sometime how a thing 
which is inevitable is subject to the human will', Lowe 
remarked after Sholl had read a document concerned with the 
role of human endeavour in the Communist theory of revolutions. 
(RCT 3240). And after a particularly lengthy session of 
documents, 'I am beginning to realise what Disraeli had in 
mind in his reference to one becoming intoxicated with the 
exuberance of his own verbosity'. (RCT 3284).
Lowe's outward neutrality was emphasised by his 
'common-sense' approach to a number of contentious issues 
which arose in the evidence. He showed readiness on occasion 
to deflate the sinister aura in which assisting Counsel 
attempted to cloak some of the Communist Party's activities, 
and equally well he would check Communist Counsel when 
their efforts to contradict all the implications of assisting
47. R. Gibson, My Years in the Communist Party (Melbourne 
1966) p.156. Gibson in 1949 was a member of the 
Victorian Communist Party Executive, and was called 
as the first witness for the Party's case at the 
Commission. See Chapter 3, p. 184.
48. E.W. Lawn, interview, Melbourne, 21 June 1971.
91
Counsel's case led them to try to explain away even the most
4 9innocuous of the Party's pursuits.
Lowe undertook a considerable amount of the 
questioning of the Communist Party's two major theoretical 
witnesses,^ his participation at this stage of the inquiry 
contrasting markedly with his usual reserved demeanour.^ 
During the testimony of Gibson particularly, Laurie must 
have felt that he was losing control over the direction of 
his own case. It is not possible to judge how far Lowe's 
participation reflected a personal interest in these 
theoretical matters, and to what extent it was simply an 
effort to gain some insight into a complex section of the 
Commission's subject from the people who were in the best 
position to understand it. Lowe certainly made it plain 
that he took the Party's aims and objectives (as distinct 
from their activities) sufficiently seriously that he wanted 
to be sure in his own mind of the Communist's view of them. 
But his lively discussion and astute grasp of the theory 
makes one suspect that he possessed a very real intellectual 
curiosity, and that it considerably modified the natural 
repugnance towards Communism that could be expected of a 
politically-conservative gentleman.
It would be a mistake to terminate a discussion of 
Lowe's attitude to the subject matter, and indeed whole 
conduct of the proceedings, without referring to his dry 
sense of humour, which did so much to relieve the charged 
atmosphere of the inquiry. The Australian Press has often
49. Lowe's reaction to Laurie's attempt to lead the witness 
Gibson in an explanation of the Communist's campaign 
for free speech is typical. 'I am wondering why you 
are making this', he said to Laurie. 'It seems to me 
elementary that if you are going to advance the doctrines 
of the Party, you must have an opportunity to approach 
the minds of the people ... and I should have thought, 
with that necessity, it was obvious that the aims of your 
Party must be to remove any existing restrictions and to 
prevent the imposition of restrictions which would debar 
or fetter your approach.' (RCT 6462).
50. Ralph Gibson and Ted Hill.
51. It may be that during the investigations of Communist 
actions, where the import of the allegations was more 
serious, Lowe considered it wise to maintain a degree of 
judicial 'distance'.
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drawn attention to his talent for the witty remark, con­
trasting it with his habitually serious facial expression.
As the Melbourne Age observed, 'His quips are in a mood of
52pure fun, wrapped up with a dry gravity'. Newman Rosenthal 
has described the effect of his humour in court. 'Lowe 
possessed the essence of real wit in that it was spontaneous, 
or appeared to be so. It was not used for the purpose of 
evoking admiration for himself. It lightened the proceedings, 
... relieved a tension, and even, at times, illustrated an 
argument.'
At the Commission Lowe's wit showed itself at
unexpected moments; and after a long period in which he had
made no remarks, it was a reminder that he had not lost
concentration on the proceedings. Most often it was a
studiously neutral style of humour, and it is difficult to
find in it an expression of any personal attitude to a witness.
If there was something behind his 'mood of pure fun' he
disguised it well. One of the rare occasions when his
witticisms carried an implied comment upon the value of the
evidence was when he made an 'aside' about the capabilities of
5 4an hysterically anti-Communist witness for 'fast-talking'.
But they could also be directed at himself. During the 
investigation of ballot rigging charges against the Builders' 
Workers' Industrial Union, an Industrial Grouper (for 
assisting Counsel's case) gave evidence of his dispute with 
the Union's Returning Officer for the 1948 election, one 
George Morris. Mr. Cullity cross-examined on behalf of 
Morris.
Mr. Cullity: And Mr. Morris, you will agree, is
a mild old gentleman? - A: Oh, he's a decent old
chap.
Q: Yes, a decent old man? - A: As far as old
chaps go he is a decent chap.
The Commissioner: There are none of them very
good? - A: Oh yes, you can easily find them.
(RCT 3938)
52. Age, 24 January 1959.
53. Rosenthal, op.cit., p.35.
54. The witness was C. Moss. See Chapter 3, p. 154 ff.
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Counsel
The Victorian Communist Party's later approbation
of the conduct of the Commission is testimony to one of the
most conspicuous and important features of the proceedings:
Lowe's scrupulously fair treatment of all who appeared
before him. In Newman Rosenthal's biography of Lowe, it is
recorded that at the time of Lowe's retirement from the
Supreme Court Bench (in 1962) Ted Hill personally thanked
him for his fairness at the Commission.^ 5 In a political
pamphlet written in 1963 Hill referred again to the
Commission. 'Royal Commissions with their arbitrary powers
... are weapons of the monopolists. [Such was] the Royal
Commission on Communism in Victoria in 1949-50, where
however the monopolists made, from their point of view, the
mistake of appointing as Commissioner a man with an objective
o u t l o o k C o m i n g  from Hill, a tough and doctrinaire
57Communist, this was praise indeed.
Assisting Counsel were on the whole in a privileged 
position at the Commission, but within the framework of the 
rules Lowe laid down at the beginning, both parties were 
treated equitably. The transcript of proceedings can be 
thoroughly scrutinised, and it will reveal no evidence of a 
bias on Lowe's part for or against any particular set of 
Counsel. If his rulings more often favoured the position 
of those assisting him, it was a result of the nature of 
the inquiry and of the Communist Counsel's defensive role 
in it, rather than an expression of any personal antagonism 
which he may have felt towards the latter. In their 
objections, the Communists attempted to force the inquiry to 
proceed as closely along judicial lines as possible, as a 
means of reducing the opportunities for assisting Counsel to
55. Rosenthal, op.cit., p. 135.
56. E.F. Hill, Towards the Police State: Some Analyses
of Repressive Laws in Australia (Melbourne 1963), p.27.
57. Ted Laurie confirmed the Party's satisfaction with the
Commission in an interview, Melbourne, 1 June 1971. In 
an interview with me in Melbourne, 25 May 1970, Ted Hill 
qualified his praise of Lowe: he thought Lowe had as
objective an outlook as could be hoped for in a Judge 
conditioned by the capitalist legal system.
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introduce evidence which implied subversive action by their 
Party. Where Lowe ruled against them (and as we have seen, 
he did not always do so), he was well within his rights as 
Royal Commissioner.
To Reginald Sholl, the senior barrister assisting 
the Commission and shortly to be elevated to status of Judge 
himself, Lowe accorded a certain degree of deference, and 
he rarely saw occasion to object to his approach to witnesses. 
Far fewer rulings went against assisting Counsel when Sholl 
was conducting the questioning, than was the case with Lewis 
or Mclnerney. The latter did not share Sholl's subtle 
techniques of interrogation, and Lewis especially showed a 
tendency to initiate hostile interchanges with the Communist 
Party Counsel, and with Mr. Cullity. Lowe's relations with 
both of them were somewhat less smooth. He never reprimanded 
Counsel when they bickered among themselves over the 
implications of a particular question, but he invariably cut 
them short by pointing out that their argument would have 
no effect upon his own view of the matter. (RCT 4573).
After a bad start when Communist Counsel demanded 
that Lowe should resign his Commission, they went on to 
establish themselves quite favourably in Lowe's estimation.
It seems that he was impressed by the intellectual calibre 
of the Party's team, and particularly by the 'gentlemanly' 
qualities of Fred Paterson and Ted Laurie, who, perhaps to 
his surprise, accorded him apparently genuine courtesy and 
respect. ^ 9 Hill, who was responsible for the presentation of
58. Both Ted Laurie and Rex Mortimer (who instructed the 
Communist Party Counsel in the Commission) have taken the 
view that Mclnerney (now Mr. Justice Mclnerney of the 
Victorian Supreme Court) was the least strongly anti­
communist of assisting Counsel, and that he was willing 
to treat the Communist Counsel in a friendly fashion on 
the personal level. According to Mortimer, Sholl had a 
deep-seated aversion to Communism and Communists which
he made plain throughout the proceedings. Lewis' 
hostility, he said, was as much a result of his view of 
the barrister's combative role in the court as of his 
attitude to Communism.
59. This interpretation of Lowe's attitude to Communist 
Counsel rests not only on the opinion of Communists I 
have interviewed, but on that of E.W. Lawn (interview,
4 August 1971) and Mr. Justice Mclnerney (15 October 
1971). According to Rex Mortimer: 'So far as Paterson
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the Party's case, adopted a rather belligerent and more 
obviously 'political' approach to the proceedings, which 
must have pleased Lowe less.^ After the opening weeks of 
the hearings, Paterson returned to Queensland and took no 
further part in the Commission; somewhat later Julius also 
departed. Hill completed his cross-examination of Sharpley 
in August and after this time he ceased to appear at the 
Commission in the role of Counsel; Laurie carried on the 
defence unaided until the end. After the first few weeks, 
too, the Communist Counsel discarded their efforts to 
obstruct proceedings. Their opposition to the inquiry was 
plainly jeopardising their cause by antagonising the man 
whom they sought to convince of the Party's integrity.
Moreover, they suspected that Lowe had gained an unfavourable 
view of Sharpley's reliability as a witness, and this 
suspicion led them to adopt a more optimistic attitude to 
the value of attempting to meet the challenge of the Commission 
within its own terms.
59. Contd.
was concerned, [^ Lowe's] attitude ultimately amounted to 
affection - he recognised in him a man not only highly 
intelligent, but also genuinely selfless and humble' 
(letter, R. Mortimer to V. Rastrick, 12 January 1972).
60. An interesting angle on the difference between the 
demeanour of Hill and Laurie was provided by Sharpley.
At one point in his evidence he claimed that there had 
been a discussion at a Communist Party Executive 
meeting upon the value of the Party's barristers, and 
that Laurie had been 'passed over' in favour of Hill.
It had been agreed, he said, that Laurie tended to show 
subservience to the Judges, and did not have Hill's 
contempt for the capitalist legal system. (RCT 1140).
61. The Party had originally intended that Laurie and Hill 
in partnership would conduct the defence, but Hill was 
so deeply implicated by Sharpley's evidence that he 
had no option but to go into the witness box himself 
(Laurie, interview, Melbourne, 11 October 1971).
62. According to Laurie (interview, 11 October 1971), when 
the inquiry opened, the Party's Counsel had not decided 
whether they would go ahead and conduct the defence.
It was only their recognition that Lowe was going to 
treat them with reasonable fairness which caused them to 
stay. The alternative would have been to boycott the 
proceedings, and brand the Commission as a biassed 
(because one-sided) Communist witch-hunt.
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The 'softening' of their approach was accentuated 
when Laurie was left as the sole spokesman for the Party's 
interests. He was not reticent in voicing protest, but - 
whether deliberately or not - he managed to avoid incurring 
Lowe's antagonism by keeping his political attitudes as a 
Communist out of his objections, and by restricting himself 
to matters of procedure and evidence. Lowe's own attitude 
to the Communist Counsel's position showed a corresponding 
softening as the proceedings wore on. At times he indicated 
some appreciation of Laurie's difficulties in attempting to 
conduct what was virtually the role of Counsel for the 
defence in an inquiry where the normal legal rules did not 
apply.
The witnesses
The careful neutrality of Lowe's conduct of the 
proceedings forces any conclusions as to the direction of 
his personal sympathies to rely very largely on conjecture. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to detect a definite contrast 
in the manner he adopted towards the two broad groups of 
witnesses: the accused and their accusers. In general he
seemed inclined to offer those witnesses whose presence at 
the Commission was a result of allegations against themselves 
a gentler treatment than those who were there for the purpose 
of making the allegations. It seems to have been essentially 
a response to their role within the framework of an 
inquisitorial proceeding, and to be quite distinct from an 
evaluation of their personal integrity or the reliability of 
their evidence.
With the accused in the face of hostile questioning 
Lowe tended to be helpful, summing up their position for 
them when they were in difficulties. This was most obvious 
in the cases of those voluntary witnesses who came forward 
to deny allegations that they had Communist Party 
associations - for he was usually not concerned to test their 
evidence. But even with the Party witnesses there were many 
instances of the same basically sympathetic treatment. The 
experience of Samuel Merrifield, a Labour member in the
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Victorian Parliament, well illustrates Lowe's protective 
impulse. On his third appearance at the inquiry to answer 
allegations that he was a secret Communist, Merrifield was 
asked a series of questions by Stanley Lewis designed to 
reveal whether he had ever adopted a 'Communist line' at 
Labour Party meetings.
Mr. Lewis: Did you take part in any of those
debates or discussions dealing with the Essential 
Services? A: I am not too sure whether
there were any in our branch.
Q: Was there any discussion you remember at all
dealing with the Liberal Government's attitude in 
regard to Essential Services? - A: There were
some in our Parliamentary caucus.
The Commissioner: Well, Mr. Lewis, do you think
this is going to help me? Before it can be of any 
help at all, I must make up my mind, on the 
particular matter of the discussions, that there 
is a Communist line and an anti-Communist line.
Mr. Lewis: Of course Your Honour has had a great
deal of evidence.
The Commissioner: Oh, I know that well.
Mr. Lewis: Andthere are many things apart from
controversy in it.
The Commissioner: As I understand the witness's
attitude, he says that he did vote on questions in 
accordance with what he thought was right. And if 
the Communists happened to vote for it, so much 
the better for the Communists. [To the witness]:
That is your attitude is it not? - A: Yes, and 
I think that those who know me know that to be so.
(RCT 6163)
When Mr. Sholl complained during his cross- 
examination of Ralph Gibson that the latter was refusing to 
give a direct answer to his questions, Lowe observed: 'I
suppose public controversy does not dispose one to the 
categorical answering of questions, does it Mr. Gibson?'
(RCT 6788). And when the witness Ted Hill, in cross- 
examination to Sholl, had difficulty in putting over his 
reasons as to why the Party did not keep written records of 
its affairs, Lowe came to his aid thus: 'Does the answer
come to this, that in itself you do not think such 
correspondence could do any harm, but that you think it 
might be distorted and that the distortion might do you harm?' 
(RCT 7343) .
During the testimony of witnesses called by 
assisting Counsel against the Communist Party, Lowe intervened
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less often, and usually only when he wanted the evidence 
upon which their allegations rested to be clarified. Under 
hostile cross-examination he was largely inclined to leave 
these witnesses to their own devices, as long as the scope 
of the questions put came within his rulings on the 
legitimate role of Counsel.
The sympathy Lowe apparently felt for the accused 
had its source in neither his political outlook, nor in his 
'legal' attitudes as Royal Commissioner and judge of the 
evidence. To the extent that he allowed his own politics 
to sway him, (and he scrupulously avoided giving the 
appearance of doing so), he must have identified with the 
anti-Communists. Moreover, there was no prima facie reason 
why the testimony of witnesses called by assisting Counsel 
should have been any less reliable than that of the 
Communist witnesses and others.
But a consideration of Lowe's personal traits does 
suggest why his tolerance might have extended further towards 
those who appeared before him to answer charges. As a man 
of law, Lowe had a natural inclination to give an accused 
person the benefit of the doubt until proven guilty.
Normally this would not demand preferential treatment for 
that witness. But Lowe was fully aware of the differences 
between a court of law and a Royal Commission, and he must 
to some extent have felt the invidious nature of the 
position (from a strictly judicial point of view) where 
persons, although not formally accused, were still obliged to 
come forward and answer charges in an environment which to 
all intents and purposes equated with that of a court.
The inquiry into Communism, especially, was far 
removed from the kind of proceeding in which Lowe was 
accustomed to act as adjudicator, since the 'offences' it 
dealt with were for the most part not illegal. Essentially, 
all of the witnesses who appeared to answer charges were 
there because of the nature, or suspected nature, of their 
political affiliations. Lowe's comments on more than one 
occasion showed that he appreciated the political significance 
for the 'outside world' of the task assigned to him, as well 
as the damage which could be wrought upon persons brought
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before the inquiry if a full-scale inquisition was allowed to 
develop. In the political context in which the inquiry took 
place, it was only the Communists, and those who were 
suspected of fellow-travelling, who stood to lose, and they 
could lose even when the Commission officially declared them 
innocent. An awareness of this situation perhaps caused 
Lowe even unconsciously to give accused persons more protection 
from hostile interrogation than he gave to the anti­
communists. It is true that this protection did not usually 
extend to the cautioning of assisting Counsel in their 
questioning of the accused, but he did give the impression 
that he wanted to ensure, by his own intervention if 
necessary, that these witnesses had a reasonable opportunity 
to present their defence to their own satisfaction.
There is another reason why Lowe might have felt 
more sympathy for the defendants, and it concerns the general 
type of witness called by the respective sides. With few 
exceptions, Counsel assisting the Commission relied for their 
evidence against the Communist Party upon witnesses who 
could only be described as political 'extremists'. Almost 
all of them, before appearing at the Commission, and indeed 
during its proceedings, were engaged in a public anti­
communist crusade of one kind or another. Whatever the 
explanation for this preponderance of extreme anti- 
Communists, the result was inevitably to cast a certain 
aura of doubt upon their capabilities for a reasoned and 
'objective' approach to the subject of the inquiry. This was 
especially true of several witnesses who were unable to conceal 
from their evidence an element of hysteria in their reaction 
to Communism and Communists.
Assisting Counsel's principal witnesses on the 
general nature of the Communist Party were four ex-Communists, 
whose evidence invited another kind of scepticism. They had
63. Assisting Counsel probably did not have a great deal of 
choice in the matter, having decided to present a case 
against the Party. Only those people publicly known 
as anti-Communists, or those whose anti-Communist 
convictions were strong enough to lead them to approach 
the Commission on their own initiative, were likely to 
come to Counsel's notice as prospective witnesses.
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apparently moved rapidly from one side of the political 
spectrum to the other, and their outspoken denunciation of 
an ideology and a Party they had once embraced and worked 
for must have easily called forth questions about the 
stability of their political mind and about their ability 
to discern clearly the nature of Communism. Yet another 
psychological factor operated to disadvantage these anti­
communist witnesses: their role as informers. The ex-
Communists in particular were open targets for common 
prejudice against the turncoat. But even in the evidence 
of others, a similar element of 'betrayal of their fellows' 
prevailed. In their public denunciation of their work-mates, 
the Industrial Groupers might have been seen as traitors to 
the old trade-union ethos of loyalty and solidarity among 
working men.
It is not possible to know how far Lowe himself 
would have been influenced by attitudes of this kind. Perhaps 
it would not be entirely futile conjecture to say that he 
would have shared the liberal English gentleman's traditional 
distaste for someone who was willing to play the role of 
public informer upon past friends and associates. His 
comments in the Report on the witness Sharpley indicate that 
at least he considered the reliability of such a person's 
testimony to be 'heavily suspect'Moreover, his statements 
during the proceedings expressing a desire to exclude political 
propaganda from the evidence would suggest that where he 
recognised hysteria, irrationality or malice in the testimony 
of an anti-Communist witness (and there were many instances 
of it) he would be bound to regard their contribution as 
being of only limited acceptability for the purpose of making 
findings against the Party.
64. Referring to the fact that in cross-examination many of 
Sharpley's statements were shown to be unreliable, Lowe 
said in the Report that Sharpley's 'role was akin to that 
of an informer on those he had for years associated with, 
and for his disclosures to the Press he had been paid at 
a rate which must have seemed to him munificent'.
(Report, p. 7) .
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In a section on 'Credibility of Witnesses' in the 
Report, Lowe has this to say on the matter:
The determination of many of the questions raised 
before me has been more than usually difficult because 
of the nature of the evidence on such questions.
Communism presents a view of history and an outlook on 
life which evokes from its adherents a fanatical 
devotion, and provokes in its opponents a fanatical 
hatred. Each of these responses is very apt to distort 
the testimony of a witness so affected, and both are 
likely to cause the witness to relate for fact what 
is really no more than suspicion. There were, in my 
judgement, a number of examples of this tendency, and 
it has resulted in my not accepting the evidence of two 
witnesses called by those assisting the Commission.^4
It is apparent from these words alone that Lowe's 
evaluation of the evidence given by the Communist witnesses 
was based on an attitude no less critical than that he adopted 
towards the anti-Communists. As we have seen, both in the 
course of the proceedings and in the Report he drew attention 
to the Party's teachings on the use of the Courts for 
propaganda purposes, and on the necessity for Communists to 
dissemble in order to protect the Party's interests. (RCT 
1276; Report, pp. 6-7). And his single comment in the Report 
about the general quality of the testimony of the Communist 
witnesses is not entirely complimentary: '... I was left with
the impression that many of the Communist witnesses who gave 
evidence contradicting Sharpley told me only so much of the 
truth as they could not succeed in withholding'. There can 
be little doubt that on both 'sides' there were witnesses 
whose approach to the giving of evidence Lowe found objection­
able; and where he had serious doubts about a defendant's 
integrity, he is unlikely to have felt a great deal of 
sympathy for his plight as politically-accused person. Still, 
it is note-worthy that the only evidence Lowe specifically 
mentions as being unacceptable to him was given by witnesses
64. Report, p. 7. Lowe does not name the two witnesses, but 
they were almost certainly Miss Chorkles Moss and Mr.
Noble Kerby, to whose evidence he makes no reference 
whatever in the Report as a basis for his findings. (See 
Chapter 3,pp 154-158).In an interview (Canberra, 12 March 
1971) Rex Mortimer told me that Lowe was so annoyed by 
the style of their testimony that he made a private request 
to Sholl to undertake that assisting Counsel would refrain 
from calling any more witnesses of their calibre.
Report, p. 7.65.
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called against the Communist Party.
Irrespective of the value of their evidence, the 
Communist witnesses were perhaps in a position of psychological 
advantage from the point of view of gaining Lowe's favour.
They were, of course, as equally committed politically as were 
those who testified against them. And the Report shows that 
Lowe expected and found fanticism in their approach to the 
subject, as he did with their opponents. But due in part to a 
sharper appreciation of their own interests, and in part to 
the nature of the role they played in the Commission, the 
Communists were successful in minimising the extremism of 
their political convictions.
The Party must have had far greater scope than did 
assisting Counsel to control the quality and content of its 
witnesses' testimony. Furthermore, by the time they came to 
present their case, it must have been clear to the Party's 
Counsel that they would make a better impression on Lowe if 
they toned down any tendency in their witnesses to adopt a 
belligerent or hysterical political 'line'. Those responsible 
for the working-out of the case accordingly took considerable 
care in the choosing and schooling of their witnesses, as far 
as possible calling those who were capable of appearing to be 
'reasonable' men. Leading Party officials were selected not 
only for their knowledge of the Party's operations, but for 
their ability to give a calm, rational explanation of the 
Communist ideology and aims.^ Like the Communist Counsel 
themselves, the witnesses on the whole were of a fairly high 
intellectual calibre. Ralph Gibson was chosen to open the 
Communist case because it was hoped his 'credentials' would 
appeal to Lowe: he had a well-educated and respectable
family background, was University-educated himself, and possessed 
an articulate and intelligent approach to Communist theory.^
The Party's efforts towards moderation were to some 
extent facilitated by its defensive position in the inquiry.
66. This is based on information given in interviews by Ted 
Laurie and Rex Mortimer.
67. Gibson's father and grandfather were both Professors of 
Philosophy at Melbourne University. His brother was also 
an academic.
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It was called upon to show that the 'unsavoury' activities 
alleged by anti-Communist witnesses were in reality quite 
harmless and proper. Essentially the task of the Communist 
witnesses was to offer to the Commissioner an explanation 
and justification of their political convictions and the 
actions they inspired. It was not an aggressive role, and 
therefore less liable than that of the case against the Party 
to provide an opportunity for the passionate invective 
associated with an attack on political enemies.
Lowe expected a hostile reaction from the Communists 
in response to assisting Counsel's questioning, and its marked 
absence must have agreeably surprised him. To the extent 
that he was able to divorce himself from his own political 
conservatism, it is probable that the Communists' role as 
upholders of their principles in the face of attack had more 
appeal to him than that of the anti-Communists as their 
impeachers. He may also have found himself able to respond 
to the enthusiasm for their cause which some Communist 
witnesses - notably Gibson - made apparent. According to E.W. 
Lawn, he considered that the lively conviction of some of the 
Communist trade union officials contrasted favourably with
6 8that of the Industrial Groupers who testified against them.
Lowe's attitudes to the witnesses who appeared 
before him are gleaned with difficulty from beneath the 
personal restraint and 'judicial' decorum which he consistently 
observed. And yet despite the fact that Lowe strove for 
neutrality in his conduct of the inquiry, and that his own 
participation (apart from in matters of procedure) was both 
limited in extent and reserved in manner, one is left with 
the impression that the Commission was essentially moulded 
by his personality. Indeed, one suspects that his personal 
attitudes, just as much as his procedural rulings, were the 
factors which determined the 'tone' and whole nature of the 
proceedings. He rarely interfered directly in the presentation 
of assisting Counsel's case, but there can be little doubt 
that any inclinations on the part of the latter towards a 
form of investigation along the lines of a 'witch-hunt' must 
have been modified by Lowe's light-hearted and interested
68. Interview, E.W. Lawn, Melbourne, 4 August 1971.
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approach to Communist ideas, his courtesy to Communist 
Counsel, and his very evident desire to allow all accused 
persons the rights of defence. Moreover, his considerate 
treatment of the Communist Party's position encouraged its 
Counsel to undertake a serious attempt to meet the charges 
laid against it by assisting Counsel, thus ensuring that 
the inquiry proceeded within the quasi-judicial framework 
provided for in Lowe's rulings. At virtually every point 
during the presentation of the cases for and against the 
Communist Party, Lowe seemed to exercise a controlling 
influence. One can only conclude that his omnipresence was 
of considerable benefit to the Royal Commission.
"How Sun artist saw Royal Commission on Reds
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CHAPTER THREE : THE EVIDENCE
Sir Charles Lowe followed customary Royal Commission 
procedure by taking no part in the discovery, assembling or 
presentation of evidence.-*- The nature of the material sub­
mitted to his scrutiny was determined initially by assisting 
Counsel and the Victorian Crown Law Office, and much later in 
the proceedings, by the Communist Party. But whereas 
Commissioner and Counsel operated in different ways to mould 
the actual character of the inquiry, the influence of both was 
over-shadowed by the Press where the public view of proceedings 
was concerned. The Commission held open hearings, but the 
public gallery was small in size, and in any case, few 
Melbourne citizens possessed either sufficient interest or the 
opportunity to attend in person. Thus the effectiveness of the 
Commission as an instrument for public 'education' about 
Communism depended more upon the manner in which the Press chose 
to interpret the evidence, than upon the internal conduct of 
the inquiry. And in attempting to establish the innocence and 
worth of their Party in the public eye, Communist Counsel 
were disadvantaged vis-a-vis assisting Counsel by Press 
antagonism to their cause as much as by the limitations imposed 
upon their legal status at the Commission.
Assisting Counsel's case was assured of considerable 
prominence in the Melbourne daily newspapers by a happy 
combination of circumstances: the evidence against the
Communist Party was to be presented first, while public 
interest was at its peak. Perhaps inevitably, in the first few 
weeks Press reports coated the proceedings with a patina of 
sensationalism which bore little relation to the substance of 
the inquiry itself, achieving the effect by headlining the
1. Lowe drew attention to this custom at an early stage in the 
proceedings. (RCT. 617). In an interview (Melbourne,
23 December 1971) Sir Reginald Sholl stated that he had 
frequent private discussions with Lowe during the course 
of assisting Counsel's case, but he indicated that these 
were concerned with matters of organisation - such as the 
order in which subjects would be led - rather than with 
the evidence directly.
2. Melbourne's No. 1 High Court, which accommodated the 
Commission for the greater part of its sittings, had a 
public gallery with a capacity for 200 people.
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most dramatic allegations of anti-Communist witnesses as if 
they were statements of fact, and ignoring the points scored 
against these witnesses by Communist Counsel in cross- 
examination. All of the Melbourne dailies were guilty of this 
style of reporting, although assisting Counsel apparently 
considered that none had over-stepped the 'permissible limits' 
referred to by Lowe. (RCT.4047). But as the inquiry extended 
into its second month, a disparity in the Press's approach 
could be discerned. Only the Herald sustained the drama and 
scale of its initial reports, while other newspapers 
relegated the proceedings to a minor position in their news 
coverage, and at times neglected them altogether. Moreover, 
when the Age and the Argus did carry reports on the Commission, 
the increased attention given to material cited in reply to 
allegations reflected their adoption of a more scrupulous 
attitude.^ In October 1949 the Editor of the Argus went so 
far as to make the rather pointed comment that 'in future' 
his newspaper would not publish the names of any persons 
about whom allegations were made by a witness whose own name 
was withheld from the public.^
Large-scale reporting of assisting Counsel's case 
became the monopoly of the Herald, vied with only by the 
Guardian, a diminutive and plaintive voice struggling to put 
the 'correct' interpretation to its readers. The Herald 
resolutely refused to give any attention to the Communist 
view-point at the Commission; on the whole it ignored the 
cross-examination of assisting Counsel's witnesses and the 
evidence of witnesses who appeared to deny allegations, except
3. The improvement was in relative terms only, for the 
limited coverage of proceedings in itself meant that 
many denials could not be dealt with. Nevertheless, 
both newspapers showed more care in making clear that 
statements made by assisting Counsel's witnesses were 
allegations only, and that they were being replied to 
by other witnesses.
4. Argus, 20 October 1949. This policy was adopted in 
response to a female witness against the A.C.P., an ex- 
Communist known throughout the proceedings as Mrs. 'X'. 
Lowe had agreed to assisting Counsel' s request that she 
remain anonymous in view of her fear of Communist 
intimidation. The comment by the Argus was made when a 
reader's letter suggested that the names of several 
Melbourne journalists accused by Mrs. 'X" of being 
Communists had not been published by the Argus because
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where this produced additional information against the
Communist Party. Photographs were used extensively to ensure
that Herald readers were 'educated' about the faces as well
as the names of persons accused of harbouring Communist
sympathies. The undue prominence accorded to allegations
made against several members of the Labour Party strongly
suggests that the Herald was intent to utilise the evidence
to further its own political inclinations in the Federal
Election campaign. Its attention to the proceedings, lagging
temporarily after Cecil Sharpley withdrew from the witness
box, saw a spectacular revival when 'Former Red Tells of 1940
Mission to Ward' (the Federal Minister for Transport), and
when another ex-Communist witness claimed that a 'Labour
M.P. "Worked With Red Fraction"'.^ And one of the few points
in Ted Hill's five-day testimony that the Herald considered
news-worthy, was indicated in an article headlined 'Claims7Many Labour Men Accept Marx'.
When Mr. Laurie opened for the Communist Party in 
November, other Melbourne newspapers maintained the same 
limited and desultory interest that had characterised their 
treatment of all but the first weeks of the inquiry. But the 
event did not pass uncelebrated in the Herald. Its reports 
on the Commission slipped from their customary pride of place 
on the second page, and where they appeared at all, were small 
and obscure. Ralph Gibson records in his autobiography that 
the Age and the Sun 'faithfully reported' the Party's 
witnesses; the Herald on the other hand 'ignored us except
owhere it could slam us'.
Public attendance at the Commission seemed to
4. (cont.)
members of its own staff were among them. The Editor 
denied the suggestion.
5. Herald, 10 October 1949. The witness was T.C. McGillick, 
see this Chapter, pp. 151 ff.
6. Herald, 13 October 1949. The witness was Mrs. 'X', see 
this Chapter, pp. 146 ff.
7. Herald, 29 November 1949.
8. R. Gibson, My Years in the Communist Party (Melbourne 
1966), p. 155.
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respond directly to fluctuations in the Herald's interest.
People queued for a seat in the public gallery while Sharpley
testified, but no witness could rival him as a crowd-pleaser
except 'Mrs X', whose evidence was blazoned across the pages
of the Herald under the words "Widow Alleges Reds Victimise
gHer' and 'Death Threat Story at Red Inquiry'. The numbers 
attending the hearings gradually diminished as Assisting 
Counsel's case lengthened. There were only a half-dozen people 
present in the courtroom when Mr. Laurie rose to make his open­
ing address for the Communist Party, a startling contrast to 
the tension and expectant interest of the atmosphere which 
had set the scene for the first weeks of Mr. Sholl's case, 
some four months earlier.
PART (A) : ASSISTING COUNSELS CASE
Members of the public with a thirst for the 
sensational were in fact better served by the Press reports 
of proceedings than by the substance of the case against the 
Party as presented to the Royal Commissioner. The newspapers 
made no attempt to capture one of its most striking features: 
namely, the 'low key' performance of assisting Counsel in the 
presentation of their evidence. And though the testimony of 
several anti-Communist witnesses did furnish the Press with 
some snippets of dramatic headline material, in the course of 
the actual proceedings, the effect of these touches of 
sensation and of the tendency of witnesses to 'politicise' 
their evidence was dissipated by the sheer volume and detail 
of the information produced, as well as by the formalities 
of an adversary procedure.
Assisting Counsel shared the Herald's pre-occupation 
with the subversive aspects of Communist operations and its 
strongly anti-Communist point of view; but Mr. Sholl was too 
deeply imbued with the rituals of legal propriety, and too 
mindful of the Commissioner's own caste of mind, to permit 
his case to be damaged by any over-indulgence in colourful 
histrionics. In general he seemed content to allow the style 
of the case to be guided by the essentially legalistic
9. H e r a l d, 11 October 1949; 14 October 1949.
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atmosphere which Lowe imparted to the proceedings. 'Hostile' 
witnesses sometimes faced aggressive interrogation, but they 
were not unduly harrassed. Relations between assisting 
Counsel and the Communist Party Counsel, while retaining an 
underlying brittleness, observed the traditional etiquette of 
the Bar. The only real weakness in the conduct of assisting 
Counsel's case rested in their failure to instil into some 
of their 'friendly' witnesses a corresponding degree of 
restraint.
Observance of court-room decorum in no way deflected 
Counsel from their intention to level a full-scale attack on 
the Communist Party. Mr. Sholl did not disguise his 
determination to concentrate solely upon that evidence which 
was indicative of improper activities on the part of 
Communists (RCT.104), a narrow interpretation of the terms 
of reference which he probably considered to be amply 
justifiable. In view of the size of the investigation, it was 
a realistic approach, and it met with the Commissioner's 
approval. The Communist Party's leave to enjoy separate 
representation meant that an imbalance in the picture presented 
by assisting Counsel could in any case be corrected by the 
Communists themselves. In these circumstances Sholl could 
argue that it was not incumbent upon him to deal with matters 
other than those activities about which the Party's Counsel 
were unlikely to adduce evidence.
If he was looking for additional support for his 
position, Sholl could have pointed out that it could be 
assumed that the real concern of the Government was to uncover 
evidence concerning the Party as a subversive organisation.
The Sharpley exposures and the industrial troubles which 
preceded them, far from provoking an 'academic' interest in 
Communism, had focussed public attention with increasing 
sharpness upon the possibility that Communists were working to 
destroy democratic government and society. The Hollway 
Government was clearly very little interested in those 
activities of the Communist Party which were characteristic 
of any 'respectable' political party content to work within 
the framework of the parliamentary system. It bore the expense 
and political controversy engendered by the appointment of the
Counsel: " A nd , of course, gentlem en, you w ill give your verdict as 
it  the accused were just an ordina ry c itizen and not a C om m unist."
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himself with a substantial role in the selection of documents 
for Counsel's 'theoretical introduction', allegedly because 
of his knowledge of Communist literature gathered during 
Campion Society days. He has also said that his personal 
friendship with B.A. Santamaria was utilised as a means of 
obtaining members of the Movement and A.L.P. Industrial 
Groups as anti-Communist witnesses. Apparently Mclnerney 
advised Santamaria as to which trade unions were to be 
investigated, and invited him to bring forward some of 'his 
men' to testify at the Commission.^  To the extent that the 
Victorian Crown Law Department acted upon its own initiative 
in determining the substance of the case against the Party, 
there can be little doubt that its 'policy' met with the 
approval of assisting Counsel.
1. Foundations of the anti-Communist evidence
The actual sources of assisting Counsel's evidence
are not always easy to ascertain. Some documents relating
to the Party's organisation and financial affairs were obtained
12by subpoena (from banks and the Registrar-General's Office), 
as was documentary material from trade union offices. Party 
literature other than that which was reproduced in photostat 
form from public libraries, was drawn principally from the 
private collections of witnesses, or from collections held 
by anti-Communist organisations such as the Australian
11. Interview with Mr. Justice Mclnerney, Melbourne, 15 
October 1971. According to Mclnerney, Santamaria was 
instrumental in the appearance of a number of witnesses 
who testified about Communist activities in the Clerks' 
Union and Actors' Equity.
12. Assisting Counsel were able to scrutinise lists of share­
holders in Federal Press (the Party Press) and the 
International Bookshop, as well as numerous documents 
relating to the Party's bank accounts. Some financial 
documents, en transit by train to Melbourne from the 
Commonwealth Bank in Bendigo, disappeared from the train 
along with 13160 worth of gold on 10 August 1949. 
According to the Herald, postal investigators of the 
incident 'were not overlooking the theory that the 
bullion might have been only of secondary interest in 
the robbery'. (H e r a l d, 26 August 1949).
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Constitutional League in Melbourne and the Sane Democracy 
League in Sydney. (RCT. 606-8). Assisting Counsel were 
eager to obtain the Victorian Communist Party's own records, 
but numerous requests to Communist Counsel to produce them 
met with small success. Max Julius tendered some State 
Conference resolutions in pamphlet form (RCT. 1424), but in 
response to Sholl's demands for membership lists, Conference 
minutes and financial statements, the Party's Counsel informed 
the Commission that such records were no longer in existence. 
Mr. Reynolds, K.C. seemed particularly agitated by the Party's 
failure to make their records available, declaring that Ted 
Hill should be put into the witness box and cross-examined upon 
the matter. But Lowe pointed out that this could not be done, 
since Hill had at that time been given no leave to appear at 
the Commission except in the capacity of Counsel. (RCT. 1351). 
Lowe said that he could not issue a subpoena for the production 
of the records unless assisting Counsel provided him with an 
affidavit deposing to the fact that they existed; but, as he 
assured Mr. Reynolds, '...if [the Communists) do not produce 
documents which are in existence, or were in existence at the 
beginning of the Inquiry, they will have to submit to the 
inference that may be ordinarily drawn when documents are not 
produced'. (RCT. 1299 ).^
13. Reynolds told the Commission during debate on this matter 
that on 11 July 1949 (four days earlier) a large quantity 
of printed material was observed to be removed by taxi 
cab from the headquarters of the Victorian C.P. (RCT. 
1351). Much later in the proceedings, during cross- 
examination of Ralph Gibson, Sholl raised the same point, 
implying that the material had been Party records removed 
in response to the security raid on the Federal C.P. 
headquarters in Sydney (7 July 1949). (RCT. 6678). The 
Communists on both occasions declared that the documents 
had been material used in the preparation of its case at 
the Commission. They were consistent in their explanat­
ion that all important Party records had been destroyed 
during 1948 as a precaution against the possibility that 
the Party would be banned, and that since that time no 
records had been kept. It is interesting to note that 
Lowe personally did not accept this explanation of their 
failure to produce records. In the Report he observes, 
'It is difficult to understand how the Party can operate 
without records, and I am completely sceptical of the 
statement that they do not exist. I suspect that they 
do somewhere and in some form'. (Report, p. 43).
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It is difficult to ascertain the dimensions of the 
part played by the Security police in providing information 
for the case against the Party. According to Brian 
Fitzpatrick,^ A.S.I.O. officers helped to prepare assisting 
Counsel's brief in the Victorian as well as the Petrov 
Commission; and in his autobiography, Sharpley writes that he 
had '... frequent interviews with two detectives making 
investigations and collecting data for the Crown's case'
In the light of these remarks, it is tempting to conjecture 
that the July raid on the Sydney Party headquarters might have 
unearthed some material of use to Mr. Sholl. But the only 
piece of evidence acknowledged by assisting Counsel at the 
Commission as originating from the industry of A.S.I.O. was 
some printed matter illustrating Communist 'indoctrination 
of the young' and the Party's attitude to religion, seized by 
Security police in a raid on the Western Australian Communist 
Party in May 1949. (RCT. 6283).^
Assisting Counsel's source of witnesses was more 
varied than that of their documentary evidence. The Crown 
Law Office customarily advertises in the Press for persons 
who consider they have some information of value to a Royal 
Commission to come forward and be interviewed with a view to 
acting as witnesses, and this procedure was followed. But 
Mclnerney claims that in actual practice few people who replied 
to the advertisement were utilised for the case owing to their 
excessively 'crankish' brand of anti-Communism.-^-^ His
14. B.C. Fitzpatrick, The Royal Commission on Espionage, 
(Australian Council for Civil Liberties, Melbourne 1955)
p. 3.
15. C.H. Sharpley, The Great Delusion, p. 134.
16. I could obtain no insight into the role of Security from 
C.P. Allen, now Registrar of Titles in the Victorian 
Crown Law Department, in 1949 the officer most directly 
concerned with assisting Counsel's case. He was unable 
to offer any suggestions in response to a lengthy letter 
from myself requesting information on a wide number of 
matters relating to the formulation of the case, includ­
ing the influence of assisting Counsel upon it. (C.P. 
Allen to V. Rastnck, 11 November 1971). Likewise, Sir 
Reginald Sholl indicated that he had no clear recollection 
of the sources of evidence for his case.
17. Interview, Mr. Justice Mclnerney, op. cit. I have used 
the word 'crank' in this chapter to denote those witnesses 
who exhibited an extremely irrational attitude to
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information suggests that generally the more valuable 
witnesses were aquired through the exertions of the Crown Law 
officials or assisting Counsel. Their task was made easier 
in some instances by the availability of people who had made 
it publicly known that they possessed some knowledge of 
Communist 'subversion'. One of assisting Counsel's 
industrial witnesses, W.T. Lloyd, who testified that the 
1945 amalgamation between the Munition Workers' Union and 
the Federated Ironworkers' Union was engineered by the 
Communist Party, had made statements to this effect in the 
Melbourne courts in February 1949. During a courtcase in 
which he had sued the management of the Ironworkers' Union 
for /3000 damages for libel, Lloyd had declared that the 
amalgamation had been 'part of a Communist plot to get control 
of the munition w o r k e r s ' ( R C T .  4374-4515). An Industrial 
Grouper in the Victorian Postal Workers' Union,
J. Ward, who gave evidence at the Commission concerning the 
presence of Communists in the Post Office, had addressed both 
the 1948 A.L.P. Easter Conference and the 1949 annual 
conference of the Victorian R.S.L. on that subject. (RCT. 2948 
ff.) Ward told Mr. Laurie in cross-examination that he had 
also made a 'public statement' to the effect that he would be 
willing to give evidence at a public inquiry into Communist 
activities, and was subsequently contacted by an official of 
the Crown Law Department and subpoenaed to appear at the 
Commission. (RCT. 3006). Likewise, one suspects that the 
attention given in Melbourne newspapers to the clashes in the 
Victorian State School Committees' Association over the 
expulsion of Communist Executive members and the formulation 
of a new anti-Communist Constitution, was the inspiration for 
assisting Counsel to obtain the Association's Vice President
17. Cont.
Communism, even to the point where some mental imbalance 
might be suspected. See this chapter, pp. 127; 154 ff. 
When one considers the irrationality of some of the 
witnesses who were accepted, the rejects must have been 
extreme indeed.
Age, 18 February 1949.18.
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(who headed moves against the Communists) in support of 
their case. (RCT. 5645-5729).19 It is likely that Sharpley 
proved to be the most effective channel for making contact 
with anti-Communists, particularly in trade union spheres. 
Sharpley's description of his aid to assisting Counsel's 
case is probably generally accurate:
... For many weeks I worked in close association 
with the lawyers appointed to assist the Commissioner. 
There was much to do. There was the preparation of 
my evidence; there was the tracking down of other 
witnesses who might be called, and I was asked for 
opinions on their reliability on whether or not they 
could give useful information. I spent many hours 
with officials of the Crown Law Department while 
they considered evidence which could be given by other 
witnesses. I corrected what appeared to be errors, 
and I gave information hitherto unknown or which might 
not be otherwise obtainable ... More than once, as 
a result of conferences with me, evidence was clarified 
and straightened out at the last moment.^
No doubt Sharpley's knowledge of potential witnesses was 
reinforced by the help that these people themselves could 
offer, having agreed to make their 'services' available to 
the Commission.
The manner in which one of assisting Counsel's 
witnesses came to give evidence was revealed during the 
proceedings. The appearance of Sydney Bulletin journalist 
Malcolm Ellis was prompted, as he explained in cross-examinat­
ion to Mr. Laurie, by an invitation from the Victorian Premier. 
According to his testimony, Ellis had on at least one occasion 
in 1948 conducted a private discussion with Hollway upon the 
subject of Communism, during the course of which Ellis had
19. A .E. McLean, the witness, had already drawn attention to 
himself as one committed to waging war on the Communists, 
when he took part as Chairman of the Association in a 
deputation (May 1948) to the Victorian Chief Secretary 
demanding stricter censorship of films for children. The 
petition he presented claimed that a relaxed censorship 
was 'politically dangerous because it is by this 
familiarisation with horrible and ghastly things that 
the alien-spirited Communist seeks to make people believe 
that the revolution and slaughter he wishes to effect 
are normal and proper'. (RCT. 5683).
C.H. Sharpley, The Great Delusion, pp. 133-4.20.
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suggested that the 'first step' in dealing with the problem 
should be the setting up of a judicial inquiry to establish 
the facts. in May 1949, Ellis had apparently received a 
letter from Hollway inviting him to gather documentary 
material on the Communist Party to present to the newly- 
appointed Royal Commission. (RCT. 600-602).
Assisting Counsel's case relied heavily on the 
evidence of two kinds of witness: the ex-Communist and the
A.L.P. Industrial Grouper. The predominance of the latter 
was no doubt in part a result of the links between Mclnerney 
and Santamaria already noted. Roman Catholics (both Grouper 
and non-Grouper) were especially prominent among the witnesses 
on trade union matters, and here Santamaria's influence 
may well have been consolidated by the large percentage of 
Catholic employees in the Victorian Crown Law Department.
But even without such 'inside' assistance, the position of 
the Catholic Church in the fore-front of the anti-Communist 
movement was likely to have ensured a prominent role for 
witnesses of this persuasion.
The ex-Communists were all 'professional' anti­
communists in varying degrees, and well-known in local 
political circles as such; but it is not always clear how they 
were brought to the notice of assisting Counsel. T.C.
McGillick, ex-Communist and member of the anti-Communist
People's Union in Sydney, claims that he was asked by Malcolm
21Ellis to give evidence at the inquiry. The only other 
interstate witness for assisting Counsel's case was another 
ex-Communist from Sydney, J.N. Rawling. The circumstances of 
his appearance are uncertain, but since the Commission had no
22power to compel the attendance of witnesses from other States, 
it must be assumed that like Ellis and McGillick he came
21. T.C. McGillick to V. Rastrick, 8 November 1971. In a 
later letter to me (6 December 1971) McGillick said he 
had volunteered to give evidence 'in the public interest'.
22. See M.V. Mclnerney, 'Procedural Aspects of a Royal 
Commission', Australian Law Journal, vol. 24 (15 March 
1951), p. 439.
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voluntarily to Melbourne to testify about the Communist Party.
A considerable number of the Victorian witnesses 
appeared at the inquiry under subpoena, and some seemed eager 
to make this fact publicly known. On the whole the witnesses 
against the Party conveyed an impression of intense political 
commitment, and often they were part of an active anti­
communist faction within a trade union or other organisation 
which saw in the Commission an opportunity to further its aims 
by obtaining publicity for its cause. The issue of subpoenas 
was important to them chiefly as a means of avoiding the 
stigma of informer or 'pimp, which Russel Ward nominates as 
the lowest term of abuse in the vocabulary of his typical 
Australian.
The ex-Communist 'Mrs X', for instance, suggested 
that she had agreed to appear with great reluctance because 
she feared that the consequent publicity would bring a renewal 
of the Communist intimidation which she claimed had plagued 
her since leaving the Party. But the fact (revealed in cross- 
examination) that on numerous occasions since that time she 
had voluntarily supplied both the Security Police and the 
Labour Party with information concerning the Communist Party, 
throws some doubt on her claim that she was an unwilling 
testifier to Communist misdeeds. (RCT. 5139 ff).
It would seem that in her case at least, the issue of a 
subpoena was designed not to ensure that she appeared at the 
Commission, but to bolster her character as a witness.
Assisting Counsel showed no reticence in requesting 
the Commissioner to exercise his powers of compulsion in 
relation to the attendance of witnesses, and yet they did not 
avail themselves of the opportunity to demand the appearance 
of persons alleged by their own witnesses to be guilty of 
Communist fellow-travelling or secret Party membership. The 
terms of reference of the Commission made explicit provision 
for the examination of 'persons and organisations associated' 
with the Communist Party; and assisting Counsel's attention 
to 'friendly' testimony upon these matters, as well as their 
probing cross-examination of the people who came forward to 
deny that testimony, suggests that they were by no means 
disinterested in the fringe areas of the Party's operations. 
Nevertheless, they chose not to pursue the abundance of names
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which they managed to extract during the course of their case.
On only two occasions did they compel the attendance of
'hostile' witnesses, the first being when John Rodgers
(Director of Australia-Soviet House), who appeared initially
as a voluntary witness, was recalled to the witness-box to
explain certain inconsistencies discovered in his evidence-
in-chief by assisting Counsel. The affairs of A.S.H. then
became the subject of a fully-fledged investigation as an
2 3integral part of the case against the Communist Party. At 
another point in the proceedings, when the 1948 election in 
the B.W.I.V. was under scrutiny, assisting Counsel subpoenaed 
several militant branch officials of that union to appear 
before the Commission and to surrender branch membership lists 
and other documents relating to the election.^ In the case 
of these union witnesses, as well as in Rodgers' case, 
the aggressiveness of the interrogation, combined with the 
fact that their appearance was under circumstances of 
compulsion, caused them to exhibit the characteristics of 
genuinely 'hostile' witnesses.
There is no reason to suppose that Lowe would have 
objected in principle to the subpoening of persons named at 
the Commission in connection with Communist activities, as 
long as the matters upon which assisting Counsel proposed to 
question them came within his rulings on the scope of the 
inquiry. But one wonders whether his insistence that proceed­
ings be kept within practical limits led assisting Counsel to 
the conclusion that in the time available they would achieve 
the best results from 'friendly' witnesses, and from cross- 
examination of the people who came forward of their own accord 
to answer charges. Perhaps they adopted the view that those 
names as fellow-travellers who did not seek permission to deny 
the allegation had, by their very failure to appear, implicitly 
admitted their guilt. In any case, assisting Counsel would 
have expected there to be no shortage of Communists for them 
to cross-examine, since the Party had full rights to call
23.
24.
See this Chapter, p. 165. 
See this Chapter, p. 172.
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2 5witnesses in its own defence.
2. Assisting Counsel's argument
All of the material presented to the Commission by 
assisting Counsel was chosen to support their contention that 
the Communist Party in Victoria did engage in the 'subversive' 
activities particularised in the terms of reference. They did 
not attempt to present a picture of Communist 'origins, aims,
... activities and operations' in their entirety; if they 
included any evidence of what Lowe described as 'benign' 
actions, it was only incidental to their main purpose of 
illustrating other supposedly sinister aspects of the Party. 
Some attention was given to the historical development of 
Communism in Australia, and to the organisational machinery of 
the Party, which inevitably produced a proportion of strictly 
'neutral' evidence. But even here assisting Counsel emphasised 
those Party declarations and policy statements which were 
indicative of subservience to the dictates of Moscow, or which 
related in some way to the 'allegations' of harmful conduct 
contained in the terms of reference. The evidence on policies 
and objectives generally gave the impression that these 
particularised headings were co-extensive with the full intent 
of Communist aims. In matters of organisation, attention was 
drawn to those features which, if not legally improper, at 
least seemed to have an unsavoury air about them: the Party's
disciplinary apparatus, which Counsel suggested extended even 
to control of members' private lives; the decision-making 
process, which was portrayed as elitist and anti-democratic; 
and the plans for a continuation of propaganda activities on 
an underground level in the event of the Party being declared 
illegal.
In a detailed examination of Party funds, it was 
material showing substantial donations from wealthy Jewish 
citizens, or an improper use of trade union facilities, which 
was accorded the limelight. What Mr. Sholl called 'facade
25. When questioned on this aspect of their case, Sir Reginald 
Sholl told me that the fact that the Commission was 
conducted as a court proceeding relieved assisting Counsel 
of the onus of calling members of the Communist Party.
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organisations' were also dealt with, as part of the 
investigation of the Party's fringe operations, but the nature 
of the evidence about these bodies suggests that Sholl was 
concerned to relate it to the section of the terms of reference 
which asked if Communist activities were designed to effect 
the 'attainment of social, economic, industrial and political 
ends by ... fraudulent practices', rather than to examine 
their workings in a more general fashion.
If, in the event, assisting Counsel's case introduced 
matters of greater breadth than merely those which placed an 
unfavourable light on the Communist Party, it was through 
default rather than design. Partly it was a result of the 
active presence of the Party's Counsel, whose efforts to 
force a wider reading of Communist literature were sometimes 
rewarded, and who managed occasionally in the course of their 
cross-examination of assisting Counsel's witnesses, to soften 
the import of the evidence against them. But primarily it 
was a result of the impossibility of dealing with particular 
acts of 'subversion' without going into the general aims and 
activities of the Communist Party; this was especially true 
in the case of documentary evidence, even though assisting 
Counsel read very selectively.
Mr. Sholl opened his case on June 20 with a 
'theoretical introduction' in which he offered his main 
contentions about the nature of the Party, supported by quoted 
extracts from Communist literature. This introduction 
(occupying the whole of the first day of sittings and half of 
the following day) in conjunction with the documentary material 
tendered by the first witness (M.H. Ellis) comprised the bulk 
of that section of assisting Counsel's case which dealt with 
the theoretical aims and objectives as distinct from the 
practical aspects of the Party in Victoria.
The fundamental objective of 'the Communists' was, 
Sholl advanced, 'the overthrow by violence of the existing 
State and its organs of government, the seizure of power and 
the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'. By 
the promotion of civil war between the warring classes in 
society, or by some other means, this Dictatorship would 
initiate Socialism, under a State which would ultimately 
wither away, leaving a classless, stateless society: Communism.
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It was Sholl's contention that 'every activity of the Party 
is designed to achieve this fundamental strategic objective, 
however much the tactical plan may vary from time to time'.
The objective was to be brought about by the proletariat 
under the leadership of the Communists. The role of the 
Communist Party was accordingly,
(a) to rouse the proletariat into class consciousness;
(b) to teach them the need for the seizure of power
through revolution;
(c) to train them to use violent means for this
purpose; and
(d) to act as their "general staff" in directing the
revolution.
The means of achieving this objective, Sholl alleged, 
were control of the trade unions and the use of strikes and 
armed demonstrations, 'the production thereby of a revolutionary 
situation in which the Government can no longer govern, and 
the masses are perplexed and ready to follow the Communist 
lead'. Armed insurrection would then occur, and the prolet­
ariat would seize power. It would liquidate the State 'as we 
know it', including the Judiciary, Police and Parliament, and 
it would engineer the forcible expropriation and suppression 
of class enemies. (RCT. 30).
Assisting Counsel produced an abundance of appropriate 
extracts to illustrate these aims, although they were gleaned 
more often from the writings of Russian Communist theoreticians 
and early Australian Communist Party documents, than from 
contemporary material. Literature utilised by Sholl throughout
the case was virtually without exception written and published 
2 6by Communists. According to Mclnerney, material of non-
Communist origin was deliberately avoided in the belief that
their case would be strengthened if the Party could be
2 7incriminated by its own writings.
26. The only non-Communist document tendered as evidence of 
Communist aims was the Report of the Canadian Royal 
Commission on Espionage, which Lowe accepted on a 
provisional basis only, after some lengthy debate with 
Sholl. (RCT. 23-25).
27. Interview, Mr. Justice Mclnerney, 15 October 1971.
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The Commission's terms of reference legitimised the 
use of documentary material relating to past eras of the 
Party's operations. The justification for the inclusion of 
writings of Soviet Communists was in most cases the publication 
or sale of these works by the Australian party, or the fact 
that they were taught in classes conducted by its training 
school. And where this was not the case, assisting Counsel 
could always fall back upon the links between the A.C.P. and 
the international Communist movement in defence of their 
approach. The evidence they relied upon to show Soviet 
direction of the Party would not have been accepted as proof 
in a court of law: it was based largely on the printing of
Comintern declarations in the Australian Communist Press, and 
periodic visits of A.C.P. officials to Moscow and Eastern 
European Communist States. But the Commission was not obliged 
to restrict itself to matters for which strict legal proof 
could be furnished; there was sufficient evidence to suggest 
links of some kind with international Communism, and to 
justify the assumption of common theoretical aims.
The real force of assisting Counsel's opening lay 
in their ability to 'quote back' at the Party's Counsel by 
drawing upon extracts from a vast pool of Communist 
publications. Skillfully used, they made for an impressive 
start to the case. Communist Counsel were, of course, scarcely 
in a position to disown the writings of their own Party.
Those which showed Communism to disadvantage they attempted to 
explain in terms of the exigencies of the historical 
circumstances which produced the documents; but the seemingly 
incontrovertible quality of the written word made their task 
a difficult one. Paterson was on unsteady ground in arguing 
that an early theoretical work had no applicability to the 
Victorian Communist Party's objectives in 1949 when assisting 
Counsel could point to its inclusion in the current Marx 
School syllabus. Ultimately, the Communists had to counter 
the argument of assisting Counsel's case by asserting that the 
documentary extracts it utilised were taken out of context, 
and could not be properly understood unless they were considered 
as complete documents in the light of the time and place in 
which they were conceived.
The charge that quotations were being lifted out of
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context carried some substance, but like other flaws in 
assisting Counsel's approach to theoretical matters, it 
tended to be cloaked beneath their confident and polished 
presentation of the evidence. Indeed, the sheer volume of 
material they had on hand to support their argument must 
have concealed to all but the most perceptive observer the 
fact of some serious omissions in their treatment of Communist 
ideology and aims. In its allegations that the Communist 
Party advocated the violent overthrow of established 
government, assisting Counsel's case skirted the well- 
established problem of timing (recognised by other legal 
investigations into the nature of Communism). Mr. Sholl made 
no attempt to indicate at what point of time in the future 
the Communists expected the Capitalist order to collapse. 
Moreover, he regarded as irrelevant the serious embarrassment 
posed to his case by the doctrine of historical inevitability, 
which tended to the view that Capitalism's collapse would be 
wrought by its own internal contradictions, and not by the 
Communist Party. 'It does not matter very much', said Sholl, 
'whether the people who write this material say that it is 
violence which they advocate in an offensive sense, or whether 
they choose to call it defensive violence by ascribing to 
their alleged enemy the desire for violence. It is all 
relevant to the attitude that you must have violent scenes 
in order to bring about the result they want'. (RCT. 476).
The weakness of the theoretical section became most 
apparent in assisting Counsel's handling of the relation of 
ideology and aims to the practical aspects of the Communist 
Party in Victoria. Mr. Sholl in fact carefully avoided 
raising the question of whether the theoretical aims as taught 
by the Party coincided with its practice. He substantiated 
his claim that the Communists believed in violent revolution 
and in the necessity for arming the workers with voluminous 
evidence from the theoretical writings of the Russians. From 
Bukharin's Communist Programme of the World Revolution (1920), 
Sholl quoted to the Commission: '... the best security for
freedom is a bayonet in the hands of the workers' and 'every 
workman and every peasant must be trained and must be taught 
how to use arms' (RCT. 41); and from the Foundations of Leninism, 
Stalin's claim that 'the dictatorship of the proletariat is 
the domination of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie,
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untramelled by law and based on violence and enjoying the 
sympathy and support of the toiling and exploited masses'
(RCT. 45). Yet of all the oral evidence given at the 
Commission, the only detail which had any concrete bearing 
upon the arming of the masses in Australia was the single 
word 'arms' written in a book of notes taken by Mrs 'X' 
when she was a member of the A.C.P., the effect of which was 
somewhat spoilt by her total inability to account for its 
significance. (RCT. 5266).
Strictly speaking, the Commission's terms of 
reference did not oblige assisting Counsel to correlate theory 
and practice in their investigation of the Victorian Communist 
Party: the terms made explicit provision for the separate
treatment of general matters and specific activities. Moreover, 
Counsel assisting any Royal Commission are not expected to 
furnish conclusive proof in support of a particular argument. 
Their correct role - as Sholl himself recognised at one point 
in the proceedings (RCT. 940) - is to gather all the available 
evidence relevant to the matters named in the terms of 
reference, and to present it to the Commissioner without regard 
to the kind of conclusions for which it might afford proof.
But in the inquiry into the Communist Party, assisting Counsel 
made it clear from the beginning that they were to take sides 
in the issue. They chose to make out a case against the Party, 
presenting a series of contentions about the nature of its 
objectives (based on documentary evidence), and then seeking 
to implement the oral testimony of their witnesses on the 
Party's activities as a means of 'proving' the validity of 
these contentions in the manner of prosecuting Counsel in a 
court of law. Sholl's frequent reiteration that every 
activity of the Party was designed to achieve the fundamental 
objectives outlined during the course of his theoretical 
introduction drew unnecessary attention to the failure of his 
case to bridge the gulf between the theory and practice of 
Australian Communism.
For evidence of the practical nature of the Party, 
Assisting Counsel looked to the witness box, and found that 
it provided a far less predictable and malleable source of 
information than had their collection of Communist literature.
A perusal of the case leaves a strong impression that they
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constantly over-stretched the talents and knowledge of 
'friendly' witnesses in an effort to furnish a factual basis 
for their argument against the Party. Time and again, the 
dramatic revelations of Communist misdeeds made during 
examination-in-chief were reduced under cross-examination to 
absurdly inconsequential proportions; and at least some of the 
'friendly' testimony proved to be based on such shaky expertise 
and limited experience that the anti-Communist cause would have 
been better served if it had never been given.
3. The witnesses against the Communist Party
Assisting Counsel called a total of 80 witnesses, a 
number far in excess of that called on behalf of the Communist 
Party. After the theoretical introduction and the testimony 
of the first witness, M.H. Ellis, the anti-Communist case ceased 
to be thematic in its presentation: each witness was examined
with a view to extracting all the damning information about the 
Party that he or she possessed; the case meandered its course 
through an endless variety of subjects, and the evidence as a 
result was frequently repetitive. The enormous number of 
witnesses, combined with the controlling influence which they 
exercised upon the effectiveness of assisting Counsel's argu­
ment against Communism, has demanded that they be given a 
proportionate emphasis in this thesis. An attempt to categorise 
the types of witnesses, rather than to analyse the themes and
objectives of the evidence as a whole, seems to be the only
2 8practicable approach to the case.
The appearance of Cecil Sharpley, the Commission's
2 9star witness and public 'draw card', was delayed for 8 days 
while an 'historical expert' on Communism (Ellis) completed 
the presentation of documentary evidence. In a very concrete 
way, the nature of Sharpley's evidence determined the subse­
quent course of assisting Counsel's case. Occupying the
28. See p. 178 ff-of this Chapter for a discussion of the 
contrasting approach to the Communist Party's case.
Sun, 7 July 1949.29.
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witness-box for a total of 28 days, he was responsible for the 
bulk of the allegations against the Party, a number of which 
were later pursued in detail by other witnesses produced by 
Assisting Counsel, or by persons who denied his allegations.
His evidence ranged so widely that there were few aspects of 
the case which it did not touch upon in at least cursory 
fashion; perhaps unfortunately for assisting Counsel, much of 
their evidence against the Party relied upon Sharpley's word 
alone. For that substantial section of the case which sought 
to show the Party's internal operations, the contributions 
of the three ex-Communists who supplemented Sharpley were 
severely circumscribed by factors of time and geography.
J.N. Rawling and 'Mrs X' both ceased to be members of the 
Party in 1939; T.C. McGillick told the Commission that his 
membership terminated in 1942, but it appeared that for several 
years prior to that date he had played no active role in 
Communist affairs. The evidence of all three was limited 
to the 1930's, and only 'Mrs X' could contribute to the 
picture of the Victorian Party branch. Evidence on industrial 
matters was at times weakened by a similar thinness. The most 
serious of Sharpley's allegations were those concerned with 
trade union ballot-rigging, but of the 14 separate unions 
involved, assisting Counsel managed to produce supporting 
witnesses in only 3 cases. Thus to a significant extent the 
effectiveness of their case depended upon Sharpley's 
credibility.
The most prominent witnesses fell into four cate­
gories. The first two were the ex-Communists, and the anti­
communist trade unionists (mainly Industrial Groupers).
Thirdly, there was the group of alleged fellow travellers and 
secret Communists, that is, people who came forward on their 
own initiative to answer charges of Communist association 
made against them by Sharpley or other anti-Communists. 
Assisting Counsel utilised the appearance of these voluntary
30. McGillick admitted to Ted Laurie in cross-examination that 
his membership fell into abeyance in 1932, but he said 
that he still considered himself to be a member of the 
Party even though he did not pay dues or possess a member­
ship card. McGillick joined the Friends of the Soviet 
Union in 1935, and during the war the N.S.W. State Labour 
Party; he was expelled from both in 1942 for opposition 
to the war effort. (RCT. 5239, 5072).
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witnesses to expand their evidence of the Communist Party's 
connections and influence in the community at large, and 
wherever possible produced minor witnesses in an attempt to 
substantiate the original allegations. Closely cross-examined 
by assisting Counsel, and by Mr. Reynolds on behalf of Sharpley, 
the 'fellow travellers' comprised an important, if unplanned, 
section of the case, although the contribution of their 
evidence towards an indictment of the Party was often neglig­
ible. A fourth category, that of the anti-Communist 'cranks', 
is less clearly distinguishable, since a number of trade 
union witnesses and ex-Communists exhibited in varying degrees 
that hysterical and paranoid attitude to Communism denoted 
by the rubric 'crankish'. But there were two witnesses whose 
extreme paranoia imparted to them an especial prominence at 
the Commission. Their experience of Communism extended no 
further than a casual aquaintance with individual Communists, 
whom they perceived as personifications of the Party's evils. 
Their motivation in testifying against these individuals 
apparently derived from private feuds and resentments, and
they proved more of an embarrassment than an asset to assist-
31ing Counsel's effort to denigrate the Communist Party.
The areas of subject-matter covered by oral evidence 
naturally did not always coincide with the divisions into 
witness 'types'. In fact the only subject dealt with as the 
exclusive expertise of one group was the internal organisation 
and operations of the Communist Party, about which the ex- 
Communists alone were in a position to testify. Evidence of 
other matters was adduced in piecemeal fashion from a variety 
of witnesses. The ex-Communists elaborated their own versions 
of the theoretical teachings and aims of the Party first 
presented to the Commission in documentary form, while all 
anti-Communist witnesses contributed information on Communist 
activities in extra-Party spheres. The examination of the
31. There was one relatively significant section of the case 
dealt with by witnesses who did not come within any of 
these categories. Assisting Counsel called an Executive 
member of the Victorian State School Committees' Associat­
ion, and a minor supporting witness, to testify to the 
Communist affiliations of certain members of that 
Association. McLean was strongly anti-Communist, but his 
style of testimony was too sane and competent to qualify 
him for inclusion among the 'cranks'.
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'fellow travellers' was designed to illustrate the workings of 
the Party's front organisations, its influence within the 
Labour Party and its power to dupe liberal Ministers of 
Religion. But in the mass of repetitive and frequently 
confusing detail offered to the Commission, it was the types 
of witnesses rather than the precise content of their evidence 
which emerged as the more significant: what motives led them
to testify? what function did they serve in the broad scheme 
of the case? and how damaging were they from the Communist 
point of view? These are the kind of questions upon which any 
useful evaluation of the oral evidence for the anti-Communist 
case must be based.
The 'historical expert'
MALCOLM HENRY ELLIS, historian and Bulletin journal­
ist, was assisting Counsel's 'expert' witness, his contribution 
to the case being an extension of the documentary introduction 
with the professed aim of illustrating the origins and 
organisational development of the Communist Party in Australia. 
Ellis’s career as a student of the subject had begun in 1918 
at the request of the Commonwealth Directorate of War 
Propaganda (RCT. Ill); subsequently, during the course of 
private research in Australian history, he had published The 
Red Road (1932) and The Garden Path (1949), both of which 
sought to prove the A.C.P.'s connections with Moscow and with 
sections of the Australian Labour Party. When Ellis died in 
1969, Professor C.M.H. Clark observed that his political 
philosophy had been based on a deep conviction
... that the Protestant religion, and British 
political institutions, were the recipe for men 
of heroic ingredients and that the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 was an international 
conspiracy to degrade and besmirch mankind.
Publicly, he seemed anxious, indeed over anxious, 
to shake Australians out of their complacency and 
force them to see that the barbarism of world 
communism was already in their midst.
32. C.M.H. Clark, 'R.C. Mills and M.H. Ellis: A Note',
Historical Studies, vol. 14 no. 53, p. 96. Ellis 
was perhaps best known to Bulletin readers under the 
pseudonym 'Ek Dum'. His extreme view of Communism 
has also been noted by D.W. Rawson. In 1919 Ellis
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Unlike other witnesses for the case, Ellis did not 
testify concerning his own experience with the Communist 
Party, nor did he express directly his personal views on the 
nature of Communism. Essentially he was employed by assisting 
Counsel as a vehicle for the presentation of documents which 
they could have tendered themselves. But Ellis possessed the 
advantage of being able to act as an 'interpreter' of the 
evidence, backed by more than 30 years experience in research­
ing the field. He could select those documents of use to the 
case, link them in logical historical sequence, and place 
them in context where this was not clear. And he provided an 
opportunity for assisting Counsel to exploit the conventional
image of the detached historian in order to dignify their
3 3argument with an aura of objectivity.
Ellis told the Commission that he had used his 
discretion in selecting the evidence, the basis of his choice 
being that each document should show 'some act in the progress 
of the Communist Party' or constitute an official declaration 
by a Party officer; and that each should be capable of 'stand­
ing on its own feet' without comment, as a means of avoiding 
the intrusion of his own political bias. (RCT. 565-6).34
32. Cont.
(then private secretary to the Leader of the Queensland Opposition) observed a march in Brisbane organised by 
the Qld. Industrial Council in protest against the 
continued use of the War Precautions Act against 
Government opponents. Ellis said later under oath that 
some Russians participating in the march had waved red 
flags and foamed at the mouth. (See 'Political 
Violence in Australia', Dissent no. 22 (Autumn 1968)
p. 20).
33. The question naturally arises as to why assisting Counsel 
did not call a University academic to testify for this 
section of their case. The evidence of an academic
like John Anderson would surely have carried more weight 
and prestige than that of Ellis, whose extreme anti­
communist bias was well-known. Perhaps the hegemony of 
the Left was too strong in intellectual circles for 
anyone to risk appearing in the role of a pimp.
In cross-examination, Ellis would not agree with Paterson 
that he was 'insanely' biassed against Communism, but he 
admitted that he had a 'natural' bias against treason 
and violence. (RCT. 566).
34.
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He must have forgotten how interpretative the mere act of 
selection can be. It was very much apparent that his choice 
of material had been governed by a wish to make out a case 
against the Party, and that he had taken the opportunity, 
in showing its organisational development, to include those 
documents which placed its aims and policies in the most 
unattractive light. His chronological grouping of documents 
betrayed the bent of his pre-occupations, the most 
conspicuous of which concerned the changes in A.C.P. policy 
in relation to the Second World War as an example of the 
Party's subservience to Comintern. Ellis tendered a total of 
22 exhibits (mainly articles from the Party's journals) to 
document the 1939 reversal from initial support of an 'anti- 
Fascist' war effort to bitter hostility towards 'Imperialist' 
war-mongering. In marked contrast, the years 1940-42 were 
represented by only 5 documents; and for the final years of 
the war during which the Party gave its enthusiastic and 
whole-hearted support, Ellis produced none at all.
In general the basis of Ellis's selection of
documentary evidence would seem to have been his wish to
portray the A.C.P. as a Party of violent revolution; which
necessarily called for a glossing over of those periods when
it sought accommodation with more moderate elements in the
Labour movement. His emphasis on the year 1930 was justifiable,
since this point marked a radical overhaul of the Party's
organisation, the institution of a new leadership and the
embarkation upon a revolutionary brand of socialist
propaganda. But significantly enough, the concentration of
documents extended throughout the period of the early 1930's,
when Communists were at their most belligerent and
uncompromising in their support for revolutionary tactics,
and declined only after the Party adopted a softer approach
in favour of co-operation with the 'forces of progress and
35peace' for the defeat of Fascism. Similarly, Ellis showed 
no interest in the dissipation of Communist revolutionary 
fervour resultant upon the A.C.P.'s war effort and the influx
35. Ellis tendered 30 documents covering the period 1930-34, 
and 2 documents for the period 1935-38.
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of middle-class intellectuals into its ranks. His neglect of 
the latter war years carried over into 1946 and 1947, and it 
was only with the re-adoption of hard-line policies in 1948 
that he saw developments in the Party as once more warranting 
exposition at the Commission.
For the Communist Counsel, cross-examination of Ellis 
was a testing ground to determine how Lowe would interpret the 
role he had assigned them during the procedural rulings. At 
this stage they remained very much on the defensive, approach­
ing the witness with that aggressive spirit which springs 
from insecurity. Ellis's portrayal of the A.C.P.'s organisat­
ional development, like assisting Counsel's introduction, 
relied solidly upon the Party's own literature, and at no point 
was its accuracy challenged. The Communists attacked on the 
grounds that in showing this development, Ellis had chosen 
documents which gave a biassed view of the Party's aims 
and policies as a means of articulating his extreme personal 
hatred of Societ Communism. Ellis seemed to feel some 
embarrassment at Paterson's use of his Bulletin articles to 
demonstrate his pro-Fascist attitudes in international affairs 
during the immediate pre-war years; and Paterson enjoyed a 
degree of success in attempting to show that his war-time 
reporting of events concerning the Soviet Union was consciously 
inaccurate and designed to prejudice the Soviets' image in 
the eyes of the Australian public. But Lowe remained uncon­
vinced by Paterson's assertion that Ellis's political bias had 
guided his selection of evidence. He was even more disinclined 
to accept the proposition that the documents submitted to the 
Commission were so unrepresentative of the true position of 
the Party that no findings could legitimately be based upon 
them. Even if there were some serious omissions, Lowe 
commented, this could in no way affect the validity of that 
material which had been tendered as evidence. (RCT. 608). 
Nevertheless, it was upon the basis of their claim that Ellis 
had deliberately conveyed a false impression of Communism that 
Lowe allowed the Party's Counsel to tender additional document­
ary evidence. Assisting Counsel were watchful of their 
opportunities to object to the breadth of this 'supplementary 
picture', and Lowe agreed with the point made by Stanley Lewis 
that the Communists should only adduce evidence on matters 
raised by Ellis in his examination-in-chief. He reminded
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Paterson that since the Party was not yet presenting its own 
case, he should restrict himself to quoting only the 'barest 
essentials' of the documents. (RCT. 581). In response,
Paterson took the opportunity to draw attention to the 
difficulties of the Communist Counsel's position:
... In an ordinary case we would have been in a 
position to ask for particulars ... and then we could 
have based our evidence on the particular charges 
levelled against us.. However, unfortunately we have 
not the slightest idea of that. We do not know what 
evidence will be given, and therefore we must take 
advantage of every occasion in which to get in any 
evidence at all which can help to explain our teaching 
or our policy so that it may be interpreted correctly.
(RCT. 594).
Having arraigned the Party almost exclusively from 
Communist literature, Malcolm Ellis was secure from the 
challenge to credibility normally levelled by cross-examin­
ing Counsel at witnesses who give testimony of a personalised 
kind. The Communists could demonstrate Ellis's strong 
political antagonism but they were unable to relate this to 
his evidence except in terms of its selectivity; his picture 
of Communism was inaccurate only in so far as it was incomplete. 
Failure to undermine the value of his contribution to the 
Commission nevertheless did not unduly compromise the Party's 
position. For whilst this 'impregnability' made him a fairly 
solid introductory witness, his evidence did not ultimately 
constitute a serious indictment of Communism. Its capacity 
to damage was limited by the fact that it merely portrayed 
the Party as an advocate of unworthy causes, furnishing no 
actual proof of misdeeds in contravention of law.
The ex-Communists.
As the sole source of information on internal aspects 
of the Party, and the most authoritative agents for the 
identification of Communists and 'associated' persons, the 
former Party members were indispensable to assisting Counsel's 
case. Each had been actively involved with the Communist Party 
for a number of years, and it was difficult to dispute the 
likelihood that from this experience they had gleaned consider­
able knowledge of its functioning. Their inside experience of 
a political organisation whose essence, as posited by assisting
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Counsel, was secrecy and conspiracy, imparted to their words 
a more than average persuasiveness. But this effect was 
diminished by the nature of their political conversion. 
Exhibiting an intensely hostile reaction to their old 
allegiances, it was evident that they were far from being 
disinterested parties in the matters to which they testified; 
their credibility was thus rendered particularly vulnerable 
to challenge from opposing Counsel
CECIL SHARPLEY'S testimony illustrated most clearly 
the co-existent strength and weakness of the ex-Communist 
witness. During the course of his examination-in-chief, he 
proffered a wealth of plausible detail about the Communist 
Party, his confident, unruffled manner impressing the
3 6Commissioner as the bearing 'in general' of a good witness.
And Sharpley was undoubtedly correct in his subsequent claim 
that 'the Royal Commission could not have proceeded far on its 
way without my help'.^7 His usefulness to assisting Counsel 
was impaired, however, when he faced Ted Hill in cross- 
examination. Through an attack on Sharpley's personal credit 
and a challenge to the factual basis of many of his 
allegations, Hill managed to convince Lowe that there was 
'much to make one doubt parts of his evidence', and Sharpley 
emerged from a lengthy ordeal in the witness-box with his 
earlier reputation as a 'phenomenal' witness somewhat tarn- 
ished. Cross examination suggested that at many points he 
had exaggerated his understanding of, and role in, Communist 
affairs, and over-reached himself in an effort to prove his 
worth as chief witness against the Party. That deep-seated 
insecurity and thwarted ambition which had led Sharpley to 
desert the Party now operated to flaw his evidence against it.
Sharpley's value as an anti-Communist witness 
derived from his official position in the Party, and the
36. Report, p. 7.
37. Sharpley, The Great Delusion, p. 132.
38. Report, p. 7.
39. The Melbourne Herald and Sun were lyrical about Sharpley's 
performance during the first few days of his testimony, 
and their readers remained unaware of the fact that his 
success was not sustained under hostile interrogation.
" Hark, the Herald's angel sings!"
*r 
T
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length and recent nature of his membership. Yet these same 
assets made his credit more susceptible to attack from the 
Party's Counsel, for in cross-examination Sharpley confronted 
the hostility of the men he had directly 'betrayed'. The 
Communist barristers knew as much as Sharpley himself about 
the matters concerned in his allegations; unlike assisting 
Counsel, they also knew to what extent he had told the truth, 
and from this vantage point they were well-equipped to 
produce additional information which would throw his reliability 
into question. Moreover, their personal knowledge of the 
witness enabled them to organise their cross-examination in 
such a way as to exploit to the full the 'cracks' in his 
personality. In line with the Party's anti-Sharpley 
propaganda outside the Commission, Hill depicted his former 
comrade as a moral degenerate, and a weak, ambitious man who 
turned against the Party because he could not succeed in it. 
Communist Counsel found it useful to emphasise the element 
of the turn-coat in the make-up of all the ex-Communist 
witnesses, but it was a line of attack which proved 
particularly successful in the case of Sharpley, because his 
profitable journalistic exposure of the Party conformed to 
the stereo-type of the professional paid informer.
Sharpley appeared at the Commission in the constant 
company of his private bodyguard, and according to Press 
photographs, with dark-ringed eyes and haggard expression.
For the Communists the latter was fresh evidence of a 
degenerate private life, and of the internal erosion caused 
by the conscience of a man who had betrayed his friends and 
principles 'for a price'.
Sharpley's mentors, on the other hand, would have 
accounted for his physical appearance in terms of the strain 
imposed by the Party's efforts to intimidate him. During 
re-examination, Mr. Reynolds made much of the fact that his 
client had been approached and abused by Communists in public 
places, and he drew attention to 'threatening' articles in 
the Guardian.^  (RCT. 2650-1). There was no evidence that
40. Reynolds referred to the following statement in the
Guardian, 12 July 1949: 'The gentlemen so enamoured of
... Sharpley are not above killing him and fabricating 
a chain of clues implicating some Party leader. History 
shows that they have not hesitated to destroy similar
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physical violence had been employed against Sharpley, but 
a vocal 'demonstration' by Communists in the public gallery 
when he first entered the witness box gave some substance to 
assisting Counsel's picture of the Party's tendency to 
victimise its political enemies. Lowe seemed angered by the 
shouts of 'You rat, Sharpley!' and 'You couldn't tell the 
truth, Sharpley!'; he ordered the court to be cleared, and he 
acceded to Mr. Sholl's request that 'in the circumstances', 
Sharpley's current address should be withheld from the public. 
(RCT. 688 ff.)41
In the witness-box, Sharpley enlarged upon the 
conception of the Communist Party he had given in his Herald 
articles: an organisation dedicated to securing control or
influence in all sectors of community life preparatory to its 
major aim of seizing political power and establishing a 
Communist dictatorship. He claimed that where its objectives 
could not be achieved by open persuasion and propaganda, the 
Party was actively engaged in methods of violence, intimidation 
and fraud: '... the policy of the Communist Party, as I
endeavoured to show in my articles, was completely disruptive 
and completely destructive and against the fundamental inter­
ests of the Australian people and of the nation, and ... [it] 
is prepared to stoop to any means to advance its policy'.
(RCT. 1802) . Only under the pressure of cross-examination did 
he concede that revolution was not considered by the 
Communists to be a matter of 'immediate and practical politics'. 
(RCT. 848).
Sharpley's contribution to theoretical matters was
40. Cont.
individuals and then endeavoured to place the blame on 
working class leaders'. According to the Melbourne Sun, 
Communists present in the court during Sharpley's 
testimony conducted a 'war of nerves', attempting 
unsuccessfully to disconcert him with 'a steady damning 
stare'. (6 July 1949). In confirmation, Sharpley 
writes that 'Communists were always present in the public 
gallery, staring and mouthing abuse at me'. (Great 
Delusion, p. 129).
41. Sharpley describes this outburst as 'rather more horrible 
than the attack by a shoal of sharks starving for blood 
... It was as if one were chained to a spot where a foul 
sewer had burst'. (Great Delusion, pp. 128-9).
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offered in the context of his evidence on Marx School classes 
and his experience as a Party tutor. He implied that the 
Party's published material on ideology and aims provided no 
adequate measure of the real nature of Communism, thus giving 
expression to the theory (a favourite of ex-Communist witnesses) 
that the language of Communist texts, even when innocent on 
its face, was understood by the initiate in a different and 
sinister sense. Revolutionary content was deliberately toned 
down for consumption by the Australian public. Even within 
the Party itself, Sharpley claimed, rank and file members were 
fed a 'sugared line' by their leaders and tutors, and were 
kept in ignorance of the extent of its commitment to violent 
revolution. (RCT. 949 ff.).^ In the unions, Communist 
organisers practiced a similar deceit. The Party took advantage 
of the political gullibility of the ordinary working-man, 
encouraging him to believe himself activated by his own 
interests, while in fact manipulating him to serve those of 
the Communist revolution. (RCT. 863).
If ultimately Sharpley proved to be a damaging 
witness against the Communist Party, one is struck neverthe­
less by the basically inconsequential nature of the bulk of 
his evidence. Of the numerous instances of quasi-criminal
42. See H.L. Packer, Ex-Communist Witnesses, (California, 
1962), p. 12.
43. During cross-examination, Sharpley admitted to Hill that
his evidence on the Party's teachings was not a com­
prehensive picture, but was intended to show only 'some 
aspects' of what was taught. Hill successfully 
demonstrated that several of the documentary extracts 
tendered by Sharpley had never in fact been used by the 
Party's tutors. He also drew attention to what he 
called the 'tendentious' subheadings under which the 
extracts had been presented to the Commission: e.g.
"Communist technique for actual seizing of power"; "Why 
the Communist Party forbids free criticism by rank and 
file". Mr. Sholl told Lowe that the headings should be 
disregarded. 'They apparently represent some effort on 
the part of the person who collated them ... to convey
a description of the subject matter.' Sharpley denied 
Hill's suggestion that assisting Counsel had given him 
the headings and asked him to find quotations from Party 
literature which accorded with them. (RCT. 1859-66).
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conduct he alleged, only a few could be furnished with solid 
evidence, and more often the information which purported to 
incriminate the Party failed to rise above the level of the 
banal. His evidence on the Party's internal operations 
functioned primarily to create the 'atmospherics' of assisting 
Counsel's case; the effect was to present an unappealing 
view of the organisation by emphasising its authoritarian and 
conspiratorial aspects. Organised upon a rigid bureaucratic 
structure, the Party's policy decisions emanated from the 
highest committee and were enforced upon the rank and file. 
Delegates to the State Conference, while in theory enjoying 
a free vote, were subject to pressure from Party leaders, 
and the Executive reserved to itself the power to alter 
resolutions passed. (RCT. 821; 1285-6). Autonomy of local 
branches was minimal: the ruling clique could interfere at
any time to 'eliminate' an elected official if it considered 
him unsuitable for the position, Sharpley claimed. (RCT. 1283). 
He pictured the Party's membership as held within the grip of 
an iron discipline. A 'Control Commission' enforced conformity 
with the Party rules and the Communist ideology, and 'deviants' 
were subject to public censorship, suspension or expulsion 
from the Party. (RCT. 837-8).
Whether founded upon fact or not, Sharpley's claim 
that the Party had raised funds by rigging its Melbourne Cup 
sweep so as to ensure that no prize money would have to be paid 
out (RCT. 906) possessed that faintly ridiculous quality typical 
of much of his evidence of Communist misdeeds.^ And even the 
less absurd allegations failed to achieve the damaging effect 
that was apparently intended. For instance, Sharpley deposed 
to the fact that a domestic tribunal interfered in the personal 
relationships of Party members, even to the extent of directing 
that a married couple should separate and permitting another 
unmarried couple to co-habit. (RCT. 837; 2631-3). His
44. Sharpley instanced a number of underhand methods employed 
by the Party to add to its funds, including the employment 
of members to work the Party's Press at under-award rates 
of pay. Sharpley claimed that when he became manager of 
the 'Starlight Press' in 1936 he remedied this situation, 
although he continued to accept under-award rates himself. 
This latter information was probably brought out by 
assisting Counsel to bolster their image of Sharpley as a 
man of selfless principle, counteracting the Party's 
attempts to discredit his character.
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implication was no doubt that the Party observed unsavoury 
moral standards, but as Lowe later commented in the Report, 
Sharpley produced 'no evidence to show that these irregular­
ities ... are any greater than, if indeed as great as, those 
existing in any other section of the c o m m u n i t y L i k e w i s e ,  
one suspects that Sharpley's picture of an unscrupulous lead­
ership, 'prepared to stoop to any means to advance its policy'
did not single out the Communist Party as being especially
4divergent from its rivals in party politics.
Hoping to clarify the fact that, in their view 
at least, the A.C.P. was no 'ordinary' political party, 
assisting Counsel gave a prominent place to evidence of its 
underground activities, questioning Sharpley closely on the 
manner in which the Party operated whilst under the con­
strictions of the 1940-42 ban. The use of false names and 
secret printing presses suggested an appropriate degree of 
conspiracy, but the only 'misconduct' alleged by Sharpley 
(other than defiance of the ban) was the Party's anti-war 
propaganda before the German invasion of the Soviet Union. 
Communists infiltrated the factories to slow down war product 
ion, and into the Armed Forces to stir up soldier's grievances 
(RCT. 718-33). True, Sharpley testified to misconduct of a 
more serious order in illustrating his contention that 
deserters of the Party were frequently subject to intimidation 
and assault by other Communists. He claimed that 'Dinny' 
Lovegrove had been brutally bashed by several Party members 
(including Ralph Gibson) after his expulsion in 1933, but the 
force of the allegation, like many others of a similar kind, 
was considerably weakened by the fact that it rested entirely
45. Report, p. 71.
46. Dealing with this subject in his Report, Lowe found that 
'The Communist Party is prepared to use any means to 
achieve what it thinks to be a desirable object, so long 
as it regards the means as fitting and the result as not 
on the whole disadvantageous'. (p. 105). Brian 
Fitzpatrick's rather apt comment was that Lowe's finding 
would be remembered as 'an unimpeachable description of 
the ethics common to all political parties'. (The Un­
necessary Police State Bill, Australian Council for Civil 
Liberties, Melbourne 1950, p. 8.)
139
upon hearsay information. (RCT. 765; 1244).
Evidence of the Party's external operations (to 
which a sizeable portion of Sharpley's testimony was devoted) 
centred upon its 'front' organisations, and Communist 
penetration of trade unions and a variety of non-Communist 
voluntary organisations. Confirming a widespread popular 
belief, Sharpley revealed that the Party promoted its cause 
through the creation of 'progressive' bodies whose Communist 
origins remained unapparent to the public. The invited 
participation of prominent public figures furnished a veneer 
of respectability, cloaking from general view, and often from 
the organisations' non-Communist members themselves, the fact 
that policy was controlled by a few strategically-placed 
Communist office-bearers. Party members in organisations 
like the R.S.L. and the Labour Party carried out another kind 
of deception, disguising their political affiliations to avoid 
expulsion under anti-Communist membership rules. As in the
47. Lovegrove held the position of Organising Secretary in 
the Victorian branch of the A.L.P. in 1949. Sharpley told the Commission that it was fear of a similar fate for 
himself which had prompted him to leave the Party secretly. 
Lowe does not mention the Lovegrove affair in the Report
in his section on the Party's use of force, violence and 
intimidation, indicative perhaps that he did not accept 
the allegation as proven.
It is interesting that Lovegrove was not called as a 
witness by assisting Counsel: in many ways he would have
been an asset to their case - a strongly anti-Communist 
ex-Communist, fluent, aggressive and unlikely to be 
intimidated by Hill's cross-examination techniques.
Perhaps the Federal A.L.P.'s opposition to the inquiry, 
and the need to protect the Federal Government in an 
election year, deterred Lovegrove from appearing as a 
witness.
48. Sharpley quoted a number of examples of the Party's front 
organisations, including Australia-Soviet House, the 
Eureka Youth League, and the New Housewives' Association. 
Among the numerous fellow travellers whom he said the 
Party relied upon for the successful operation of such 
organisations, Sharpley named 3 Melbourne University 
professors (Greenwood, Woodruff, and Crawford). These 
were associated with A.S.H. and could be influenced to 
favour 'certain aspects' of Communist policy (RCT. 868 ff.)
49. Sharpley's evidence on the infiltration of Communists 
into non-Party organisations was extensive. Assisting 
Counsel introduced this section of their case by showing 
considerable interest in his evidence about the creation 
of sub-committees within the Party to centralise its activities in particular fields - e.g. industrial affairs,
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case of his evidence on Communist fractions in the unions, 
Sharpley's information for the most part did not amount to 
more than a description of the tactics of an ordinary pressure 
group. He claimed that Communist members of these extra- 
Party organisations sought to influence policy in accordance 
with A.C.P. objectives and where practicable, to instal 
themselves in positions of office as a means of facilitating 
this aim. But there were few instances where he could show 
that the Party worked towards its ends by methods other than 
those of persuasion, the use of legitimate voting power, and 
in trade union affairs, a polished technique in the 'manage­
ment' of meetings.
With the notable exception of matters concerning 
Communists in the unions, Sharpley's evidence on these 'fringe 
activities suggested a negligible degree of illegal conduct. 
Its capacity to injure the Party derived principally from its 
exposure of the presence of Communists in key areas of 
community life - a phenomenon perhaps intrinsically harmless, 
but liable to be badly construed by an anti-Communist public 
convinced of the subversive aims of Communism. Sharpley's 
success as a witness must be measured by the standards of 
what his evidence purported to achieve. Assisting Counsel 
constantly sought to impart an unsavoury atmosphere and a 
sinister meaning to the information provided by Sharpley - an 
exercise in which he was only too willing to co-operate - and 
they made it abundantly clear that they viewed their witness 
not as a source of general information on the Communist Party 
but as a vehicle for its indictment. In this respect the
49. Cont.
agriculture, youth, and the medical profession. (RCT.
833 ff.). Subsequently, Sharpley spoke of organised 
groups of Communists present in a wide range of occupat­
ional, educational and cultural bodies, such as a 
journalists' group, a unit of Communists in the Greek 
community, and another in the Education Department. (RCT 
844-890).
Lowe showed much curiosity about Sharpley's allegation 
that there was a Party branch active at Melbourne Univer­
sity (RCT. 893), and questioned him closely on the matter 
as he did other witnesses who made the same claim. The 
number of members Sharpley could name specifically as 
being members of these groups was usually small. He knew 
of only 2 teachers who were in the Party's fraction in 
the Education Department, and he had no idea whether they 
incorporated Communist doctrine into their teaching.
(RCT. 850).
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greater part of his testimony was ineffective.
It redeemed itself, however, on industrial matters,
where Sharpley's experience as a trade unionist and secretary
of the industrial sub-committee of the Party came to the fore.
Lowe did not accept all of his allegations about the Party's
S 0use of violence and intimidation in trade union affairs, 
but there was enough apparently authentic detail to indicate 
the propensity of Communists to adopt 'bullying' tactics as a 
means of defeating their political opponents, and to disregard 
the niceties of the law and democratic procedure where these 
did not suit the Party's purposes. Taken in conjunction with 
the most serious evidence against the Party - Sharpley's 
charges of ballot rigging - it amounted to a damaging 
accusation of Communist misconduct in the most vital area of 
the Party's operations .
Ted Hill featured consistently in the evidence as a 
kind of bogey, responsible it seemed for almost all of the 
misdeeds. Sharpley claimed that a major reason for his own 
disillusionment with the Party was Hill's frequent direction 
(as head of the industrial sub-committee) that forceful 
tactics should be employed at union meetings, and that ballots 
in which Communist candidates were unlikely to succeed should 
be rigged. (RCT. 762). And Sharpley projected an image of 
himself as one who carried out such orders, but with reluctance 
and distaste. The two 'comrades' had associated closely in 
their Party work for a number of years; their clash as witness 
and cross-examiner was consequently pursued on intensely 
personal level with mutual hostility only thinly veiled.
50. See Report, p. 75.
51. The Party's alleged misdeeds in the industrial sphere 
were not all of a criminal kind. Sharpley claimed it 
had instigated several major strikes in Victoria:
the 1946 Transport Strike, the 1947-8 Metal Trades 
Strike, and the 1948 Essential Services dispute. He 
said that Communist union officials had manipulated 
union rules to consolidate their position, and in*some 
cases had deliberately precipitated disputes with anti­
communist union members which provided the opportunity 
for intimidation, black bans and expulsions. The 
Party maintained a vigilant eye on the affairs of all 
unions, and where it succeeded in getting its members 
into office, these officials would seek the advice of’ 
Party leaders on all important matters- of union policy 
and strike action.
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Sharpley was inclined to frame his answers in such a way as 
to suggest 'You ought to know, you were there', while his 
general bearing indicated that he feared Hill as a person 
who knew him too well, and would use the knowledge ruthlessly 
to his disadvantage. Hill's own manner exhibited that cold 
implacability attributed to him in Sharpley's articles. 2^
Hill concentrated on undermining Sharpley's credit 
rather than challenging directly the truth of particular 
allegations. The latter were usually approached with a view 
to establishing that Sharpley had consciously distorted an 
ordinary and quite harmless occurrence so as to imbue it with 
a sinister aspect. Hill pursued a two-fold aim. Firstly, he 
tried to demonstrate that many of what purported to be factual 
statements in Sharpley's articles and evidence were simply 
his personal opinions, or generalisations based upon 
recollection of a single incident, neither of which were 
supported by more substantial kinds of evidence. Secondly, 
he charged that Sharpley's motive both in writing the articles 
and in testifying at the Commission had been to support the 
current anti-Communist campaign of the Capitalist Press, and 
to turn people away from Communism, rather than to present 
a truthful account of his experience in the Party. Lowe's 
suspicion of Sharpley's reliability (as recorded in the Report) 
is in large part a reflection of Hill's success.
It seems indisputable in view of his position in the 
Party that Sharpley possessed accurate knowledge about a wide 
range of the Communist activites; and close scrutiny of the 
detail of his evidence leads one to doubt the probability of a 
serious degree of conscious fabrication. Where the facts
52. C.H. Sharpley, I Was a Communist Leader, p. 2. Hill 
undertook the entire cross-examination with the exception 
of trade union matters. No doubt the Party considered it 
more prudent to allow Laurie to deal with these, since 
Hill figured so prominently as an accused person.
53. The accuracy of a considerable number of points in 
Sharpley's testimony was successfully challenged by Hill, 
but they were almost always very minor factual mistakes. 
Sharpley did admit that there were a number of errors in 
his Herald articles, some of a 'serious' kind, and that 
he did not in every case take the trouble to see them 
corrected. For instance, he agreed that his claim that 
Party recruits swore a 'solemn oath' upon entering the 
Party was technically incorrect; also that the sentence 
in his articles declaring that Sharpley was elected to
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were distorted, Sharpley's impulse was probably as much his 
desire to create a picture which conformed to assisting 
Counsel's pre-occupations as his determination to wreak 
vengeance on the Party. On the whole, the flaws exploited 
by Hill derived from his inclination to testify beyond the 
bounds of direct experience, and from his eagerness to 
expose the 'real' aims which lay behind Communist activites - 
tendencies which assisting Counsel conspicuously failed to 
discipline. Determined to capitalise upon their star witness, 
Mr. Sholl and his colleagues over-extended the potential of 
Sharpley's testimony so as to cover every aspect of the terms 
of reference. Moreover, they laboured to convey the impression 
that his knowledge of Party practice was supplemented by 
expertise in the theory of Communism, manufacturing an image 
of Sharpley which he could not sustain in the face of aggressive 
cross-examination. Hill destroyed the image with a facility 
which quickly deprived Sharpley of the smooth confidence he 
displayed under examination-in-chief.
Perhaps sheer nervousness induced by the hostile 
confrontation with Hill stultified his mental processes, for 
Sharpley was unable to articulate a clear understanding of: some 
of the most elementary aspects of Communist theoretical teach­
ings, although he has worked as a Party tutor for a number of 
years. (RCT. 1766 ff; 1830 ff.). Hill frequently saw occasion 
to point out the faultiness of Sharpley's memory about matters 
not dealt with in evidence, contrasting it with the detail of 
other occurrences recounted in his articles and in the witness 
box. He demonstrated that notwithstanding this apparently 
detailed knowledge of the Party's affairs, a great many of 
Sharpley's allegations lacked a solid factual basis. In support 
of his assertion that the Party received substantial monetary 
donations from 'wealthy foreign-born manufacturers', Sharpley
53. Cont.
the position of assistant Secretary of the Munition 
Workers' Union after 2 weeks work at Maribyrnong 
munitions factory should have read '10 weeks'. (RCT. 
1149; 1177). More often, however, the effectiveness of 
the cross-examination was based less upon a direct 
challenge to the factual accuracy of the evidence, than 
upon its exposure of Sharpley's tendency to rely on 
hearsay or on knowledge of a single isolated event for 
his generalisations about Party behaviour. In other 
words, Hill concentrated upon distortion rather than 
fabrication of the 'facts'.
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could cite only a single example, and admitted he had no idea
how many people were involved in this category of contributors.
(RCT. 1301). His evidence that Comintern controlled the
operations of the A.C.P. was similarly demonstrated to be of
nebulous character. Sharpley had told Sholl that the sources
of policy directives from Moscow were the Comintern newspaper,
Pravda editorials, and broadcasts by Moscow radio. Questioned
by Hill, he could give no examples of the Victorian State
Executive discussing the content of these newspapers, or of
Party policy being altered in accordance with the views they
disseminated; he knew of one occasion alone when a Party
member had recorded a Moscow radio broadcast. (RCT. 1249 ff.)
The last occasion he could recall of a Party leader paying a
visit to the Communist International was in 1938, but he
'assumed' that R. Dixon's recent trip abroad was of a similar
3 4nature to those of the Comintern period. (RCT. 1876 ff.) 
Sharpley's evidence on control and authority within the A.C.P. 
was also shown to be a distortion of reality. Hill asked 
Sharpley to illustrate his claim that the State Executive 
altered resolutions passed at the State Conference.
The witness: ... I think that in 1947-48 there
were discussions on the final form of the 
resolution, that is on the State Executive, and 
for certain political considerations it was 
altered.
Mr. Hill: Were they material alterations on
what had been carried? A: I do not think so.
Q: There was in fact no change of policy at all?
A: No, I think it would be just some question of
emphasis. (RCT. 1286).
Likewise, the allegation of 'interference' by Party leaders in 
A.C.P. elections amounted, in the face of Hill's questions, to 
pressure on voters deriving from their 'general fear of 
displeasing the leadership'. (RCT. 1286).
By the end of Sharpley's cross-examination,
Communist Counsel could feel well satisfied with the way they 
had diminished the stature of the Commission's major witness.
Sydney school-teacher J.N. RAWLING, the second ex-
54. J.D. Blake (former Victorian President, and in 1949 a
member of the National Committee) returned from a visit 
to Moscow in 1938. R. Dixon was National President in 
1949.
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Communist led by assisting Counsel, was in terms of
personality their most successful witness, although his
testimony benefited their case very little as a condemnation
of the Communist Party. Motivated by pacifist rather than
revolutionary political persuasions, Rawling was active
throughout the 1930's in the New South Wales branch of the
Party, and particularly in Communist peace movement
organisations. His expulsion in 1939 (from the Australian
League for Peace and Democracy, of which he was National
Secretary, as well as from the Party itself) followed the
publication of articles in Communist journals in which he
denounced the Russian invasion of Finland and the A.C.P.'s
initial support for war. (RCT. 2488; 2508). Thenceforth
Rawling moved rapidly towards a position of committed
opposition to Communism, during the 1940's participating
in Sydney Domain politics as an outspoken critic of his 
55former party.
Deeply interested in historical research in later 
years, his image at the Commission was that of an intellectual, 
'academic' witness, more comparable with Malcolm Ellis than 
with the other ex-Communists. Unlike Ellis, however, he did 
not spoil an apparently detached and intelligent approach to the 
subject by allowing his political bias to become obtrusive.
He tendered a vast amount of Communist Party literature, much 
of it from his private collection, manifesting a devotion to 
'historical truth' and an obsessive regard for detailed 
documentation which effectively destroyed any potential for 
sensationalism in the matters he dealt with. His evidence 
primarily concerned the workings of Communist front organisations 
in Sydney, and the role of the Party within them. Although 
it involved no allegations of criminal conduct, another type 
of witness could have utilised the material to add considerable 
vigour to the anti-Communist case; as presented by Rawling it 
became a lengthy and tedious succession of documents in which
55. Rawling told Mclnerney that he left the Party because 'I 
had come to the conclusion that socialism had not been 
established in Russia, that the Communist International 
was organised merely as a tool of the Russian Foreign 
Office, existing ... to organise support for Russia in 
various countries, and I came to regard the Communist 
Parties of the world as fifth columns inside a democracy, 
and I further came to the conclusion that Stalinism and
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the force of revelations about secret Communist fractions and 
'facades of respectability' was lost beneath the weight of 
pedantic detail. But if he did the Party no serious harm, 
Rawling succeeded in convincing Lowe that a variety of 
voluntary public organisations espousing 'progressive' causes 
were Party-creations effectively controlled by their 
Communist members. By frequent quotation in the Report, Lowe 
indicated that he accepted Rawling's evidence virtually in 
its entirety.
The other two ex-Communists offered testimony 
strikingly different in style to that of Rawling. Their 
evidence, while less solidly grounded upon factual detail, and 
strongly tinged with anti-Communist paranoia, nevertheless 
produced information of a considerably more challenging order. 
Communist Counsel could, in their own minds, dismiss much 
of the evidence as the fabrications of a political crank and 
a neurotic widow,^ but they were compelled to furnish the 
Commission with some kind of answer to the allegations made.
Lowe in fact showed in the Report that he accepted the bulk 
of 'Mrs. X's' allegations of the Party's 'offences', and that 
he was unwilling to discount all of McGillick's evidence. Even 
taking into consideration the difficulties faced by Communist 
Counsel in effectively refuting witnesses such as these, it 
strikes one as surprising that Lowe found himself able to 
accept their testimony to the extent that he did.
The anonymous 'Mrs. X' was Mrs. M.M. BAXTER, a 
middle-aged widow who joined the Communist Party in 1936, and 
subsequently became Secretary of the Middle Park branch. In 
1939 she severed her Communist Party connections, according to 
her evidence because she felt 'frightened' by its preparations 
for illegal activity in response to the war situation (RCT 5139-
55. Cont.
the Communist International represented a bigger danger to 
culture and democracy and freedom than even Hitler and 
the Nazis had done'. (RCT. 3563).
56. Ted Laurie (interview, Melbourne, 11 October 1971) said 
that the Party did not take McGillick seriously because 
he was an obvious crank. He claimed that Mrs. 'X'
was a neurotic, mentally disturbed woman, and that he 
privately protested to Sholl in very strong terms for 
allowing her to be brought forward as a witness.
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5144). At the Commission Sholl presented Baxter as an 
unhappy victim of Communist vindictiveness towards those who 
deserted the Party's ranks. A large portion of her nine-day 
duration in the witness box was devoted to the recounting of 
a variety of ill-doings perpetrated by Communists in an 
effort to inflict suffering upon her. These included threats 
of physical violence, the distribution of scurrilous leaflets 
in her neighbourhood alleging she was a policy spy, and the 
use of industrial pressure by Communist unionists as a means 
of forcing factory managements to dismiss her from several 
jobs.^ (RCT. 5344 ff.). Baxter's most sensational allegation 
was that shortly after leaving the Party, and while she lay 
ill in bed, a group of Communist officials forcibly entered her 
home in search of some Party documents which she held in her 
possession; she claimed that they ransacked the house and 
physically assaulted her in their attempt to discover where 
the documents were concealed. (RCT. 5340-42).
Baxter managed to retain the documents, and she 
produced them at the Commission as the basis for her evidence 
on the Party's organisation and activities. As &ell as branch 
minute books, and extensive notes on 'theoretical' matters 
which she said comprised material taught to her during her 
membership of the Party, she possessed a notebook of names and 
particulars of Communists and Party 'contacts', -Which was 
utilised by assisting Counsel for the most protracted session 
of 'naming of names' in the entire proceedings.^ To sholl 
she explained that she had compiled the list of names after she 
had decided to leave the Party, but while she was still a member, 
indicating her motives in so doing:
57. Mr. Sholl went into considerable detail in dealing with 
Baxter's dismissals from jobs, and he later called 5 
minor supporting witnesses to testify in confirmation of 
Baxter's claim that Communists in the factories spread 
rumours among her fellow workers that she was a police 
agent who spied upon the working class. Baxter lodged 
numerous appeals against the dismissals, and she enlisted 
the support of S. Keon (M.L.A. for Richmond) in her 
fight for reinstatement. Keon drafted several of her 
letters of appeal. (RCT. 5574).
58. The notebook contained the names of Communists, their 
position in the Party and their specialised Party work. 
Much of the information rested on hearsay, and it 
appeared she had frequently included names she had come 
across in Party records, but about whom otherwise she 
knew nothing. Lowe told Mr. Laurie that he would not
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Mr. Sholl: Do you mean that members of the
Communist Party were attacking you? A: Yes
Q: And were you trying to note down all persons
whom you had known in the Communist Party for the 
purpose in your turn if necessary of protecting 
yourself by referring to their names? A: Yes,
or memorising who they were in case they did attack 
me.
Q: So that if somebody later attacked you, you
could refer to those notes as indicating that person 
was a member of the Party? A: Yes.
(RCT. 5403)
Cross-examination showed that Baxter in fact adapted her notes
for a very positive purpose. She admitted to Laurie that she
had been engaged in adding names for fifteen months prior to
leaving the Party, and that she continued to make additions
after she left. Laurie established that many of the entries
in her book could only have been made in the years 1940-1945.
(RCT. 5460; 5463). During this time she supplied information
on the Party to Melbourne security police and A.L.P. conferences,
and in the course of 'private discussions' with D. Lovegrove,
*she had revealed the names of secret Communists operating in 
the Labour Party, who were accordingly expelled. (RCT. 5461 
ff.)59
In approaching most of assisting Counsel's witnesses, 
the Party's cross-examination tended to concentrate upon under­
mining personal credit rather than directly challenging the 
truth of the allegations. In the case of Mrs. Baxter, this 
procedure was followed partly because of the problem of gather­
ing evidence with which to refute allegations involving events
58. Cont.
regard the information in the book as proof in itself, 
unless its reliability was confirmed by oral evidence.
'... it may ultimately turn out with regard to, say, 
name A, I am satisfied it is something which is signif­
icant, and it may be with regard to name B, I am satisfied 
that the witness has no real recollection of how the 
name got there and it may not prove significant at all', 
Lowe stated. (RCT. 5287).
59. Those expelled included J. Lazarus, Melbourne solicitor, 
who himself featured at the Commission later in the 
proceedings. There was one Labour man alleged by Baxter 
to be a secret Communist, whose name she did not give to 
the A.L.P., but whom she did name at the Commission.
Samuel Merrifield, M.L.A. - already 'named' by Sharpley 
as a useful contact for the Party in the Victorian Labour 
Caucus - had according to Baxter addressed two State 
Conferences of the Victorian Communist Party (1938 and 
1939), and had been introduced to her by another Party 
member as a secret Communist. (RCT. 5282) .
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which occurred more than a decade in the past, and partly
because Communist Counsel regarded her evidence about what
happened after she left the Party as indisputable in its 
6 0essentials. Laurie tried to show that there was some
foundation to the Party's belief that she was a police
informer, thus providing a 'justification' for the Communists'
treatment of Baxter at the points in her testimony where he
f) 1was unable to deny that mistreatment had occurred. But, 
however much success he achieved in impressing upon Lowe an 
image of Baxter as a professional informer, the fact remained 
that her evidence of the Party's misdeeds went unchallenged 
except on very trivial points of detail; and as judge of 
the evidence Lowe was interested primarily in the nature of 
Communist activities rather than the reasoning which lay 
behind them.
Mrs. Baxter's feud with the Communist Party did not 
produce incriminating evidence, but it showed the Party in a 
most uncomplimentary light, and gave considerable weight to 
Sharpley's claims about its ruthless manipulation of influence 
in the unions to discredit political enemies. Her evidence on 
the organisational aspects of the Party proved at once less
60. Laurie said, when interviewed (1 June 1971), that 
Baxter's allegations about the visit of Party officials 
to her home in 1939 were probably an exaggerated but 
more-or-less correct ’version of the event. He added 
that the Communists' behaviour was a product of their 
correct assessment of Baxter's character as a likely 
informer who would use the documents against the Party.
61. Laurie cited evidence in addition to Baxter's admissions 
that she gave information to the Labour Party and the 
police. He drew attention to the fact that some time 
after leaving the Party, Baxter had incurred a police 
charge for perjury in signing a false declaration with 
regard to a property transaction. Proceedings against 
her were subsequently dropped for no apparent reason.
(RCT. 5466). Laurie suggested too, that during the
war, Baxter had acted as Crown witness in several inquiries 
into aliens' appeals against internment, and that she 
had testified as to the Communist affiliations of some of 
these aliens. Laurie asked leave to recall Baxter for 
questioning on this matter during the course of assisting 
Counsel's re-examination, but Sholl objected strongly to 
the introduction of 'new evidence', and eventually Lowe 
refused Laurie's application on the grounds of a 
technicality of legal procedure. (RCT. 5590-93).
Lowe's comments in the Report indicate that he took 
seriously a failure by the Party to deny an allegation, 
in coming to a conclusion about its likely truth. (See 
Report, p. 7).
62.
150
damaging in its effect, and more susceptible to attack from 
opposing Counsel. Baxter exhibited an impressive memory 
for the names and positions of Party members, but she could 
rarely give a clear indication of the nature of their activi­
ties, and her account of Party procedure was obscure and 
contradictory. Undoubtedly a dangerous witness from the 
Party's point of view in her exposure of a vast quantity of 
names, she nevertheless frequently showed her knowledge of 
Communists and their sympathisers to be trivial in substance, 
and based upon hearsay. The primary contribution of her 
evidence on organisational matters was the identification of 
a variety of Communist fractions, but Mr. Sholl sought in vain 
to attach some sinister significance to their operations.
Mrs. Baxter did not know whether the duty of Communist taxi- 
drivers was to report information aquired in the course of 
conversations with their passengers (RCT. 5394), and she was 
forced to admit that, contrary to Sholl's expectations, there 
was no form of 'ceremonial or ritual' performed at the 
Party's 'cottage meetings'. (RCT. 5396). She thought that 
the Communist unit in Melbourne's Greek community raised funds 
for use by the Party, but the 'considerable sums' suggested by 
Sholl amounted in her own experience to only 'a few pounds'. 
(RCT. 5397).
Mrs. Baxter emerged from the witness box with her 
credibility more-or-less intact. Inconsistencies in her 
evidence about the Party's internal affairs could be explained 
by the impossibility of accurately recalling matters so far 
removed from the present. And if her efforts at name-gathering 
for fifteen months prior to her exit from the Party carried 
unpleasant connotations, there was sufficient proof of sub­
sequent victimisation by Communists for Sholl to rationalise 
her behaviour in seeking to give public exposure to the evils 
of their Party.
63. Lauri-^  managed to throw doubt upon the reliability of 
parts of the branch minutes she produced, suggesting 
that she had written up sections long after the branch 
meetings took place, with a view to giving an inflated 
image of her role in these meetings. (RCT. 5512 ff.).
A similar point of view on Mrs. Baxter was developed 
during the Communist Party's case, when Mrs. Samson (an 
official in the Party's South-Port district) challenged 
the truth of Baxter's claim that she had acted as 
District Secretary for a short period of time (see RCT. 7911-7986) .
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Communist Counsel's difficulties in meeting 
allegations of past events were compounded, in their cross- 
examination of T.C. McGILLICK, by the fact that his evidence 
related almost exclusively to the South Australian branch of 
the Communist Party. But there was perhaps less need in 
McGillick's case to draw attention to flaws in the evidence, 
for many were self-evident. Unlike Baxter he possessed no 
documents to add an aura of authenticity to his allegations; 
nor could he relate any sympathy-evoking 'misfortunes' to 
explain his violent antipathy to the politics and doctrines 
he had embraced for thirteen years of his life. In its 
pre-occupation with secret Communists and fellow travellers, 
and its picture of the Party's omnipotent and sinister 
influence, his evidence exhibited the standard characteristics 
of anti-Communist paranoia. Of all the ex-Communist witnesses, 
McGillick was most vulnerable to the charge that his current 
political affiliations were distorting his view of the nature 
of Communism.
Mr. Sholl introduced McGillick as a lecturer employed 
by the People's Union, a 'non-party public-relations organisat­
ion in Sydney'. To Ted Laurie in cross-examination, McGillick 
said the Union aimed at preventing the establishment of 
socialism. He agreed that it maintained close links with Eric 
Butler's League of Rights in Melbourne, and that it received 
substantial monetary donations from employers' organisations, 
but he claimed to know nothing about Laurie's suggestion that 
the Chamber of Commerce had recommended its members to give 
their support to the People's Union. (RCT. 5248 ff.)^
McGillick's evidence covered a wide range of topics, 
and as he has pointed out in a recent letter, it contributed 
something to each one of the particularised sections of the 
terms of references 'alleging' harmful conduct, with the 
exception of ballot rigging.^ He described the events of a
64. Eric Butler provided me with McGillick's present address 
in Perth. The latter has apparently maintained the 
political viewpoint which he exhibited at the Commission, 
his letters to me bearing the note-paper crest 'Crusade 
for Freedom - free enterprise and individual rights'.
65. T.C. McGillick to V. Rastrick, 6 December 1971.
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Communist-organised strike at Port Adelaide in 1930, when he 
delivered speeches which included the quotation of revoluntary 
poems designed to incite the strikers to violence. (RCT. 5002- 
3). Evidence of Moscow-control was furnished by the 1930 
visit of a secret Comintern envoy operating under the false 
name of Herbert Moore, ^  although McGillick's information 
about this person was apparently based upon surmise. 'You do 
not ask too many questions in the Communist Party', he explained 
to the Commissioner. (RCT. 5014-16). In 1938 McGillick was 
appointed as delegate of the Friends of the Soviet Union to the 
May Day celebrations in Moscow. He claimed that before he 
left Australia the National A.C.P. Secretary (J.B. Miles) gave 
him a sealed envelope to deliver to J.D. Blake, then attending 
the Moscow Lenin School. McGillick testified that he examined 
the contents of the envelope during the course of his trip, 
finding that they comprised a plan of an anti-submarine device 
to be affixed to ocean-going vessels. He delivered the plan to 
Blake as requested. (RCT. 5042). In cross-examination, Laurie 
wanted to know if he had asked Miles any questions about the 
nature of his 'mission'.
The witness: No, you do not ask questions in the
Party.
The Commissioner: Is that a matter of practice, or
something which is taught to you? A: It is very
unwise, Your Honour, to ask questions or to be curious.
Q: But I would like to know how you got that feeling
that it was unwise to ask questions - was there any 
teaching which was given to you in which you were 
taught not to ask questions? A: No, I just acquired
that habit.
(RCT. 5231) 6 8
66. McGillick treated the Commission to a recital of these 
poems. In a letter to me, McGillick says that while he 
was reciting "Might is Right", 'Sir Charles Lowe 
interrupted me and asked me not to be so dramatic in my 
rendering. I think he was afraid I might incite 
Communists in Court to applaud'. (McGillick to Rastrick, 
6 December 1971). In the Report, Lowe quotes two stanzas 
of this poem as evidence that the Party contemplated the 
use of violence at 'appropriate times'. (Report, p. 75).
67. McGillick said that he had recently discovered in the 
course of conversations with the superintendent of the 
'political squad' of the N.S.W. police force that Moore's 
real name was Vakin.
68. Lowe's comment in the Report reads: ' [McGillick'sj
evidence on this matter was not contradicted, nor indeed 
did Blake give evidence, although at the preliminary 
sitting he was present and asked leave to appear, and 
although the Crown Solicitor wrote offering to lead his
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McGillick provided assisting Counsel with a quantity 
of names of persons he believed to be Communists or Party 
sympathisers, including several journalists whom he identified 
on the basis of his work as a steward at the Sydney Journalists' 
Club in 1940. RCT. 5054). Amongst other people whom he claimed 
were secret Communists, he named R.A. King, who had been 
another delegate to Moscow in 1938, and who in 1949 held the 
position of Secretary of the Sydney Trades and Labour Council - 
elected, as Laurie pointed out later, on a right-wing ticket. 
(RCT. 5229) . E.J. Ward, M.H.R. was also secretly associated 
with the Communist Party, McGillick claimed, supporting his 
allegation with the explanation that in 1940 he (McGillick) 
had been sent to Canberra by the Friends of the Soviet Union to 
protest at the censoring of its journal, Soviets Today, and 
that J.B. Miles had told him to see 'our man', Ward. Mr. Sholl 
asked McGillick to elaborate his reasons for believing that 
Ward had Communist connections, but on Lowe's direction, his 
answer was struck from the record. (RCT. 5 0 5 8 ) . In cross- 
examination, Laurie questioned McGillick about his methods 
of deciding whether somebody was a member of the Communist 
Party. Anyone who supported the Communist 'line' was probably 
a member, McGillick said, and ex-Communists who publicly 
opposed Communism were very likely to be secret members attempt­
ing to disarm their political opponents. This belief, McGillick
told Laurie, was based on his knowledge that for a Communist,
7 f)the end always justified the means. (RCT. 5228).
68. Cont.
evidence. No explanation was offered for his not giving 
evidence.' (Report, p. 37).
69. In a letter to me (6 December 1971) McGillick pointed out 
that having thus been publicly 'exposed' as a Communist 
representative in Canberra, Ward made no attempt to deny 
the evidence against him. McGillick had a definite pre­
occupation with Ward. Some months before his appearance 
at the Commission, the People's Union convened a public 
meeting in the Sydney Town Hall (on 31 June 1949) to 
discuss the emergency Coal Strike legislation. McGillick, 
who spoke at the meeting, declared that the passage of 
the legislation had been deliberately held up by E.J. Ward 
M.H.R. and Senator W. Morrow, who both consistently 
followed the Communist line. This, said McGillick, was a 
matter for a Royal Commission. {Age, 1 July 1949; Sydney 
Morning Herald, 1 July 1949)
McGillick's letter conveyed his satisfaction with his 
own performance at the Commission. 'After being in the 
witness box for four days, when the Commission was nearing
70.
154
The 'c r a n k s '
McGillick provided the Commission with a view of the 
Communist Party within the framework of some probably authentic 
detail about his own experiences, but the style of his 
testimony differed only marginally from that of the anti­
communist 'cranks'. The first of these swore the solemn oath 
of truthfulness as MISS CHORKLES NELLIE LOUISA KASNER MOSS.
She was a middle-aged farmer from the outer Melbourne district 
7 1of Croydon, who contacted the Commission authorities and 
offered to testify about Communism, 'to let them know the 
damage it can do'. 'I have been speaking for a long time 
about certain Communist activities and the activities of 
certain people at the University, and I let the Commission 
know that I was prepared to give evidence to that effect', 
she told Mr. Julius in cross-examination. (RCT. 1661). In an 
effort to show Communist influence at work in the University, 
Moss recounted several conversations she had conducted some 
years in the past with a Mr. and Mrs. D. Taylor, members of 
the Melbourne University Philosophy Department, and, Moss 
alleged, both Communists. Mrs. Taylor had not only allegedly 
admitted that she and her husband used their teaching 
positions to influence students towards accepting their 
political viewpoint (RCT. 1633), but she had threatened Moss: 
'If you continue to oppose the Party in this manner, when 
the Party comes to power it will not be very pleasant for you'. 
In addition, she had outlined the A.C.P.'s plan for 
revolution, which included the 'liquidation' of Robert 
Menzies. (RCT. 1642).
The remainder of Moss's evidence concerned the 1944 
Lilydale Shire Council Election, in which a Communist
70. Cont.
its conclusion, I overheard the barrister for the 
Communist Party Mr. E.A.H. Laurie, tell the barrister for 
the Commission Mr. Reginald Sholl K.C. ... that of all 
the witnesses for the Commission, I was the best'.
(Dec. 6 1971). When interviewed, Laurie indicated that 
he was very unimpressed with McGillick's performance as 
a witness.
71. The Melbourne H e r a l d, which did not usually describe the 
physical appearance of witnesses, was apparently struck 
by Moss's 'get up' on the first day of her appearance at
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Solicitor (R. Grant-Taylor) stood for election with the good­
will of an ex-Minister of religion (A.A. Hughes) but in
72opposition to the candidate supported by Moss. Moss 
portrayed Hughes as a Christian willing to accommodate himself 
to Communistic atheism for political purposes, 'incriminat­
ing' him with what she claimed were his own words to her in 
conversation: 'Communists are fine people', he told her, and
'the Marxian philosophy is full of lofty ideals akin to 
Christianity'. (RCT. 1631). Grant-Taylor (the defeated 
candidate in the election) attempted to gain a position on the 
Lilydale Council for the purpose of advancing Communist Party 
interests, said Moss. Evidence of his attitude was provided 
in a detailed account of an incident in which Taylor allegedly 
disposed of the property of one of his clients (a mentally- 
deranged woman) to a friend of his in the Communist Party.
(RCT. 1637).73
Assisting Counsel produced the successful Shire 
election candidate (Rogers) to bolster Moss's claims that A.A. 
Hughes was a Communist sympathiser. His primary contribution 
to the evidence was a claim that during 1944 Hughes had held 
political discussion groups at his home for the stated purpose 
of educating the local people in the workings of Parliament, 
and that two Communists had attended them: Grant-Taylor,
and the assistant Secretary of the B.W.I.U., Bernard Heinze. 
Mclnerney, examining Rodgers, managed to extract little about 
the part played by the Communists at the meetings.
71. Cont.
the Commission: she was dressed in 'jodphurs, flat-
heeled brown shoes, a man's grey overcoat and scarf, 
and a man's brown felt hat'. (Herald, 26 July 1949).
72. Hughes at the time of election was Independent M.L.A. 
for the seat of Caulfield; between 1923-43 he had been 
a Minister of the Church of Christ in Swanston Street, 
Melbourne. He had already been the subject of allegations 
by Sharpley, and he appeared voluntarily at the 
Commission as a 'fellow traveller' witness to answer the 
charges of both Sharpley and Moss. See this chapter, pp. 
159.60.
73. Ted Hill made a statement at the Commission on behalf of 
Grant-Taylor to the effect that the latter would welcome
a full inquiry by the Law Institute into Moss's allegations 
of professional misconduct. The day after Moss completed 
her testimony, Taylor went into the witness box and 
testified that he was unaware at the time of the sale that 
the person who bought the house was a Communist. (RCT. 
1742). Lowe made a special finding about Grant-Taylor in
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Mr. Mclnerney: Did they ... voice any opinions?
A: Occasionally, when the meeting was thrown open
for discussion, yes.
Q: And what opinions did they voice? A: Well, more-
or-less on the lines of helping workmen.
Q: Did they express any political views? A: Well,
they never used any Party politics or Party names 
when they expressed their views.
Q: Was there any reference to 'isms' or anything of
that nature? A: No. (RCT. 1652)
Chorkles Moss had no experience of the Communist 
Party itself; her evidence was based solely upon individual 
Communists with whom she had 'crossed swords' in the course 
of a decade or more, and against whom she directed the full 
vent of an intense, almost pathological hatred of Communism.
One cannot help but assume that those who bore final 
responsibility for the content of her evidence must have 
called her to the witness box in an attempt to discredit 
particular people (Communist and non-Communist) rather than 
to make a serious contribution to the Commission's information 
about the Party's activities. Moss's allegations about 
Communist indoctrination of Melbourne University students, 
and a Communist solicitor's abuse of his professional position 
to benefit the Party, were undoubtedly intended by assisting 
Counsel to be regarded as evidence of the nature of the 
Communist Party. But at almost every point the foundation of 
the allegations appeared to be hearsay, or the fabrication of 
a conspiratorial incident from the flimsiest body of facts.
The effect was considerably aggravated by Moss's poor perform­
ance as a .witness. Lowe's cautionary remarks betrayed a hint 
of real irritation at the hysterical tone with which she 
delivered her charges of Communist ill-doings, and particularly, 
at her persistent refusal to limit herself to the questions 
asked. In ignoring the evidence of Moss and fellow-'crank'
Noble Kerby when making his Report, Lowe perhaps found himself 
in agreement with Laurie's comment in the Communist Party's 
final submission to the Commission: that their value as
73. Cont.
his Report, concluding: '... there is not the slightest
ground for the allegation, and ... Taylor's conduct in 
this transaction is not properly open to any criticism 
whatever'. (Report, p. 101).
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witnesses upon whom reliance should be placed was 'beneath 
comment' .7^
At the time of the Commission, KERBY was proprietor 
of a kiosk at Station Pier on the Melbourne waterfront, and 
notorious in wharf-labouring circles and elsewhere as a bitter 
foe of the Communist Party. He made some allegations, 
sensational in their import, though only lightly endowed with 
factual substance, concerning the Party's access to 
government military secrets. By way of illustration, he 
claimed that during the war while employed in the military 
embarkation office, he was approached by a member of the 
Communist Party and asked for confidential information on the 
movements of Australian troops. (RCT. 2892). During the war 
years the Department of War Organisation of Industry and the 
Rationing Commission had Communists working in them, said 
Kerby, and furthermore, a man named O'Donnell whom he believed 
to be a Communist, was currently employed in work dealing with 
Guided Missiles. (RCT. 3049 ff.).
The focal point of Kerby's evidence was his allegat­
ion of Communist influence in the Melbourne City Council. As 
Vice-President of the 'Services Party'7  ^ in the 1930's, Kerby 
had been refused a building permit to renovate a city building 
for use by his organisation. He was informed by the Council's 
Building Surveyor (H. Reed) that his plans contravened a city 
by-law; Reed subsequently approved plans submitted by Australia- 
Soviet House for alterations to the same premises. According 
to Kerby, Reed's actions had been motivated by political 
considerations, and he was a secret member of the Communist 
Party. In condoning preferential treatment for Australia- 
Soviet House, Sir Thomas Nettleford (the Lord Mayor of 
Melbourne at the time) had shown himself to be a Communist 
fellow-traveller, Kerby alleged. (RCT. 2890 ff.)7^
74. Final submission on behalf of the A.C.P., p. 15.
75. The United Ex-Service Men and Women's Political Association 
of Australia.
76. Too ill to attend the Commission, Sir Thomas Nettleford 
submitted an affidavit denying these allegations. (RCT. 
3133). Reed appeared voluntarily to give evidence in his 
own defence, explaining why he considered that the build­
ing plans he had received from Kerby had not accorded 
with city building regulations. Sholl cross-examined Reed 
and managed to leave the impression that if he wasn't
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The 'crank' witnesses did nothing to enhance 
assisting Counsel's case against the Party, and indeed 
probably did it a great disservice. Mr. Sholl presumably bore 
final responsibility for calling the anti-Communist witnesses: 
considering the extraordinarily low standard of evidence 
provided by Moss and Kerby, the question naturally arises as 
to why he allowed them to be placed into the witness box.
Perhaps the presence of the 'cranks' is an indication of 
the poor quality in general of witnesses willing to testify 
against the Communist Party at a public inquiry. But assisting 
Counsel were able to gather together a numerically impressive 
group of 80 witnesses, and it would surely have been no problem 
to dispense with the contributions of Moss and Kerby. Did the 
strength of Sholl's anti-Communist convictions perhaps blind 
him to the calibre of these witnesses? An alternative answer 
is that the 'cranks' were called purely for the purpose of 
attacking certain prominent Melbourne citizens (in Moss's case, 
A.L.P. members opposed to the Industrial Groupers); that 
assisting Counsel assumed the Press would cover up the weak 
aspects of the evidence, and that therefore the quality of the 
witnesses was not a serious concern so long as sensational 
exposures were made to be reported. The implication of such an 
explanation is that assisting Counsel aimed to make their 
appeal first and foremost to the news media, this being a more 
reliable and effective means of publicising Communist 
misdemeanours than a Royal Commissioner's Report.
The 'fellow travellers'
Of the numerous people who came forward at the 
Commission to deny allegations that they were Party 'friends' 
or secret Communists, five were prominent in the community.
They were Andrew Hughes, a former minister of religion and 
Independent M.L.A.; John Bennett, past-editor of Labour Call and 
at the time of the Commission, commentator of the commercial
76. Cont.
positively sympathetic to the Communist Party, Reed had 
in Kerby's case deliberately been a 'stickler for form', 
and had not shown a corresponding attitude when dealing 
with A.S.H.
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radio programme 'Labour's Views on the News'; Samuel Merrifield, 
a Labour M.L.A.; Brian Fitzpatrick, Secretary of the Australian 
Council for Civil Liberties; and John Rodgers, Director of 
Australia-Soviet House.
HUGHES came forward to answer the allegation by 
Chrokles Moss that he was a Communist sympathiser, and by 
Sharpley that he was a person 'who could be considerably 
influenced by the Party'. In his Herald articles, Sharpley 
had mentioned BENNETT as a newspaper editor^ who pursued a line 
of propaganda favourable to the Communist Party; in evidence 
at the Commission he claimed Ted Hill had told him that Bennett 
was a secret Communist. The naming of these two men was from 
their own point of view seriously inopportune. Bennett had 
recently won endorsement as the A.L.P. candidate for the seat 
of Latrobe in the coming Federal Elections, while Hughes was 
seeking victory in the A.L.P. pre-selection ballot for the 
seat of Flinders, in progress at the time he appeared at the 
inquiry. In the witness-box both of them advanced claims that 
they had been singled out for political victimisation by Right- 
wing elements operating indirectly through the Commission. 
Counsel for Bennett suggested that the Herald had encouraged 
Sharpley to name his client, not only because Bennett was a 
moderate Labour man opposed to the Industrial Groups in the 
unions, but in addition because he had been active in the 
advocation of a controlling body to supervise the ethics of 
Press reporting. (RCT. 2297). Hughes believed that Sharpley 
had mentioned his name in furtherance of a Herald-Liberal 
Party campaign to smear the Labour Party in general, and to 
destroy his personal chances in the pre-selection ballot.
(RCT. 1688).
Like some of the other 'fellow traveller' witnesses 
who presented their defence without the aid of Counsel
(Fitzpatrick, and initially, Rodgers), Hughes was considerably 
disadvantaged by his poor grasp of the techniques of cross- 
examination when questioning Sharpley. Lacking discipline 
over the direction of his testimony, he was inclined to
77. At the time of the Commission, Bennett was editor of the 
Mountain District Free Press, a local newspaper.
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devote more attention to portraying himself as the innocent
victim of a 'pattern' of political attacks than to disproving
Sharpley's allegations. The latter task was probably more
difficult than it was for Bennett, since the allegations were
peculiarly nebulous in character. Apart from a denial of any
actual dealings with the Communist Party, Hughes could respond
only by an assertion of the non-Communist bent of his political 
7 8convictions. Whether or not the charges of anti-Labour 
plots were well-founded, both Hughes and Bennett lost their 
chances of A.L.P. candidature as a result of being named at 
the Royal Commission.^ 9
SAMUEL MERRIFIELD was the subject of accusations by 
six different witnesses; after a number of appearances in an 
effort to clear his name, he became an almost familiar figure
78. Bennett's defence was more substantial. His Counsel 
pointed out that the Communist Party had attacked some 
of Bennett's publications, and had distributed leaflets 
criticising him for refusing to publish its articles in 
the Free Press. (RCT. 2298) Reynolds, in cross-examining 
Bennett, drew attention to the fact that at the 1948 
Victorian A.L.P. Conference, the editorial policy of 
Labour Call was criticised for 'Leftist' tencencies, and 
he suggested that this criticism had been directed against 
Bennett. Bennett claimed this was incorrect, because he 
had ceased to be editor in 1947. Throughout his evidence, 
he denied being either an A.C.P. member or sympathiser.
79. In the House of Representatives in July, Mr. Rankin 
(Country Party, Vic.) asked Chifley if he would have the 
allegations made at the Commission against Bennett (and 
Merrifield) investigated by the Security Service. Chifley 
refused, but the allegations were considered by the A.L.P. 
Central Executive, which subsequently withdrew Bennett's 
endorsement for the seat of Latrobe. In announcing the 
Executive's decision, the General Secretary of the A.L.P. 
(Senator P. Kennelly) said that it was concerned about the 
danger of unscrupulous political propaganda being used, 
not only in Latrobe, but in other electorates also. Under 
those circumstances, the Executive had decided that the 
best interests of all would be served by withdrawing 
Bennett from the campaign (see Herald 7 July 1949; Age
17 September 1949).
Hughes had actually won an earlier pre-selection ballot 
for the seat of Flinders, held in March. After being 
named by Sharpley at the Commission, he was asked to go 
before the A.L.P. Central Executive to answer questions 
about his relations with the Communist Party, and was 
charged with disloyalty to the A.L.P. The charge was 
referred to the disputes committee, which exonerated him, 
but a new pre-selection ballot was conducted in July.
(RCT. 1689). Hughes won the ballot again, but the A.L.P. 
Central Executive gave its endorsement to one of the 
defeated nominees. (Age 24 September 1949)
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in the proceedings. He first came forward in response to 
Sharpley's evidence that he had supplied information from 
Labour Caucus meetings to Ted Hill during the 1946 and '47 
Metal Trades and Transport Strikes. After Mrs. Baxter claimed 
that she had witnessed him address the 1938 and 1939 'closed' 
Communist Party State Conferences, assisting Counsel probably 
considered that the evidence against Merrifield was sufficient 
to make worthwhile a more intensive investigation of his 
politics. They thereupon called three minor supporting 
witnesses to contribute to his indictment: an ex-Communist
(P.B. Wilson) who confirmed Baxter's allegation; 80 and two 
past members of Merrifield's (Essendon) A.L.P. branch (W.
Ryan and J. Molloy), whose evidence dealt with an incident in 
1945 when Merrifield had allegedly evaded their questions 
concerning his attitude to Communism. Mr. Sholl also took the 
opportunity when examining the Vice-President of the Victorian 
State School Committees' Association to elicit information 
about Merrifield's voting habits during his term as a member 
of the Association's Executive, 1947-1949. McLean claimed 
that he invariably aligned himself with Communist members on 
controversial issues, and that he expressed disapproval of the 
Executive's action in expelling two of these Communists because 
of the nature of their political affiliations. (RCT. 5708).
Merrifield interrogated Sharpley, but the latter 
adhered firmly to his allegations, and Merrifield had to be 
content with simply placing against them his own vehement 
denial. In subsequent appearances at the Commission to answer 
the evidence of other witnesses, his defence was greatly 
strengthened by the services of J.M. Cullity as Counsel.
Cullity showed that the information provided by Wilson, Ryan
80. Wilson added that at one of these conferences, Merrifield 
had been introduced to him as an 'under-cover' Communist. 
(RCT. 5775 ff.). An amusing incident occurred during Wilson's term in the witness box. At the beginning of his 
cross-examination he informed Lowe that one Harold Booley 
(named by Wilson as a dual member of the Communist Party 
and the A.L.P.), who was present in the public gallery 
of the Commission, had mouthed an obscene expression at 
him while he was giving evidence. Lowe directed Wilson 
to write the expression on a piece of paper, and then Mr. 
Sholl tendered it as an exhibit. (RCT. 6091-2).
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and Molloy was of dubious authenticity, and in cross- 
examination of Baxter, drew attention to the fact that at no 
stage prior to her testimony at the Commission, either in her 
'note-book' or in her discussions with A.L.P. officials, had 
she claimed that Merrifield was connected with the Communist 
Party. Baxter admitted that since leaving the Party in 1940, 
she had attended a number of A.L.P. conferences at which 
Merrifield had been present, but could not explain satisfact­
orily why she had withheld her knowledge until 1949. (RCT.
6027 ff.).
Although he lacked some of the fluency of presentation 
exhibited by other 'fellow-traveller' witnesses, Merrifield 
conveyed an impression of indomitable honesty which Mr. Reynolds 
and assisting Counsel failed to disturb. It was an impression 
reinforced by the regularity of Merrifield's appearance at the 
inquiry and the apparent urgency with which he desired an 
opportunity to clear his name. A routine check upon the 
political affiliations of his associates was singularly 
unproductive; and if assisting Counsel demonstrated occasions 
when he had taken the 'side' of Communists in political meet­
ings, they found nothing to support the allegations of their 
own witnesses that he had any more positive connections with 
the Party.81
The remaining two 'fellow-travellers' were examined 
by assisting Counsel with a view to establishing that their 
organisations were Communist Party fronts. A relatively brief 
witness, BRIAN FITZPATRICK emerged as perhaps the most consist­
ently credible of all the people who came forward individually 
to answer allegations. His defence was facilitated by the 
innocuousness of Sharpley's allegation (at least in terms of
81. Lowe's finding in the Report was as follows: 'On the
whole I am not satisfied that Merrifield is, or was, a 
member of the C.P. or that he supplied information to 
any member of the C.P. of what happened ... in the 
Labour Caucus'. (Report p. 102) Merrifield did not lose 
his seat in the Legislative Assembly as a result of the 
allegations; in fact he was appointed Minister for Works 
in the Victorian Labour Government which took office in 
1952. Robert Murray in The Split (Melbourne, 1970) p. 95, 
says of Sharpley's allegation that Merrifield was a 
Communist Party contact in the Caucus, that it was 'news 
to most of [Merrifield's] friends who regarded him as a 
mild-mannered, fairly conventional moderate socialist, 
but it made some Groupers bitterly opposed to him'.
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the professed aims of the Council for Civil Liberties) and the 
meagreness of the evidence with which he supported it.
Sharpley testified that in 1948, when the Victorian Communist 
Party saw imminent danger of proscription by the Government, 
it successfully prevailed upon Fitzpatrick to revive the 
activities of the Council, and under its auspices to issue 
propaganda opposing the ban. The Party's appeal was allegedly 
based on Fitzpatrick's deep personal sympathies with 
Communism, and his reputation within the Party as a non- 
Communist who was always ready to take action in furtherance 
of its interests. (RCT. 875).
Like other witnesses seeking to repudiate the charge 
of having Communist connections, Fitzpatrick felt obliged to 
offer the Commission an explanation of his political position. 
It was a difficult task which he executed with skill and 
apparent candour, showing none of the defensiveness of the 
A.L.P. witnesses in their anxiety to define their politics 
in contradistinction to Communism. After denying that he had 
ever conducted the alleged negotiations with the Communist 
Party, Fitzpatrick went on to tell Mr. Lewis that he had at all 
times been 'approachable' by the Party in his capacity of 
Secretary of the Council for Civil Liberties if it considered 
its proper rights were threatened. He was indeed sympathetic 
to the A.C.P., as he was to the A.L.P., to the extent that it 
advocated the cause of socialism. (RCT. 2324). Lowe's 
willingness to listen to a full expose of the organisation and 
aims of the C.C.L., (a body about which he intended to make 
no findings in his Report), may have been a measure of his 
favourable estimate of Fitzpatrick's integrity. Perhaps, too, 
it was an indication of Lowe's interest in an organisation 
set up to scrutinise the functioning of the legal process.
JOHN RODGERS was a very different kind of witness. 
Already the source of much political dispute before being 
named by Sharpley, he showed in the witness-box the same 
tendency to generate controversy that he had in the public 
arena. He openly expressed his disapproval of the proceedings, 
and was in fact one of the few defence witnesses (including 
those called on behalf of the Communist Party) who could 
properly be described as 'hostile'. His behaviour suggested 
that he deliberately provoked a clash with assisting Counsel 
in order to draw attention to what he regarded as the Commiss-
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ion's 'pernicious' interference in the private affairs of 
citizens and lawful institutions. At the same time it is 
likely that Rodgers genuinely feared the inquiry would 
precipitate governmental action to dissolve Australia-Soviet 
House, and that his reluctance to co-operate with Counsel 
was motivated by this fear.
According to Sharpley's evidence, Rodgers had 
undertaken his 1948 trip to Moscow and East European 
Communist countries at the direction of the A.C.P., to collect 
material for a pro-Soviet propaganda campaign in Australia.
He also claimed that Rodgers was a secret Party member, and 
that the policy of A.S.H. was decided in concert with 
Communist officials. (RCT. 868). Examined by Mr. Lewis, 
Rodgers admitted that he had twice attended meetings of the 
A.C.P. State Committee to solicit the Party's aid in raising 
finance for his organisation, but he denied the rest of the 
evidence. (RCT. 2388 ff.)
Sharpley, however, had furnished more detail about 
Rodgers than was his custom in the 'fellow traveller' cases, 
and assisting Counsel utilised this as a basis for an 
interrogation which made their cross-examination of Fitzpatrick 
seem perfunctory by comparison. Hostilities came to the 
surface almost immediately when Lewis and Reynolds sought to 
discover the names of those who contributed to the cost of the 
Moscow trip. Rodgers declared his reluctance to provide any 
detailed information, because he wished to prevent further 
'persecution' of the kind he alleged had been suffered by 
people who had publicly supported him during the freedom of 
speech controversy. In the ensuing argument as to whether 
the finances for the trip was a proper subject for investigat- 
ion by the Commission, Lowe ruled in favour of assisting 
Counsel, while assuring Rodgers that the information would 
remain confidential. Rodgers responded in typical style:
'I am prepared to give these names and any future names, as
82. Mr. Julius (Counsel for the Communist Party) declared that 
the matter was not relevant to the terms of reference of 
the inquiry. Lewis explained his purpose thus: 'I am
trying to show ... that instead of him being independent 
of the Communist Party, he was really a delegate or 
something of the kind for them, and what he has been 
giving out as to his general mission and how the funds 
were arranged is not a true and candid statement of what 
took place'. (RCT. 2430).
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long as they are withheld from Mr. Lewis and the He r a l d '.
(RCT. 2431)
From this point onwards, assisting Counsel's cross-
examination of Rodgers was concerned exclusively with an
inquiry into the financial affairs of A.S.H. in an effort to
discover monetary links with the Communist Party, and thus
to establish it as a Communist front organisation. Rodgers'
evasive attitude when questioned about the source of finance
for the purchase of the A.S.H. building caused Lowe to order
the production of all its financial records, including bank
accounts and Rodgers' private account. Sholl examined them
closely, seeking irregularities which might have indicated
that money had been received from unacknowledged sources.
(RCT. 3602 ff.). He recalled Rodgers to the witness-box to
explain why he had testified in an earlier session to the sale
of a cafe by A.S.H. for the sum of ^1000 when the records
indicated that it had been sold for a sum of more than twice
this amount. With considerable reluctance, the witness
admitted that the cafe had been sold under a sham contract
in which the purchaser agreed to accept a receipt showing a
payment lower than the real amount. Rodgers said this
procedure had been devised in response to the Hollway
Government's threatened anti-Communist legislation of March
1948, which A.S.H. believed could have resulted in the
seizure of its assets. At a special meeting of the A.S.H.
Committee on 31 March 1948, a contract had been drawn up which
disguised the true extent of A.S.H. funds; the surplus money
was kept in a secret safe deposit, to be used as a political
8 3'fighting fund' if necessary.
Rodgers refused to tell Sholl whether his organ­
isation had conducted any other transactions for the same
83. Lowe directed Rodgers to give assisting Counsel the names 
of those people present at the Committee meeting, under­
taking that the names would not be revealed to the public. 
Rodgers said that Professor Greenwood of Melbourne 
University was one Executive member present, but that he 
could not remember any others. In explaining the creation 
of the special fund, Rodgers told the Commission: '...
we felt that we had not worked so hard and made the 
sacrifices that we had made, to see some Government or 
some political party that was temporarily in power, take 
these funds from us without a strenuous effort on our 
part ...' (RCT. 3605)
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purpose.
The witness: I feel in answering this question
it means that I have got to discuss all the 
activities of A.S.H. ... I came here to advertise 
the truth. Instead of that I have been dragged 
through the newspapers, and so has A.S.H.
The Commissioner: I am not going to allow you to
make statements of that sort. You are here in 
pursuance of the carrying out of the duties of 
this Commission, and when questions are put to you 
which I think are within the scope of the 
Commission, you are bound to answer.
(RCT. 3623)
Rodgers, who until this stage had conducted his defence 
without the aid of Counsel, requested and was granted leave to 
obtain legal advice. He re-appeared with two lawyers who 
engaged Lowe in protracted argument in support of their
Q Aclient's stand. Their eloquence was to no avail, however;
Lowe directed that Rodgers must answer the question, although
he allowed a confidential sitting to be held for that purpose,
8 5to which neither Press nor public would be admitted.
Examined in camera, Rodgers told the Commission that A.S.H. 
had no secret fund other than the one to which he had test­
ified. After much debate, Lowe finally agreed to allow Sholl 
to ask for the names of the persons who held the safe deposit, 
but said he would not require Rodgers to indicate where the
deposit was located because, said Lowe, it might lead 'certain
8 6persons to attempt to get control over it'. (RCT. 3665).
84. See Chapter 2, p.
85. Rodgers' term in the witness box provides a number of 
examples of Lowe's efforts to protect witnesses from 
damaging publicity. All financial records (of which 
there were many) were made confidential exhibits, and 
most of the names which Rodgers was required to give to 
the Commission were written down on paper and thus 
concealed from the Press.
86. Rodgers testified that originally the money had been held 
in the private safe deposit of a Mrs. Turnbull, a member 
of A.S.H., but that when the Royal Commission was 
appointed, it had been transferred at her request to
the Commonwealth Bank. (RCT. 3665).
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Sholl took the opportunity during this confidential sitting, 
which marked the end of Rodgers' testimony, to obtain 
identification of all the people listed by Rodgers as having 
contributed to his Moscow trip, particularly with regard to 
their connections with the Communist Party.
Their generally intelligent approach to the giving 
of evidence enabled the 'fellow travellers' to perform well 
in the witness-box. There was considerable variation in their 
temperament, the inclination of Hughes and Rodgers to launch 
a political attack on their accusers and on the Commission 
itself, contrasting with the mild approach of Fitzpatrick and 
Merrifield, both of whom seemed content to limit themselves 
strictly to meeting the particular allegations against 
themselves. In most cases they succeeded in throwing some 
doubt upon the accusing evidence, chiefly by showing that it 
almost invariably rested upon what Sharpley purported to have 
heard discussed at Communist Party Executive meetings rather 
than upon his direct experience.
Mr. Reynolds and assisting Counsel in cross- 
examination sought to establish that each of the witnesses, if 
not actually Party members themselves, had consciously served 
the Party by promoting the aims of Communism in the community. 
In all cases except perhaps Rodgers', their success was 
limited. They drew attention to occasions when the witnesses 
had shared the public platform with Communists or been active 
in alleged front organisations, but the evidence supported no 
conclusion beyond that enunciated by Lowe in the case of 
Fitzpatrick - that 'it is correct to say that he was favour­
able to many movements supported by the C.P.'®^ Rodgers' 
credibility was seriously undermined by the revelation that he 
had deliberately concealed matters from the Commission, and 
in his subsequent interrogation assisting Counsel managed to 
extract information which suggested that there were in fact 
close connections between A.S.H. and the Communist Party.
But ultimately the facts did not permit Lowe to find in favour 
of assisting Counsel's argument that A.S.H. was a Party
87. Reporty p. 55.
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o o'facade' organisation or that Rodgers was a secret Communist.
All of the 'fellow traveller' witnesses showed common 
purpose in their reluctance to provide the Commission with 
people's names. Thus in an attempt to investigate the polit­
ical persuasions of their families, social aquaintances, and 
associates in political organisations, assisting Counsel had 
difficulty in condemning the witnesses in terms of 'guilt by 
association', as well as in expanding their own list of 
'associated persons' to any profitable degree. The 'fellow 
travellers' were effectively displayed by the daily Press as 
guilty parties, but at the Commission the testimony they 
offered in answering their accusers generally held its own 
against a rigorous cross-examination. Assisting Counsel's 
experience with these witnesses probably confirmed them in 
a belief that their case would progress more satisfactorily if 
it confined itself to the evidence of witnesses who subscribed 
to their own view of the Communist Party.
The trade union witnesses
Assisting Counsel's argument against the Party rested 
heavily on evidence of Communist misdeeds in the trade unions, 
provided chiefly by witnesses who claimed membership of A.L.P. 
Industrial Groups. Sharpley's testimony formed the basic 
structure of this section of the case; a great many of the 
witnesses who came forward to support and elaborate upon his 
allegations must have been old opponents from his days as a 
Communist trade unionist. Assisting Counsel did not concent­
rate exclusively on ballot-rigging matters; in fact they 
produced more witnesses on broader aspects of the Party's
88. Lowe's finding on A.S.H. and Rodgers reads in part:
'There is nothing in the management [of A.S.H.) to suggest 
that it was controlled or directed by the C.P. ... [and] 
nothing to indicate that it was a subsidiary of the Party. 
It was in fact supported by many who were neither 
Communists, nor sympathetic with Communists, but who 
simply desired to see better relations with the U.S.S.R. 
... As to Rodgers, I see no reason to prefer his evidence to that of Sharpley ... but I am not satisfied 
on the evidence that he was a member of the C.P., secret 
or otherwise, or that Sharpley's allegations as to his 
attending meetings is true, or that his trip abroad was 
arranged or facilitated by the C.P.' (Report, p. 54).
As already noted, Lowe himself was one of the original 
patrons of A.S.H.
169
industrial activities, the main theme of their evidence being 
its use of strong-arm tactics in union politics and 'on the 
job' as a means of intimidating its opponents. Inevitably, 
much of the evidence given on trade union affairs tended to 
be a re-hash of current disputes between militants and 
Industrial Groupers. One gained the impression that in the 
case of many witnesses, tempers ran high; this was reflected 
in the frequent explosion of hostilities between Mr. Lewis, 
in charge of the trade union section of the case, and Mr. 
Cullity, cross-examining Lewis's witnesses on behalf of the 
accused unionists.
Four members of the Victorian Ship Joiners' Society, 
a break-away group from the B.W.I.U. formed in March 1949, 
testified to Communist-inspired violence on the Melbourne 
water-front following the imposition of a black ban on the 
Society by the B.W.I.U. According to the evidence of R.J.
WATERS (the Secretary of the Society and an Industrial Grouper), 
members of the B.W.I.U. at the instigation of its Communist 
officials had physically threatened the Ship Joiners in an 
effort to force them from their jobs. (RCT. 1362-1389). A 
similar kind of evidence was given by W.T. LLOYD, who headed 
a break-away group from the Munition Workers' Union in 1945 in 
protest against the vote taken to amalgamate with the
8 9Communist-controlled Federated Ironworkers' Association.
Lloyd claimed that he had been dismissed from his job after 
the factory management had been pressurised by F.I.A. officials, 
some of whom were Communists. Subsequently, other jobs on 
which Lloyd worked were declared 'black'. (RCT. 4374-4515).
Three Industrial Groupers from the Clerks' Union 
(D. NEGLINE, S. PITT and J. HENRY) testified about the 
operations of the union's Communist-dominated Executive. They 
described attempts by militant officials to manipulate union 
meetings in order to over-ride opposition from the Groupers, 
and gave a detailed exposition of events during 1945 when the 
militant Executive had been ousted from office by a vote of 
no-confidence. The displaced Secretary (Merrett) apparently 
refused to be dispossessed of the union offices even when a 
court order went against him, and for several months the
89. See p.114 of this chapter.
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building was barricaded against efforts by the new Executive to 
gain forcible entry. It was not established by the evidence 
that Merrett was a Communist, but the witnesses claimed that 
several union officials who aided his defiance of the new 
Executive were Party members. The new Secretary, Pitt, 
alleged that Communists guarding the Clerks' Union offices 
armed themselves with weapons and employed threats of violence 
against him.
Mr. Lewis: Who was there, refusing you admittance?
Was Merrett there? A: Well, Merrett was there,
Shave was there ...
Q: Were the shock troops there too? A: there were
a few shock troops.
Mr. Laurie: If Your Honour pleases, I submit that
these lurid references should be matters of fact.
The Commissioner; Yes, I thought so.
Mr. Laurie: I object to them as they are being put
by my friend Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis: Well, the person who was there with a
piece of wood, according to the evidence. What would 
my friend Mr. Laurie describe him as?
The Commissioner; You might describe him as a 
woodman.
(RCT. 5795)
Assisting Counsel also adduced evidence about 
Communist employees in the Post Office, a section of their case 
which they may have thought related to the question of whether 
the A.C.P. aimed at interference in the essential services of 
the community. Their witness on the subject was the founding 
Secretary of the A.L.P. Industrial Group in the Victorian 
Postal Workers' Union, J. WARD. As he had told delegates to 
the 1948 A.L.P. Easter Conference, Ward believed that there 
was a red cell in existence in the Postal Workers' Union, and 
that 'if war was declared on Australia I did not think our line 
of communication would be as safe as is considered by many of 
our politicians'. (RCT. 2948). Ward's further statements at 
this Conference that a Communist called Raven and several 
others used Postal Department facilities for the Party's 
purposes caused the Postmaster-General (Senator Cameron) to 
order a departmental inquiry, in which Raven's name was 
cleared and all the allegations found to be without substance. 
(RCT. 3005).
At the Commission, Ward re-stated his charges about 
Raven, and claimed that the Communist Party was 'interested'
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Q Ain the Post Office. He told of a militant group which 
always voted the 'Communist line' at union meetings, and of 
the union journal, produced by militants, which promoted 
Communist policies. In addition, the Party spread propaganda 
in the mail-sorting rooms by having pamphlets put into post- 
boxes; these were then brought into the sorting area and left 
lying around. Ward described the basis for his claim that 
there was a Communist cell in the Post Office as being 'the 
activities we see around us and which we suspect of being 
Communist-inspired. We see people working against us 
politically'. (RCT. 3011). Even Sholl suggested that this 
was a remarkably thin foundation for his evidence.
In dealing with the ballot rigging matters, the 
present writer confronts the same problem that Lowe faced 
when he wrote his Report. As he pointed out, 'to treat the 
case of each union in detail, to discuss the evidence in 
support of the allegation and the evidence to rebut it, 
would require a volume, and the interest of that volume would 
be mainly to the parties c o n c e r n e d ' F o r  most of the 14 
cases of ballot-rigging alleged by Sharpley, assisting 
Counsel did not produce any supporting witnesses. The 
charges rested on Sharpley's evidence alone, and were 
investigated further only when witnesses for the Communist 
Party, accused of playing a part in the events, gave evidence 
themselves, and when Mr. Cullity called his clients to deny 
the allegations. However, for 3 unions there were corroborat­
ing witnesses: the Blacksmiths' Society, the Building
Workers' Industrial Union, and the Actors and Announcers'
Equity Association. I have chosen to deal only with the latter 
two cases, believing them to be the most interesting and 
relevant to this thesis.
Lowe commented in his Report that if Sharpley's 
evidence was put aside, the only proof offered of his 
ballot-rigging allegations was circumstantial. The 
information provided by Sharpley seemed, to the non-legal
90. After Ward had given evidence, Senator Cameron made a 
public statement declaring that Communist activity in 
his Department was 'negligible', and drawing attention 
to the 1948 inquiry which had found 'no cause for alarm'.
91. Report, p. 81.
92. Ibid.
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mind at least, plausible in its detail. Perhaps understand­
ably, he showed indignation at Lowe's remark that there was 
some 'unexpected' corroboration of his allegations. In the 
Great Delusion he writes: 'I merely suggest that since I
was the only high-ranking ex-Communist to give evidence, the
9 1fact that there was any corroboration at all is surprising.
But by the time Lowe came to consider the allegations for the 
purpose of making his findings, he had formed a very poor 
opinion of Sharpley's character as a witness and indicated 
that he was not prepared to act upon Sharpley's evidence unless 
there was corroborating material of a fairly substantial nature. 
In a number of the union ballot cases Lowe found that there 
were 'suspicious circumstances', but as he said in the Report, 
'suspicion ... is not sufficient', and he did not find the 
allegations established. For instance in the case of the 
Blacksmiths' Society, the basic effect of the evidence provided 
by the supporting witnesses was to show that the events to 
which Sharpley deposed could have occurred; that is, that 
they were technically possible. For Lowe, this was an 
insufficient foundation upon which to base a finding. (RCT. 
2899-2937),94
The B.W.I.U. case, the only one in which Lowe found 
the allegations proven, differed from the others as a result of 
several factors. Firstly, the allegations were examined at 
quite elaborate length. Assisting Counsel produced 5 witnesses 
in support of Sharpley, one of whom was the defeated candidate 
in the ballot in question. They also subpoenaed a number of 
militant officials of the union's sub-branches, whose conduct 
under interrogation was in some ways confirmatory of the 
charge that the ballot was not 'straight'. Finally, and most 
importantly, assisting Counsel managed to produce a vast 
array of documentary evidence relating to the election, the 
most significant piece of which was an exhibit tabulating 
every vote cast, showing for whom it was cast, and whether it 
was a personal or a postal vote.9^
93. C.H. Sharpley, The Great Delusion, p. 132.
94. Report, p. 84.
95. Exhibit no. 718.
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Sharpley's allegation related to the 1948 election 
for union Secretary, in which Chandler, a Communist, success­
fully sought re-election, and was opposed by Henderson, the 
leader of the Industrial Group in the union. Sharpley described 
a scheme devised by the Communist Party to manipulate postal 
votes in the election. Communist union members were encouraged 
to apply for postal ballot papers for which they were strictly 
ineligible, and these were then filled in to favour Chandler.
The returning officer, Morris, who was not a Party member, but 
allegedly sympathetic to the Communist union officials, had 
been prevailed upon to issue postal ballot papers in a manner 
which misrepresented the standing rule on the matter. Sharpley 
claimed that in addition, Communists who were not members of 
the B.W.I.U. had been smuggled into union branch meetings on 
election night to cast their votes for Chandler. (RCT. 1027 
ff. ) .
The Commission was told that while the counting of 
votes was in progress, Henderson had issued a Supreme Court 
writ against Morris seeking to restrain him from destroying 
any applications for postal votes. It had been revealed in 
the course of the court proceedings that Morris had already 
destroyed the majority of the applications. At the Commission, 
Henderson and the other supporting witnesses (all members of 
the B.W.I.U. Industrial Group) gave evidence that during the 
election they had protested against the issuance of postal 
ballot papers to ineligible members, and that they had 
approached Morris several times while the application forms 
were still in existence to request that they should be 
preserved, and that Morris had deliberately ignored their 
requests. (RCT. 6171 ff.).
G. HENDERSON, assisting Counsel's major witness, 
gave much incidental evidence about the distribution amongst 
union members of Communist propaganda discreditable to 
himself and the Industrial Group. And as usual, Mr. Lewis 
asked him to identify the political affiliations of numerous 
left-wing union members. Cullity, who in this case appeared 
for Chandler, Morris and the B.W.I.U. Executive, cross- 
examined adeptly. Unable to challenge the factuality of 
assisting Counsel's documentary evidence, he based the defence 
on an attempt to show that in contrast to Chandler, Henderson 
was relatively unpopular in the union and therefore could not
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have enjoyed good prospects of winning the election. As in 
his cross-examination of Grouper witnesses in other union 
cases, Cullity succeeded in demonstrating that the propaganda 
tactics of Communists in the unions were matched with corres­
ponding aggressiveness by their Industrial Group opponents. 
Generally, his cross-examination aimed to present an un-appeal- 
ing view of Grouper activities as a means of off-setting 
assisting Counsel's picture of a sinister Communist Party 
fraction. The implication that the disputes between Communists 
and Groupers were simply part of an internal power struggle in 
the union, while not absolving his clients, at least had the 
effect of throwing into question the motives of the Grouper
Q Cwitnesses in testifying at the Commission.
The examination of the affairs of Actors' Equity, 
appropriately, proved to be quite entertaining at times. The 
witnesses, while no doubt taking their own evidence seriously, 
imparted a touch of colour, and sometimes humour to the 
proceedings, providing a marked contrast with the more prosaic 
approach of the typical industrial union witness. Part of the 
interest of the Actors' case lies in the fact that the evidence 
concerned attempts by themselves to secure the passage of a 
resolution by their union which would have made it illegal for 
a Communist or a member of any other 'subversive' organisation 
to hold executive office.^ At union meetings in both June
96. Lowe concluded in the Report that Sharpley's allegations
about the B.W.I.U. ballot were 'substantially true'. He 
believed that a deliberate scheme to have false ballot 
papers issued to enable Chandler to win the election had 
been carried out, but he was hesitant about how to apport­
ion blame. Of Morris he said, 'his participation may 
have been due to obstinacy, ignorance or bewilderment in 
an unusually large poll, rather than to conscious co­
operation with Chandler and his supporters'. And of the 
others, 'I have not found myself able on the evidence to 
determine the degree of complicity of each of those who 
took part'. (Reportf p. 86).
97. The resolution, formulated by two of assisting Counsel's
witnesses (L. Furze-Morrish and Kenrick Hudson) read as 
follows: 'No person shall become an officer of the
Association unless he shall prior to nomination have 
signed a statutory declaration that he is not a member of 
the Communist Party or part of a body ... which advocates 
as its policy ... the overthrow of the Australian 
Constitution, and that he has not been a member of such
a Party ... since the first day of January 1942, and that 
he accepts and agrees to abide by the Australian 
Constitution and its association as part of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations'. (RCT. 4525).
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and December 1948 a motion to this effect had been put forward; 
on the first occasion it was ruled out of order, and on the 
second it was defeated. Sharpley had alleged that this result 
had been bought about following discussions on the Communist 
Party Executive with the Federal Secretary of Actors' Equity 
(Alexander) and the Victorian Secretary (Diamond), both of 
whom Sharpley said were Communists. He claimed it had been 
decided to send Party members along to Equity meetings to vote 
with the bloc of Communist union members against the anti­
communist motions; non-members of the union were issued with 
false receipts in order to gain entry to the meetings. (RCT.
q q1014 ff.). As Lowe points out in the Report, Sharpley made 
a number of factual errors in his original allegations which 
he subsequently corrected. One of the more serious of these 
was that, when asked by Sholl to name the people who were 
illegally sent to the Union meetings by the Party, he named 
among others several members of Actors' Equity who were 
committed anti-Communists.
Assisting Counsel found 6 members of Actors' Equity 
who were willing to testify at the Commission in support of 
Sharpley's evidence: L. FURZE-MORRISH, KENRICK HUDSON,
ROBERT PEACH, KEITH HUDSON, C. ELLIS, and PATRICIA KENNEDY. 
Their evidence ranged in a haphazard fashion over a wide 
area of disputed matters in Equity affairs, its main con­
tribution being claims about the presence of non-members of 
the union at the June and December meetings, and about the 
partisan manner in which these meetings were conducted by the 
chairman (another alleged Communist) so as to prevent the 
motions from being carried. (RCT. 4536, 4543, 4548 ff.).
Their belief that strangers had attended the meetings rested 
on the fact that there had been people present who were 
'shabbily' dressed and lacked the general bearing of actors. 
Attempts by Counsel on both sides to obtain a definition of 
'shabby' dress were not altogether successful. Mr. Cullity 
asked Kenrick Hudson to point out people in the public gallery 
of the Commission whom he considered to be dressed in similar 
fashion. One spectator used as an example subsequently rose 
in his seat and addressed Lowe, explaining that he was 'a real 
old-time vaudeville artist'. Responded Lowe: 'At present
98. Report, p . 82.
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the Commission won't call upon your services. However, I
Q  Qdon't think anyone has reflected on your skill'.
Mr. Cullity's cross-examination launched a general 
attack on the Equity witnesses, portraying them as a partisan 
group which organised itself within the union in a deliberate 
attempt to undermine its leadership. His efforts were 
facilitated by the revelation in earlier evidence that the 
activities of a number of the witnesses within the union were 
influenced by strong external political affiliations. Furze- 
Morrish, for instance, was employed by the Australian 
Constitutional League at the time of his appearance in the 
inquiry, and had written several radio broadcasts on 
Communism at the League's behest. (RCT. 4571). The witness 
Ellis testified that the anti-Communist members of the union 
were friendly with 'a Mr. Manson' who had previously been a 
member of the Constitutional League, and who now held an 
'administrative and propaganda' position directly in the 
Liberal Party. Manson was not a member of Actors' Equity, 
but according to Ellis, the anti-Communist group frequently 
held meetings with him in which he acted as their 'advisor'.
' I He] has a wide knowledge of Communism, and he advises us in 
many regards, how to keep ourselves in order at meetings when 
attacking various forms of Communism in Equity.' (RCT. 4807).
The Actors' Equity evidence was unique among the 
trade union cases, not only because it showed the activities 
of organised anti-Communism emanating from a source other 
than an Industrial Group, but it also revealed in an unusually 
clear way the process whereby assisting Counsel obtained their 
witnesses for the case. Apparently, on the night following 
Sharpley's testimony to the Commission concerning the affairs 
of Equity, Manson had accompanied Ellis and Keith Hudson on 
a visit to Sharpley and Mr. Reynolds to inform him that some 
of his allegations contained errors of fact which should be 
corrected. Subsequently, upon the advice of Reynolds, Ellis 
contacted assisting Counsel on behalf of his anti-Communist 
associates to offer their services at the Commission in 
support of Sharpley's evidence. (RCT. 4758).^®
99. Herald (report on Royal Commission proceedings), 28 
September 1949.
100. It is interesting to note that during cross-examination, 
Cullity succeeded in establishing that none of the Equity
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It is illustrative of assisting Counsel's 
difficulties in making out a convincing case against the 
Communist Party's industrial operations, that even in the 
investigation of Actors' Equity where they managed to 
produce a sizeable body of corroborative witnesses, they still 
failed to make the allegations appear persuasive.
PART (B): THE COMMUNIST PARTY CASE
The Commissioner: Well, at long last Mr. Laurie.
Mr. Laurie: Perhaps it is appropriate at the
opening of the cricket season, Your Honour, that 
Mr. Sholljust did not get his century.
The Commissioner: Yes, it has been the fate of
many famous batsmen.
(RCT. 6295)
Thus on the 99th day of hearings, Mr. Laurie opened 
for the Communist Party. A span of four months seemed to have 
eased the tension of the earlier stages of the inquiry, and 
it had begun to take on the qualities of an endurance test 
for Counsel of both sides rather than a bitter struggle for 
legal and political victory. Nevertheless, neither side had 
lost any of their original commitment. The case presented by 
Mr. Laurie, albeit in mild and decorous manner, was the 
product of long and careful planning by the Party leaders.
Mr. Sholl and his colleagues, in response, supported the 
thrust of the anti-Communist case with frequent objections to 
the 'propagandising' of Communist witnesses, and with an 
aggressive cross-examination which more than matched the treat­
ment of their own witnesses at the hands of the Party's 
Counsel.
In the formulation of their defence, the Communist 
Party's leaders had one distinct advantage over assisting
100. Cont.
witnesses had challenged the bona fides of the 
attendance at the June and December meetings at the time 
they were held; in fact, they raised the issue for the 
first time only after Sharpley had given evidence that 
the Communist Party had packed the meetings with its 
supporters. (RCT. 4754).
101. Lowe found that the allegations made by Sharpley and 
supporting witnesses were un-proved, although he 
thought there was some suspicion as to the regularity 
of the conduct of those in charge of the meetings. 
(Report, p . 82).
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Counsel: they enjoyed a very tight direction of their
witnesses, not only in terms of selection, but psychologically 
in that they could control closely their performance in the 
witness box. The Communist case was in fact constructed in 
the opposite way to that of assisting Counsel's. The Party 
leaders decided upon the kind of picture of Communism they 
wished to offer to the Commissioner and then were able to 
select, from the pool of potential witnesses represented by the 
Party's entire membership, those whom they considered to be 
best fitted to present such a picture. On the other hand, 
assisting Counsel to a large extent had been forced to devise 
their case from whatever raw material they could unearth; it 
was the quality of the witnesses themselves (over which assist­
ing Counsel had negligible control) which had primarily 
determined the nature of the case. And in a very real way, 
assisting Counsel were the 'victim' of these witnesses. The 
overall structure of the anti-Communist case equalled the sum 
total of a large number of idiosyncratic witnesses of varying 
capabilities. It lacked the unity, and as a result some of the 
forcefulness, of the Communist Party's case.
For the purposes of this thesis, these divergences 
have dictated a different approach to each case. In deal­
ing with the case against the Party emphasis has been placed 
on the individual witnesses because essentially it was they
102. Mr. J.M. Cullity's defence of a group of trade union 
officials against charges made by Sharpley and other 
witnesses for assisting Counsel's case amounted to a 
third 'case' at the Commission. From the close of the 
Communist Party's case on 15 December 1949 until the 
last day of hearings on 6 March 1950, the Commission was 
largely occupied with the evidence Cullity presented on 
behalf of his clients. I have chosen not to deal with 
this case in my thesis. While an important part of the 
evidence answering assisting Counsel's case, Mr. Cullity's 
case was entirely separate from that presented by the 
Communist Party, and quite a number of his witnesses 
denied membership of the Party. I have been concerned 
with Cullity only in his capacity of cross-examiner of 
anti-Communist witnesses during the course of Mr. Sholl's 
case. Cullity's case-proper restricted itself almost 
entirely to detailed and complex evidence re ballot­
rigging charges, and it adds little directly to the 
picture of the clash between the Communist Party and 
its opponents in the Royal Commission.
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who made the case. Moreover, their evidence has been dealt 
with at considerable length, because the raison d'etre of the 
thesis is chiefly as a study of anti-Communism, and not of 
the nature of the Communist Party. The Party's general response 
will not be examined through a detailing of its evidence, but 
as an expression of the Communists' political position in the 
wider framework of the Cold War anti-Communist offensive.
Rather than to 're-try' the Party, the concern of this chapter 
is to look at the pre-occupations of the 'prosecution' and 
the defence as a microcosm of the Commission's political sett­
ing. The witnesses for the Communist Party were really only 
spokesmen presenting parts of an argument which had been 
formulated in advance as a carefully-devised and consistent 
whole. It is the broad objectives of the defence, rather than 
individual contributions to it, which are important. Thus 
the approach will be thematic rather than chronological.
Comprising only 30 days of hearings and the test­
imony of 12 witnesses, the Communist Party case was consider­
ably shorter than Assisting Counsel's. This relative brevity 
was not wholly a matter of the Party's own choice: it was at
least in part a result of the divergence between the role 
ascribed to its Counsel by Lowe, and the functions which the 
Party leadership wanted their evidence to serve. Lowe's 
determination to conduct the inquiry as far as possible in 
the manner of a litigation inter partes, which had led him to 
grant the Party separate representation, operated at the same 
time to confine it to a purely defensive role. His rulings 
stipulated that the case should be directed exclusively to 
'completing the picture' presented by assisting Counsel. 
Essentially, the Party was allowed the opportunity to try to 
prove it was not guilty of misconduct, but prevented from 
giving the 'case for Communism' in a positive sense.
As it happened, Lowe's ruling on the scope of the 
case, made at an early stage in the proceedings, proved in 
practice to be less restrictive than Mr. Laurie might have 
feared. The fact that assisting Counsel's evidence had 
traversed such a wide spectrum of the Party's operations left 
the defence case unhindered in terms of coverage of subject 
matter. And the impossibility of treating supposedly harmful 
actions without going into more generalised aspects of the 
Party - a problem confronted by assisting Counsel in their 
own case - operated to the advantage of the Communists when
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they came to give their answers to allegations. Lowe himself 
tended to be pragmatic in his decisions on the admissibility 
of evidence. While pointing out that such matters were 'on the 
very fringe of permissible evidence', there were a number of 
occasions when he allowed the Party to deal with its 
'benevolent' activities, in the absence of objection from 
assisting Counsel. Laurie, of course, could never be certain 
when Lowe would see fit to draw the line, and had to steer a 
very delicate course between procedural rulings and the 
pressure of assisting Counsel's objections in order to present 
the picture of Communism formulated by the Party leaders.
He was not seriously hampered in his attempt to give 
a full explanation of doctrinal matters, for Lowe seemed 
interested to examine Communist theoretical aims more-or-less 
in toto. This was not true of the sphere of Party practice, 
where assisting Counsel's concentration on specific misconduct, 
and Lowe's antipathy to 'a roving Commission on every aspect of 
political activity in this Party', dictated that the defence 
confine itself to evidence which directly met the charges 
against the Party. From the Party's point of view, these were 
adverse conditions in which to present a satisfactory answer 
to the anti-Communist case. It conceived of the defence in 
much broader terms than a simple refutation of the allegations 
made by assisting Counsel.
The Communist leaders no doubt saw in the Commission 
a way of infusing the Party's rank and file membership with a 
spirit of revolutionary zeal - something particularly desirable 
at a time when Communist strength in the unions found itself 
seriously challenged, and when less hardy elements m  the Party 
were dropping away in the face of pressure from the Right-wing 
political offensive. The Communists' performance at the 
Commission, if managed carefully, could help to boost the 
Party's morale. It could do so through the solidarity 
engendered by common adversity, through the co-operative effort 
required in the preparation of evidence, and through the use 
of the inquiry as a forum to publicise the aims of Communism. 
Communist doctrine demanded that the Capitalist courts be used 
for propaganda purposes by Communists brought before them, and 
it is probable that some of the Party rank and file anticipated 
such a role for its barristers and witnesses at the Commission.
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There arose a real dilemma here, since an aggressive 
restatement of the revolutionary creed was incompatible with 
the need to present a palatable view of the Party to Commiss­
ioner and public. Generally, where there was conflict between 
these two aims, the defence tended to opt for a 'soft' 
interpretation. In November 1949 the time for evangelising 
was past; the Party was fighting with its back to the wall and 
needed above all else to consolidate its fast-disintegrating 
hold on the union movement. The Party leaders recognised that 
the propagandist value of their performance at the Commission 
lay at least as much in the opportunity to project a moderate 
image of Communism to workingmen alienated by adventurist 
industrial policies, as in the opportunity to propagate 
Communist revolution for Australia. The Communist Party 
Counsel made every effort to discredit the evidence of assist­
ing Counsel's witnesses as a means of exposing them and the 
Commission as the instruments of the external anti-Communist 
campaign. But if there were Party members who hoped for a more 
general politicisation of the Party's role in the Commission, 
they were disappointed. Mr. Laurie's case plainly showed that 
the Party leadership was anxious to preach its ideas only so 
far as was consistent with the priority of self-defence.
The Party did aim to use the Commission to advance 
its own interests, but its approach was more complex than 
Sholl realised on the numerous occasions when he drew Lowe's 
attention to the Communist teaching on the use of the courts as 
a public forum. The Party's case was moulded more by the needs 
of self-preservation than by a desire to proselytize.
Suspecting that Lowe regarded much of Sharpley's 
evidence as dubious, and that he would give their case at 
least the semblance of a fair hearing, the Party had decided 
to proceed with its defence in a serious vein. Ted Hill told 
Sholl when giving evidence himself that he had been relieved 
of all normal political duties for the duration of the proceed­
ings, and that the Party had made 'significant alterations' 
in its day-to-day operations in order to cope with the 'threat' 
of the Commission. (RCT. 7366). Some Party members were 
engaged on a full-time basis researching information which 
could be put in refutation of the allegations made by anti- 
Communist witnesses. As already noted, the Communist witnesses 
were generally the Party 'intellectuals', certainly unrepre-
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sentative of the Party as a whole; and their selection, like 
the Communist Counsel's performance at the Commission, was 
based on an attempt to gain Lowe's favour through the present­
ation of a rational, intelligent view of the Party. But the 
case did not really aim to prove its innocence in the manner of 
an ordinary legal defence. ^ 3  At no stage did the Communist 
leaders entertain any great faith in the likelihood that a 
Report favourable to themselves would issue from the 
Commission: doctrine and experience dictated a lowly assess­
ment of the Party's chances of receiving justice within the 
confines of the Capitalist legal system, and in any case the 
Communists tended to see the inquiry as an instrument of the 
Victorian Government's anti-Communist policies rather than as 
a judicial body. Despite the fact that they were favourably 
impressed by Lowe's conduct of the Commission, the prejudices 
of Hill and his colleagues ran too deeply to allow them to 
believe that they could convince him by the evidence. At most 
they hoped to make it difficult for him to provide the 
Government with a strong weapon to use against the Party.
The Communist Counsel's scepticism about their 
ability to 'win' the case, combined with the knowledge that
10 4the Press would not feature denials by Communist witnesses, 
led those responsible for the formulation of the defence to 
place only limited importance on the need to refute specific 
allegations. In fact, there were more pressing circumstances 
to consider in working out their case than the likely nature 
of the Report itself. In its essentials the Communist case was 
conceived in direct response to the anti-Communist offensive, 
of which the Commission was seen as a mere preface.
Virtually all of the instances of alleged misconduct 
were denied, and the more serious allegations were met with
103. The following interpretation of the Party's attitude to 
its defence is based on information provided by Rex 
Mortimer (correspondence with myself, 30 January 1972,
3 February 1972) and to a lesser extent on interviews 
with Ted Laurie, Melbourne, 1 June 1971 and 11 October 
1971.
104. The Party tried to compensate for an inadequate report­
ing of its case in the mass media by circulating accounts 
of its evidence as widely as possible - in pamphlet form 
as well as in increased editions of the Guardian and 
Tribune.
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challenging evidence - particularly the ballot-rigging
charges, which could have resulted in criminal prosecutions,
and which were directly damaging to the Party's credibility
in the eyes of the working class. In addition, the opportunity
was taken wherever possible to show inaccuracies of detail in
the evidence of anti-Communist witnesses. But at every point
the desire to protect the Party's security from governmental
invasion guided the line of defence. Where the refutation of
an allegation involved the risk that a Party witness would be
forced to reveal facts about the Party's membership and source
of funds, or the names of members other than those already
publicly known as Communists, then the allegation was usually
10 5allowed to stand unanswered. As with the 'fellow-traveller'
witnesses, the evidence of the Communist witnesses gave the 
impression of a great reluctance to furnish the inquiry with 
the names of persons associated with the Party who might thereby 
be pilloried by the Press. This determination to avoid giving 
confidential information which could aid attempts to outlaw 
the Party, or could harm individuals, inevitably hampered 
their ability to present a full-scale defence case. It also 
caused the witnesses at times to compromise the image of co­
operativeness and candour which they were seeking to project.
Mr. Laurie opened his case, as his opponents had
105. Mortimer quotes a personal example of the way in which 
the Party was sometimes unable to answer an allegation 
for this reason. 'In my own case ... I had a good 
answer to the allegations regarding the Clerks' Union, 
but the Party would not allow me to enter the witness 
box because of my position in the University Branch of 
the C.P. between 1943 and 1947', thus making him liable 
to be cross-examined about Communist members operative 
in the University. (R. Mortimer to V. Rastrick, 12 
January 1972). One of the assisting Counsel's witnesses 
(R.D. Martin, an Industrial Group supporter) gave 
evidence that he attended a meeting of the Communist 
fraction in the Clerks' Union, chaired by Mortimer, after 
having accidently received a notice of the meeting.
Martin testified that the Communists discussed business 
to come before the next meeting of a section of the Clerks' 
Union (which Mortimer was also to chair), the tactics 
to be pursued at the meeting, and how unfavourable moves 
might be blocked by adroit chairmanship. The evidence 
later revealed that Mortimer was in fact ineligible 
to be even a member of that section of the Union, accord­
ing to the Union rules. (RCT. 5736 ff.; 9740).
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done, with a theoretical introduction in which he stated 
his argument as to the real nature of Communist doctrine and 
aims, and gave a general indication of the Party's answer to 
the propositions of assisting Counsel's case. State Committee 
member RALPH GIBSON, the first witness, elaborated the 
theoretical matters raised by Laurie. His long experience as 
a Marx School tutor and platform orator, as well as his 
intellectual background, fitted him for the role of Party 
expert on doctrine. Laurie called a further three officials 
as his major witnesses on practical aspects of the Party:
TED HILL, FRANK JOHNSON (the Victorian President), and 'JACKIE' 
BROWN (leader of the Railway Workers' Union and also a member 
of the Party's State Committee). Hill's evidence ranged 
widely over almost all the matters alleged against the Party, 
but devoted special attention to Sharpley in an effort to 
undermine his credibility. Johnson was likewise concerned 
with general Party practice, and in particular with industrial 
matters. Sharpley had declared Hill and Johnson to be the 
chief architects of Communist malpractice in the trade unions; 
as personal targets of the allegations and as leaders of their 
Party, both were anxious to demonstrate Sharpley's error in 
this sphere of activity above all others. J.J. Brown was 
presented as the examplar of the Communist trade union official. 
He attempted to disprove the notion of Communist manipulation 
of the unions, especially in relation to strikes, and to 
illustrate the altruism of the Party's industrial policies.
Minor witnesses were called to refute particular 
allegations, although like Brown's, their evidence always had 
the wider objective of showing Communist 'good works' in areas 
where they possessed some expertise. Three trade union wit­
nesses supplemented Brown's picture of Communist policy in 
industry: the secretary of the Party's branch in Melbourne
waterside unions (J. SAUNDERS); the Chairman of the branch at 
the Williamstown dockyard (F. SHARPE); and a militant member 
of the State Committee of the Federated Ironworkers Association, 
the only witness for the Communist Party who was not a 
Communist (E.L. JOHNS). A fourth 'industrial' witness (A.R. 
McLINTOCK) was a commercial artist, alleged by Sharpley to 
have employed his artistic talents in the production of false 
ballot papers in aid of a Party effort to rig the 1948 Black­
smiths' Society election. He was the only minor witness whose
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evidence concerned ballot-rigging allegations.
A broader spectrum of activities was covered by the 
remaining witnesses. Mr. Laurie summoned the head of the 
Party's 'Ex-service Committee' (W.H. TREGEAR) to testify about 
Communist action in the R.S.L., and a medical practitioner 
(A.H. DOBBIN) to refute charges of professional abuse by 
Communist doctors. A founding member of the New Housewives' 
Association (MRS. P.G. BALDWIN) gave evidence of a Communist 
front organisation in action; another woman (an official in 
the Party's South-Port district, MRS. J. SAMSON) was called 
chiefly to challenge the evidence of Mrs. Baxter. A young 
Communist connected with the Methodist Church (R.D. KENNETT) 
explained the possibility of a co-existence between Christianity 
and Communism.
Laurie's treatment of theoretical matters laid 
emphasis on the pragmatic, evolutionary aspects of the Marxist- 
Leninist theory of revolution. He argued that the class 
struggle was not an invention of Communists, and that equally 
the social revolution it would produce would not be a product 
of the machinations of the Communist Party. Both issued from 
natural changes in the relationship of the economic forces in 
society. The role of the Party was merely to assist, through 
the political education of the masses, the development towards 
a new socio-political order which was historically inevitable. 
(RCT. 6299 ff.). Laurie constantly stressed that the Party's 
actions were a direct expression of the level of political 
awareness of the working class, and that the steps towards 
revolution would, and could, be taken only with majority 
support. He argued that the Party could not maintain itself 
at the forefront of the revolutionary movement if it did not 
mould its actions in accordance with the natural growth in 
mass political consciousness; this view was to be developed 
by his witnesses as a standard defence against allegations of 
Communist trickery in the unions. The Communist Party's
central objective, said Laurie, was the replacement of 
Capitalism with a Socialist State, but the question of how the 
actual transfer of power from the incumbent ruling class to 
the proletariat was to be effected was a secondary issue which
106. See p.189 of this chapter.
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depended entirely upon the exigencies of time and place.
(RCT. 6339). The main Party witnesses all referred to the 
nature of Communist revolutions in Eastern Europe as an 
indication of the possibility of revolutionary change without 
violence. Ralph Gibson said that violence would be employed 
'if necessary'; in other words, if the Capitalist class resist­
ed the natural tide of change resulting from the political 
awakening of the masses. (RCT. 6766).
Laurie was anxious to assert the flexibility of 
Communist theory, claiming that it was habitually re­
interpreted and modified in the light of the operative political 
conditions at a given time. The nature of the Russian 
revolution could be no guide to the form which revolution 
would take in Australia; the writings of the early Communist 
theoreticians were studied closely by the A.C.P. but were not 
regarded as a rigid blue-print for its own operations. Thus 
Laurie and his witnesses argued against assisting Counsel's 
almost exclusive use of the Russian Communist writings to 
present a picture of the ruthless nature of the Australian 
Party's aims and objectives. Laurie suggested that those A.C.P. 
declarations which before 1935 expressed extreme revolutionary 
sentiments had been genuinely discarded in favour of a more 
moderate programme appropriate to Australian political 
conditions. Constitutions which stressed the Party's role as 
the vanguard of a violent working-class struggle to capture 
the State, and early election manifestos such as that of 1934 
which called for the creation of a 'Soviet Australia', were a 
response to particular political circumstances. Later 
Constitutions were an accurate representation of the Party's 
objectives and not, as Mr. Sholl had implied, merely an 
attempt to tone down revolutionary content for popular 
consumption. (RCT. 6660 ff.). It was frequently apparent 
that Mr. Laurie and his witnesses wished to avoid giving the 
impression of being doctrinaire. When cross-examined by Sholl 
as to the nature of the society which they envisaged as 
following Communist revolution, Ralph Gibson repeatedly 
resisted Sholl's attempts to pin him down to detail, reiter­
ating Laurie's assertion that procedure would be determined 
pragmatically. (RCT. 6741-48). Thus the stress on flexibility 
of theory served a dual purpose of dispelling the idea that the 
Party was dedicated to the implementation of Russian-style
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revolution in Australia, while enabling individual witnesses 
to side-step awkward questions designed to establish that 
life under a Communist regime would be anti-libertarian and 
oppressive.
Rex Mortimer believes that the main function of the
Communist Party's evidence was to 'reassure and enthuse the
faithful, and project a favourable image to the public
generally and the working class in particular'. He continues:
'Here our main problem was to combine fidelity to Marxism-
Leninism with an interpretation of it which would not repel
our audience'. To a certain extent, a careful distinction
between immediate and ultimate aims, and as a corollary, ends
and means, helped overcome this central dilemma of the case.
Laurie could concede that the Party's primary objective was
indeed the overthrow of existing society through revolution
and the institution of a Socialist-Communist system, while
asserting that such circumstances could only come about as a
result of gradual changes in the relationship between economic
classes. His introduction suggested implicitly that
revolution was considered by the Party to be a distant pros-
pect. Meanwhile, Communists were willing to work within
the existing framework, using what were essentially reform- 
109ist methods, to soften the harshest effects of Capitalism 
on the working population.
The main thrust of the Communist case as a whole was
107. R. Mortimer to V. Rastrick, 3 February 1972.
108. Gibson told Sholl in cross-examination that the 
Capitalist order would be overthrown 'at the earliest 
practicable time' (RCT. 6473) but he did not see this 
as occurring within any foreseeable term of years, and 
other witnesses gave no more definite indication of when 
revolution might be expected.
109. This is certainly not Laurie's adjective, but it sums 
up the implications of his argument.
110. Gibson told the Commission: 'When we struggle for
improved living conditions, we want to see improved 
living conditions. When we struggle for greater 
democratic freedom we want that and we value it, and 
when we struggle for peace we want that; we consider it 
vital and indispensable'.The Commissioner: Does that mean that each of these
steps in your opinion, and your Party's opinion, has a 
value which you desire to achieve although it might be 
part of a larger plan to bring about your strategic 
objective? A: I would accept that statement. Yes,Your Honour. (RCT. 6763).
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to show the A.C.P. to be an ordinary political party oriented 
to Australian conditions, closely identified with working 
class interests, and dedicated to the improvement of the living 
conditions of the masses. An important aim was to challenge 
the implication of assisting Counsel's evidence that the Party 
was 'un-Australian'. Laurie read from numerous documents in 
an effort to prove that it was not foreign-imposed, but rather 
had grown naturally out of the well-established militant 
working-class traditions of the country. (RCT. 6313) . He also 
contradicted the notion that Australian Communists were 
controlled by Moscow; the Party's links with Comintern were 
ideological only, he claimed. (RCT. 6320). According to 
Ralph Gibson, the Party was respectably patriotic. In answer 
to a direct question from Lowe, he said that there had been 
several Party members fighting with Australian forces in the 
war before the Russian involvement. (RCT. 6486). Other 
witnesses made a special point of giving their war records 
where these were favourable; for the same reason, during the 
course of Tregear's evidence, Laurie made much of the latter's 
position on the State Council of the R.S.L. (until expelled in 
1946 for his Communist affiliations) and of his achievements as 
secretary of the Party's ex-service committee in securing 
benefits for returned soldiers. (RCT. 6937 ff.).
The Communist witnesses all implied that until 
circumstances were ripe for revolution, the Party was willing 
to 'work' the existing system as far as it could be worked.
The contesting of Parliamentary elections by Communist 
candidates, as well as the existence of a variety of Party 
committees dealing with such things as health, women's inter­
ests, and agrarian problems, were presented as evidence that 
immediate Communist goals were concerned with an improvement 
of conditions within the Capitalist framework. (e.g. RCT.
6615). Mr. Laurie said that Communists viewed the existing 
laws as having been framed to protect the interests of the 
propertied class; the Party aimed to create a new kind of 
society in which the legal system would operate in the interest 
of the toiling masses. Until such time, however, Communists 
were willing to observe the law, and only in 'special' circum­
stances would they consider it justifiable to commit an 
illegal act. (RCT. 6409-10). On this point the Commissioner 
asked Ralph Gibson '... do you reserve to yourself the right
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of considering whether the occasion is sufficiently important
to warrant your disobeying the law as it exists?' 'In extreme
cases, I think nearly every human being does', answered
Gibson. (RCT. 6751). The evidence of assisting Counsel had
suggested that for the Communist Party the end justified the
means, and that its members would break any law which fettered
their purposes if there was a good chance their crime would go
undetected. But the Party's witnesses denied that they were
defective in moral principles. Ted Hill told Mr. Sholl that
'Communist morality is the only honest morality'.
Mr. Sholl: That implies that it is different from
others, does it not? A: It is based on --
Q: Let us get that clear first. Does it imply
that? A: I think it is undoubtedly different from yours.
(RCT. 7396)
Later, Hill said, 'I think that my morality and that of the 
Communist Party is determined by what will assist human 
development forward'. (RCT. 7396).
The Party claimed that only by 'keeping faith' with 
the working class could it hope to fulfil its role as the 
vanguard of the Revolution. Its witnesses all advanced this 
idea when faced with cross-examination as to what objection 
the Party would have to breaking the law (and particularly 
to rigging a trade union ballot) if the result would be an 
increase in Communist political influence. As Laurie first 
put it in his opening,
... as far as the Party is concerned, we say that if 
the Party did in fact adopt fraudulent means or did 
in fact try to win a position of leadership by 
violence ... the evil consequences even from the point 
of view of the Party would so overweigh the immediate 
possible gains that it would not be justifiable and 
would result in the loss of confidence of the working 
class.
(RCT. 6425)
The witness Hill was closely cross-examined on this point.
Mr. Sholl accepted his contention that the Party might lose 
face with the workers if they became aware that Communists had 
tampered with a union ballot, and that furthermore, 'the effect 
of doing such a thing would allow the enemies of Communism 
and the working class movement to use it against them'. But 
what if the fraud was undiscovered?, asked Mr. Sholl. The 
Communist Party would not do it, Hill responded lamely. 'It 
would infringe the law'. (RCT. 7398).
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In the sphere of Party practice, the major aim of 
the evidence appeared to be to dispel the impression of a 
subversive, conspiratorial organisation conveyed by assisting 
Counsel, and to illustrate the Party's 'good works', with 
particular emphasis on a view of the Party which might appeal 
to the working class. Examples of Communist efforts to 
improve the general lot of the workers, or to struggle for 
political rights, usually had to be given in the context of 
refutation of specific allegations - for instance, in the 
course of J.J. Brown's testimony on the Party's industrial 
policies.'^ '*"'*' But in dealing with the subject of Party 
'organisation', Laurie found it possible to include evidence 
about the achievements of some sub-committees (particularly 
those concerned with health and ex-servicemen) in the field 
of social welfare. (RCT. 6956 ff.; 7807 ff.). During 
examination of Tregear on the activities of the latter 
committee, Laurie did not reveal that his witness had been 
involved in two attempts to instal homeless ex-servicemen's 
families in vacant holiday homes without the owners' consent, 
since to do so would have been to provide the Commission with 
evidence of illegal action by a Party member. But after Mr. 
Sholl introduced the matter during cross-examination in an 
attempt to discredit Tregear, Laurie revealed the details of 
the incidents with a view to illustrating the Communists' 
deep concern for the welfare of the underprivileged. (RCT. 
6999 ff.). The Communist evidence on 'fraternals' or front 
organisations devoted as much attention to portraying their 
espousal of progressive, humanitarian causes, as to refuting 
allegations that these bodies were controlled by the Party for 
the purpose of enlarging its own political influence. 
Generally, the Party's effort to counter assisting Counsel's 
charges of subversion and conspiracy was made indirectly, by
111. Brown's quite lengthy evidence purported to show that 
the primary aim of Communist Party's involvement in 
union strikes was to rectify workers' grievances. He 
outlined the gains made by the union while under 
Communist leadership, and asserted that Communist 
policies were pursued only to the extent that they were 
endorsed by the rank and file union membership. (RCT. 
7026-7110).
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creating a picture of a moderate, intrinsically 'normal' 
political organisation; but in cross-examination, Communist 
witnesses denied the charges outright.
The pattern of assisting Counsel's questions
exhibited a number of marked pre-occupations, causing Mr.
Laurie to complain in his final submission to Lowe that 'the
cross-examination of witnesses called on behalf of the
Communist Party in no way enabled them to explain the aims,
objects, origins j and_| funds ... of the Communist Party, but
was designed to elicit statements which would assist to
discredit Communism'. On matters of Communist theory, for
instance, the questioning was largely directed towards two
major issues: the role of violence in the transition from a
Capitalist to a Socialist State; and the kind of measures
which would be adopted by a Proletarian Dictatorship in
dismantling the old system, with particular emphasis on the
113problem of expropriation of the capital-owning classes.
Mr. Sholl's basic approach was to demonstrate that 
the Party relied on methods of secrecy and fraud to advance 
its interests. He made much of the fact that several members 
admitted to having adopted false names in the past, and to 
having kept their Communist affiliations concealed from non- 
Communist associates. Every witness who occupied a leading 
position in the Party was tested at length about the Party's 
claim that it had destroyed its own records. Sholl appeared 
to be very sceptical of the truth of Ralph Gibson's statement 
that minutes were no longer taken at meetings, and that no 
correspondence now passed between the A.C.P. Central Committee 
in Sydney and the Victorian Executive. (RCT. 6666 ff.).'*'14
112. Final submission on behalf of the Communist Party, p. 8.
113. See particularly the cross-examination of Gibson,
RCT. 6739-6794.
114. Mr. Sholl: You can hardly be surprised if :_the absence
of Party records! gave a pretty general impression that 
the Party is essentially conspiratorial in nature, can 
you? A: The Party is not conspiratorial at all.
Q: As I follow you, this is a Party which says it is a
political party and has nothing up its sleeves, and it 
keeps no membership records, it keeps no minutes, and it 
has no correspondence even between its head body and its 
branches. A: The Party is absolutely open in all its
dealings with the people, but it cannot ignore the fact 
that it is proclaimed as the dangerous enemy by monopoly 
capital and by the powers that be. (RCT. 6674).
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In response to the witness's further claim that the Party did 
not engage in any 'underground work', Sholl read to the 
Commission a Communist pamphlet setting out procedures of 
organisation for illegal activity, and reminded Gibson of 
the evidence of ex-Communist witnesses on the measures which 
were taken by the Party during the 1940-42 ban to ensure that 
its propaganda continued. (RCT. 6680 ff.) A number of the 
Party's witnesses were questioned on their activities during 
this period, as well as on current preparations for a return 
to similar undercover operations in the event of the Party 
being outlawed again. Most of them professed to have little 
knowledge of what had occurred during the war-time ban, 
accounting for their own political action simply in terms of 
a 'discussion' of Communist ideas and policies on the war
115when they came into social contact with other Communists.
All witnesses questioned on the illegal period denied know­
ledge of the existence of secret printing presses, and of any 
formalised system for communication between members.
Assisting Counsel had notably little success in their
efforts to supplement their collection of names by questioning
116witnesses on the identity of Party members and associates.
Nor did they get much co-operation when trying to ascertain 
the origin of a number of political pamphlets and articles 
concerned with the Royal Commission and the Essential Services 
issue. Hill denied any personal responsibility for the 
publication of material attributing biassed motives to Sir
115. Lowe summed up their viewpoint when he helped the 
witness Johnson out of his difficulty in meeting Sholl's 
suggestion that, as a leading member of the Party in 
1940, Johnson should have known about the arrangements 
for the printing of the Guardian. 'Was it the policy at 
that time that the less each individual knew about the 
actions of others, the better it was', asked Lowe, and 
Johnson agreed. (RCT. 8207) .
116. The cross-examination of R.D. Kennett (the Party's 
'religious' witness) provides a good example of the 
process. Kennett was asked for the names of Communist 
clergymen, of members of the Methodist Youth Fellowship 
who participated in the radical 'Youth March on Canberra' 
in May 1949, and of Communist members of that Fellowship. 
Sholl was particularly interested in the Rev. Stephen 
Yarnold, whom Kennett had mentioned as someone with whom 
he associated in the Christian Commonwealth Movement.
It was not apparent whether Sholl regarded him as having 
connections with the Communist Party, but he noted that
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Charles Lowe as Commissioner and to Sharpley as witness, and 
attacking the Royal Commission Contempt Law, When pressed, he 
said that he was in agreement with their general content, but 
he did not 'subscribe to every word' in a Guardian article 
which criticised Lowe for his acceptance of the Commission 
while a shareholder in the Herald and Weekly Times Ltd. He 
failed to explain to Sholl why he had made no attempt to 
restrain the Party Press from publishing material of this kind. 
(RCT. 7361 ff.)
Wherever possible, assisting Counsel revealed a 
witness's record of court convictions. Sholl opened his cross- 
examination of Gibson by listing the occasions when he had 
been convicted for political offences resulting from particip­
ation in demonstrations and the illegal holding of street 
meetings. (RCT. 6639 ff.). He appeared to consider it 
significant that at a public meeting in 1940, Gibson had told 
his audience that the flag to which he gave allegiance was the 
Red Flag, not the Union Jack. (RCT. 6649). Sholl even went 
to the trouble of producing two police witnesses who had taken 
short-hand notes of Gibson's speech, and who testified to the 
Commission in support of the charge. (RCT. 6967). This 
method of discrediting the Communist Party's witnesses was 
probably most effective in the case of its President, Frank 
Johnson. Cross-examination showed him to have been involved in 
a number of minor breaches of the law, including the use of a 
false name in a court proceeding, and the falsification of 
documents. Assisting Counsel were quick to draw conclusions
about Johnson's attitude to law-breaking in the sphere of
117trade union politics. Most attention, however, was given
116. Cont.
Yarnoldwas 'the gentleman who broadcasts on the A.B.C.', 
and that he had left his position as Chaplain of Scotch 
College after 'some disagreement with the authorities'. 
Kennett agreed with Sholl that there were 'a number of 
leading members of the Churches who are members of the 
Communist Party', but searching questions by Sholl 
revealed that he did not know if this was the case in 
Australia. 'I have never sought after such information 
... since religion is not a subject that we discuss much 
in the Party', Kennett claimed. (RCT, 7991; 7997; 8002- 
3) .
117. Mr. Sholl: Well, so far we have got you known as 'Ewer',
'Johnson' and 'Cassidy', and we have got an untrue 
statement in your application for a motor-car driving 
licence, a false name given to police, and a nomination
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to undermining Hill's credibility as a witness, the attack 
being based upon his position as a practising member of the 
Victorian Bar. Assisting Counsel suggested that in condoning 
the Party's publication of pamphlets critical of the Royal 
Commission proceedings and the Contempt Law, Hill had acted 
irresponsibly as a lawyer. (RCT. 7362). At a later stage 
in cross-examination, Sholl devoted an entire day to an 
investigation of events relating to the settlement of 
Henderson's court action against Morris during the 1948 
B.W.I.U. Election. Hill had appeared for Morris in this 
case, instructed by J.M. Lazarus, a Communist solicitor. The 
information which Sholl managed to reveal pointed to the 
possibility that Hill and Lazarus had behaved dishonestly, 
seeking to engineer an agreement with opposing Counsel about 
the preservation of ballot papers which they were aware were 
no longer in existence. (RCT. 7564 ff.)^®
With the probable exception of the B.W.I.U. ballot­
rigging matter, the anti-Communist case rested upon evidence 
of the kind which would not have furnished proof in a court 
proceeding. But by concentrating on the conspiratorial 
'atmospherics' of Communist activities, and on a number of 
instances in which the Party had shown itself willing to break 
the law, assisting Counsel were able to imply the likelihood 
of other more serious occasions when Communists had been guilty 
of misconduct. And if the Party was conspiratorial in nature, 
then here was an explanation of their difficulty in procuring 
substantial evidence to prove its misdeeds.
117. Cont.
of authorised insurer in another false name, haven't 
we? Do you regard those as some of the latent 
capacities which the Communist Party has developed in you? A: No.
Q: Well, after that, I suppose a little bit of ballot­
rigging would not worry you, would it?
(RCT. 8218)
118. It is interesting to note that Hill, the Party's 'strong­
man', broke down in the witness box, showing severe 
emotional distress, during his refutation of allegations 
of professional impropriety as a barrister - he was the 
only Party witness who did so. (R. Mortimer to V. 
Rastrick, 3 February 1972). In the Report, Lowe made
no finding against Hill or Lazarus with regard to this 
matter, but said he believed he had 'not heard the whole 
truth' about it. (Report, p. 103).
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The effort put into preparing its case served the 
Communist Party well at the Commission. The Communist 
witnesses, thoroughly schooled in the objectives of the case, 
and in the kind of information they should avoid revealing, 
usually succeeded in presenting their evidence-in-chief in 
an articulate, non-aggressive fashion. For the most part 
they gave the impression of having a great enthusiasm for their 
cause, an eagerness to explain it to their audience, and a 
desire to co-operate with the needs of the inquiry. Gibson 
was probably the most outstanding of the Party's witnesses in 
these respects. Lowe seemed to respond favourably to his 
eloquent, almost academic style of explaining Communist theory, 
although he reprimanded him more frequently than any other 
Party witness for a tendency to 'propagandise'. Apart from an 
occasional protest against assisting Counsel's efforts to 
limit the scope of his theoretical explanations, Gibson 
maintained a markedly genial manner which was echoed in the 
performance of most of the other witnesses. R.D. Kennett, who 
testified on Communist attitudes to religion, was perhaps the 
most successful of the minor witnesses. He was a young 
Communist who had continued to pursue his involvement in the 
Methodist Church after joining the Party. He was employed as 
a witness to demonstrate that the Party did not regard a 
person's religion as an obstacle to his acceptance as a member, 
and that there was no basic antagonism between the aims of 
Communism and the true ideals of Christianity. One suspects 
that Lowe was interested in the subject matter of Kennett's 
evidence, as well as being receptive to his earnest, youthful 
idealism.
Under the pressure of cross-examination, the 
Communist witnesses found it considerably more difficult to 
maintain an impression of willingness to 'tell all'.
Particularly when questioned about alleged fraudulent activities, 
they tended to produce the stock answer that a certain 
event 'may have occurred', but they had 'no recollection' of 
it. Ted Hill showed a strong inclination towards this type 
of response, to the extent that he seriously risked the 
appearance of calculated untruthfulness. It was a defence 
doubtless at times used to protect the Party from revelations 
which might endanger its security; it may have had the 
additional aim of deflating assisting Counsel's image of a
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tightly-knit organisation whose control lay wholly in the 
hands of its top-ranking officials. Hill's refusal to admit 
to any knowledge of numerous Party activities alleged by anti­
communist witnesses had the effect of suggesting a more 
loosely-organised body, and one not as capable of conspiratorial 
plotting as Mr. Sholl would have it.
Most of the Party's witnesses were subdued in response 
to the provocation of assisting Counsel in cross-examination; 
if they were at times unco-operative, they nevertheless avoided 
giving expression to open hostility. The only occasion on 
which Lowe reprimanded a Communist for engaging in an antagon­
istic interchange with Counsel was when Sholl declared that 
the witness Tregear was receiving 'signals' from Rex Mortimer 
(instructing Communist Counsel) in the course of his cross- 
examination, and Tregear heatedly denied it. (RCT. 7016).
It is curious to note that the two witnesses who appeared 
least capable of observing the Party's formula for a non- 
aggressive performance in the witness-box were its leaders,
Hill and Johnson. The latter, perhaps naturally inept as a 
witness, was made ill at ease at an early stage in his cross- 
examination by the revelation that he was guilty of some 
fraudulent practices. His composure may also have been 
disturbed because he was most deeply involved with the Party's 
affairs in the unions, and thus most vulnerable to assisting 
Counsel's energetic grilling with regard to ballot-rigging 
allegations. This insecurity expressed itself in a disgruntled 
manner which bordered on truculence. Hill's temperament in 
the witness-box was likewise noticeably different to that of 
other Communists who testified, although in his case hostility 
seemed to be politically-motivated. Hill had supervised the 
schooling of the Party's witnesses to ensure that they did not 
over-politicise their testimony, and yet he himself was unable 
or unwilling to disguise his personal views on the Royal 
Commission. He did not hesitate to express disapproval of the 
damaging effects which the proceedings were having upon people 
accused by assisting Counsel's evidence, nor to point out 
that the charges implied in their questions were a development 
of 'current slanders' against the Party. His tone was partic­
ularly antagonistic when he faced Sholl. 'You and I talk 
different languages philosophically', Hill told him.
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Mr. Sholl; That is unfortunate, of course. A: I
think it is unfortunate for you.
(RCT. 7390)
Their exchange on the matter of Communists in the trade unions
was typical of the way in which the cross-examination proceeded.
Hill asserted that the allegation that the Communist Party
controlled the unions was 'a slander that has been uttered
against [it] as long as I can remember'.
Mr. Sholl; What is there slanderous about it? Why 
shouldn't the Communist Party control the trade 
unions? A: The suggestion is put repeatedly that
we are conspirators that pull strings here, there and 
everywhere, and I reject that view utterly.
Q: Don't get heated about it. I am trying to get
the logical basis of this. What is there reprehens­
ible about the Communist Party controlling the trade 
unions, from your point of view? A: If your
implication is that the Communist Party pulls a string 
here and pulls a string there in a trade union, I 
reject the suggestion completely.
Q: Nobody is talking about pulling strings. A: That
is the presentation that you have put repeatedly here.
(RCT. 7397)
Hill's difficulties under cross-examination 
reflected the central dilemma confronted by the Communist 
Party throughout the presentation of its case, a dilemma which 
was probably inherent in its very existence within the confines 
of a Capitalist democracy. The inconsistencies in the Party's 
evidence (and there were many) arose from its attempt to 
reconcile the conflicting demands of survival and respect­
ability on the one hand, doctrinal fidelity and revolutionary 
spirit on the other. The problem, and the way in which the 
Communists at the Commission struggled to overcome it, well 
illustrates the bind of a revolutionary party in an 
unpropitious environment.
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CHAPTER FOUR : THE REPORT
By August 1949 the Royal Commission had settled in 
to become one of the established features of Melbourne's 
political life. The daily press kept a polite, if progress­
ively disinterested, eye on the proceedings, but in the 
Victorian Parliament some uncomplimentary remarks were heard. 
The Labour Opposition began to refer to the length of the 
inquiry as proof that its findings would be put to no useful 
end by the Government. 'Everyone knows that [the Royal 
Commission] looks as if it would go on forever',-*- declared 
Mr. Cain during the debate on the Contempt Law, and Mr. Barry 
rounded off his point with 'Some persons are hoping that [it] 
will never finish'. Even some members of Hollway's own 
Party seemed discontented. Mr. Edmunds, M.L.A. (L.C.P., 
Hawthorn), unappreciative of Lowe's conscientious efforts to 
apply strict judicial principles, complained that 'Known 
members of the Communist Party are accepted at the Royal 
Commission's hearings on terms of equality as if they were 
good citizens and good Australians'. Patrick Kennelly, 
least restrained of all, told the Legislative Council: 'The
purpose of this Commission has been served. Nothing has been 
said that anyone in political life did not know. It is a farce 
and a joke'.^
Outwardly impervious to such criticism, Lowe carried 
on in the same scrupulous fashion with which he had begun his 
task. And finally on 6 March 1950, precisely nine months after 
the preliminary hearing, the Commission came to an end. Lowe 
departed with 31 volumes of transcribed oral evidence and an 
even vaster amount of exhibits - the raw material which he was 
required to sift and evaluate before he could present his
1. V.P.D., vol. 229, 9 August 1949, p. 1481.
2. V.P.D., vol. 229, 9 August 1949, p. 1483.
3. V.P.D., vol. 231, 19 October 1949, p. 2967. Edmunds
continued: 'It is the personification of impudence on
their part to stand up as champions of free speech and a 
better form of civilization. They are the conscious and 
deliberate agents of a foreign power ...'.
4. V.P.D., vol. 230, 20 September 1949, p.
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Report to the Government. The Press predicted that this would 
take at least three months,5 but in fact Lowe completed the 
enormous amount of work involved in just seven weeks. On the 
28th of April, the day after Mr. Menzies introduced a bill to 
outlaw the Communist Party in the House of Representatives, 
and two weeks before the Victorian State Election, Lowe pre­
sented his findings to the Governor of Victoria, Sir Dallas 
Brooks.
The Report, described by the Melbourne Sun as a 
'classic of clear thinking'^ and by the Premier as one of the 
most important documents that had ever been presented to any
nAustralian Government , was relatively short in view of the 
immensity of the evidence it summarised.^ In its introductory 
section, Lowe indicated the kind of interpretation which 
should be put on his findings.
... I have felt that I should not treat the matters 
investigated before me merely as a piece of litigation 
between parties in which findings should be made on the 
evidence in favour of one party or the other, but as 
matters in which the Executive desires to know, not 
merely what I find proved by the evidence, but also what 
the evidence does not satisfactorily determine and 
which I think may nevertheless be true.
He explained further that there were some matters in which 'all
I can say is that I am not satisfied on the evidence that the
allegation is true. Such a finding is not intended to be, and
must not be taken to be, equivalent to a finding of "not
guilty"'. The Introduction also showed that Lowe was prepared
to accept Sharpley's evidence only to a very limited extent.
... I have not acted on Sharpley's evidence to prove 
any allegation except where I find it admitted or not 
denied by the persons affected, or corroborated by other 
evidence ... which I accept, or where I think the 
circumstances are much more in favour of the truth than 
the untruth of his story.^
5. A g e, 7 March 1950.
6. Sun, 1 May 1950.
7. Age, 1 May 1950.
8. It comprises 107 pages of findings, plus appendices.
9. Report, p. 7.
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It is clear from the body of the Report that he felt far less 
sceptical about the credibility of the other ex-Communists; 
Rawling's evidence in particular was the sole basis of quite a 
large number of his findings about Communist Party practice.
On matters of doctrine and theoretical objectives, Lowe 
seemed to rely heavily on the Communist texts and on the 
testimony of the principal Party witnesses in preference to 
that of the anti-Communist witnesses. Wherever possible, he 
allowed the evidence to 'speak for itself', quoting the 
arguments of Communist and assisting Counsel without interposing 
his own comment. In the 'Summary of Findings' at the end of 
the Report he was forced naturally enough to indicate his 
conclusions, but he warned that these should only be read in 
conjunction with the more detailed discussion in the Report. 
'Read alone, they give a starkness of outline and a seeming 
simplicity where the truth embodied in the findings in often 
complex and sometimes not absolute but only relative to the 
circumstances.'^
The most striking feature of the Report was its 
dispassionate tone, entirely out of keeping with the 
sensationalism promoted by public exponents of anti­
communism. While not always exonerating the Party, the 
majority of Lowe's findings were both mild and inconclusive. 
Approximately one third of the Report dealt with basically 
'neutral' evidence such as the origins and organisational 
basis of the Party; on controversial issues, only a very few 
of his comments were in agreement with the propositions about 
the Party put forward in assisting Counsel's case. Mr. Sholl,
R e p o r t, p. 104. This recognition of the complexity of 
his subject carried into the area of language, the Report 
having a section on 'Special Sense of Words Used - 
Capitalism, the State, Dictatorship, Imperialism'.
(p. 17)
10.
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one suspects, must have regarded the Royal Commission as one 
of his less successful cases.11
Lowe found, for instance, that there was no evidence
to show that the A.C.P. was controlled from abroad, although
its policy was 'in harmony' with that of the Cominform. Funds
came from various local sources, but there was no evidence
that they came from overseas. The Party did not hold itself
bound to obey laws which it regarded as oppressive, or
restrictive of its efforts to overthrow the existing system.
It was in fact, said Lowe, 'prepared to use any means to
achieve what it thinks to be a desirable object, so long as
it regards the means as fitting and the result as not on the
whole disadvantageous'. On the Party's industrial policy, he
concluded that 'where strikes have occurred under Communist
leadership or influence, the purpose has been really, in the
first place, to gain the advantages sought in the men's
demands. I think, however, that the leaders of the Communist
Party at any rate have never lost sight of what they consider
are the further advantages of giving training to the strikers
in concerted action against the employers and of striking one
further blow at the capitalist system'. Lowe found that the
Party had dislocated or disrupted industrial production and
essential services, but noted its claim that this effect
was only a concomitant to the struggle to obtain better
conditions for the workers. He found no evidence of any
Party member 'who is or was an officer either of the
Education Department or of any School or of the University
using his position for purposes of indoctrination in 
12Communism'.
11. In a letter to me dated 4 October 1971, Eric Butler, 
Director of the Australian League of Rights, suggests 
that Sholl was not happy with the Report. He writes:
'When the late Vladimir Borin, former Czechoslavakian 
Communist leader, was living in Australia, I had him 
look at the report produced by the Victorian Commission, 
and he was rather critical, charging that those 
responsible clearly did not understand Marxism-Leninism.
I think you will find that Sir Reginald Sholl will agree 
with this'.
When interviewed on this point, Sholl said he was 
satisfied with the Report - his response may, of course, 
have been dictated by professional etiquette, since he 
is still in the legal profession.
12. This is by no means a comprehensive survey of Lowe's 
findings. I have merely set out those concerning some of 
the more contentious issues which arose in the Commission.
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One of the sections in the Report most revealing of 
Lowe's modification of Mr. Sholl's propositions was that 
dealing with the Party's revolutionary aims and the 'Means and 
Stages by which C.P. Aims to Achieve its Objective'. During 
investigation of this subject in the Commission, Lowe 
constantly tried to arrive at a restatement of Sholl's 
propositions in a form which the Communist witnesses would 
accept; and it is clear from the Report that he usually accepted 
them himself in their modified form. Thus, on the question of 
the role of the Communist Party in achieving revolution,
Sholl's phrase 'to teach [the proletariat] the need of the 
seizure of power through revolution' became in Lowe's finding 
'to teach them the need of obtaining power through revolution' 
and Sholl's 'to train them to use violent means for this 
purpose' became 'to train them in the means of obtaining 
power'. This latter modification did not mean that Lowe 
rejected the idea that violence would be a part of the 
Communist revolution; in fact he found that, in the Party's 
objectives, 'if the present [ruling class] do not abdicate 
power voluntarily, they will be violently overthrown'. But 
he did not find any evidence that the Party trained its 
members to use violence, as alleged by Sholl.
Further modifications of assisting Counsel's 
phraseology occurred on the issue of Communist methods of 
achieving revolution. Sholl's 'control' of the unions became 
'leadership of and influence in' the unions; and 'the 
production thereby of a revolutionary situation in which the 
Government can no longer govern and the masses are perplexed 
and ready to follow the C.P. lead' was altered to read 'the 
leadership of the masses in a revolutionary situation when the 
Government can no longer govern and the masses are ready to fol­
low the Communist lead'. Finally, the 'forcible suppression and 
expropriation of all class enemies' became the 'forcible supp­
ression and expropriation of the owning class who have resisted1.
Throughout the Report, Lowe paid attention to the 
question of timing when considering the Communist revolution.
He had no doubt that the Party aimed to overthrow the present 
form of government (by force if necessary) 'when a 
revolutionary situation arises'; but he accepted that until 
that time, it was willing to use the existing institutions to 
promote more immediate aims.
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'Indeed, it is on the successful operation of the 
existing system for the workers' benefit that it relies to 
maintain, consolidate and extend its influence over the working 
class.' Lowe could obtain no precise indication of when a 
revolutionary situation might be expected to develop, and he 
noted that 'indefiniteness of time seems inherent in the 
authoritative exposition of revolutionary crisis by Lenin 
himself'.
The circumstances of the Report's release suggest
that Premier Hollway was in considerable haste to have the
findings publicised. Lowe handed in the Report with several
appendices still to be finalised, and the following day,
Saturday 29 April, Hollway provided the Herald with this
incomplete document in time for it to go to press the same
afternoon. Thus the Herald, which had 'scooped' the Sharpley
story, scooped the Commission's findings too. A section of
the Premier's Department worked throughout the weekend to have
copies of the Report ready for distribution to other newspapers
13and members of Parliament on the Monday. Subsequently, Lowe 
found it necessary to request the circulation of an addendum 
to the recipients of these copies, making 78 amendments to the 
text, and disclaiming responsibility for underlining which 
emphasised some of the findings more unfavourable to the 
Communist Party. 'It must be noted that much of the under­
lining in the ronoed copies has been added by some person 
other than the Commissioner and that the emphasis resulting 
from such underlining should be ignored.' These events 
provided the Victorian Opposition with an opportunity to 
howl with indignation. They complained that a copy of the 
Report had been prepared by the Premier 'with extreme haste 
for the benefit of one Melbourne newspaper', and demanded to 
know who had been responsible for the 'tampering' with Lowe's 
findings.^
13. Age, 2 May 1950.
14. An officer of the Premier's Department later told the Press 
the underlinings had been made by a Press-man 'for 
reference purposes' on a copy of the Report which had then 
been used by typists for the purpose of making further 
copies. Age, 6 May 1950.
15. Argus, 5 May 1950; Age, 6 May 1950.
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The Victorian public remained ignorant of the
essentially mild Lone of the Report, for the daily Press
sought in general to present it as a complete vindication of
its anti-Communist campaign. Through careful choice of
headlines and emphasis in their coverage of the findings,
it managed to lend them an aura of drama which was certainly
not present in the original. A Sun editorial summed up the
Report's significance thus: 'It constitutes a damning
indictment of the activities of a body of men enjoying the
advantages of the Australian way of life while plotting to
overthrow the country's established institutions and to
16sabotage its industrial machinery'. The Herald thought the
Report would convince most Australians that Communism was
17their 'implacable enemy'. The exception to this style of
comment was to be found in the reports of the Argus which,
perhaps because of anti-Herald sentiments, gave considerable
prominence to those matters where Lowe concluded that an
allegation against the Party had not been proven, and to his
unfavourable remarks about Sharpley's credibility, which it
19quoted in full.
According to the Communist Press, Lowe's findings 
vindicated the case put forward by Party Counsel at the 
Commission, and repudiated the claims of public anti-Communist 
propaganda. The Guardian expressed some qualified praise of 
Lowe. 'There are some curious examples of misunderstanding by 
the Judge, which demonstrate the difficulty of a person in his 
position, with no working class experience, having the job of 
investigating such a matter. On the other hand, some of the 
Report reveals a penetratingly accurate analysis of the 
position.'20 Here the Party had an ideological explanation 
for those findings which went against it, an advantage which
16. Sun, 1 May 1950.
17. Herald, 1 May 1950. The same kind of exaggeration of 
the meaning of the findings can be found in Lowe's 
biography by Newman Rosenthal, who refers to them as 
showing the Communist Party's 'indoctrination of 
individuals, and its subversion of industrial and social 
institutions'. Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 134.
18. This is the interpretation given by Ralph Gibson in My 
Year in the Communist Party, p. 155.
19. Argus, 5 May 1950.
20. Guardian, 5 May 1950, p. 6.
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the anti-Communist Press did not share in their own 
interpretative effort. Where the latter was unable to make 
Lowe's findings amount to the 'damning indictment' desired, 
it accounted for the moderate tone in terms of Lowe's 
scrupulous application of the normal rules of evidence - his 
tendency, in other words, to give the Communists the benefit 
of the doubt if the evidence did not constitute strict legal 
proof. The Press of both sides exaggerated the findings to 
confirm their own viewpoint, yet considering their original 
expectations, the Communist Party was probably better pleased 
than the sponsors of anti-Communism with the outcome of the 
Royal Commission.
The most interesting aspect of the release of Lowe's 
findings was the way in which it coincided to within the space 
of a day with the introduction of Federal anti-Communist 
legislation. While the Commission had sat, a new Liberal 
Government had taken office in Canberra, and while Lowe had 
worked on his Report, Mr. Menzies and his advisors had been 
simultaneously engaged in devising a law which would put into 
effect his pre-election promise to ban the Communist Party in 
Australia. Apparently in January 1950 when Federal Cabinet 
first met to discuss the proposed legislation, there was some 
suggestion that action should be delayed until the Victorian 
Royal Commissioner had made his Report. The suggestion was 
rejected, according to the Herald 'because the Commission is 
expected to sit until about April, and Ministers realise that 
the longer the ban is delayed, the more time Communists will 
have to move underground'. But problems in drafting the 
anti-Communist law, particularly the outspoken opposition in 
the Labour movement to the likely provision for the exclusion 
of Communists from trade union office, meant that Menzies'
Bill was itself not ready for presentation until April. Its 
preamble, a sensational declaration of the current menace to 
Australian security and industrial welfare represented by the 
Communist Party, made claims about the nature of Communist 
activities which were almost identical to the 'allegations'
21. Herald, 2 January 1950, p. 3.
206
9 9contained in the Royal Commission's terms of reference.
Why, when it was publicly known that the release of the 
findings was imminent, did Mr. Menzies not wait another 24 
hours to discover the conclusions of a Judge who had spent a 
full nine months hearing evidence on the matter?22 whatever 
the reason, his blithe disregard for the value of Lowe's 
exertions was symptomatic of the fate of the Report in the 
coming controversy over Menzies' anti-Communist programme.
The findings of the Commission were not the 'abundant 
justification' for Menzies' state of emergency that some 
political commentators would have them.2  ^ Menzies himself 
saw, if other members of his Party did not, that their very 
sober nature could not be of great use to him in his attempt 
to convince Parliament that the A.C.P. endangered the security 
of the nation. In his second reading speech on the Bill, he 
referred to a 1948 report of the U.S. Committee on Foreign
22. The Preamble to the Bill, apart from alleging that the 
Party engaged in espionage and treason, declared that it 
would seize power as a revolutionary minority, that it 
sought to attain its ends by force, fraud or intimidation, 
and engaged in activities designed to dislocate, disrupt 
or retard production in vital industries.Communist Party Dissolution Bill, introduced in the House 
of Representatives by the Prime Minister, 27 April 1950. 
C-P-D. , VOI. 307, XI A p r i l  mo, pp. I994--ÄOÖ7
In dealing with the similarities of subject matter between 
the Commission's findings and the Preamble to the Bill,
Brian Fitzpatrick remarks: 'The unprejudiced reader ...
is virtually forced to infer either that one-quarter or 
one-third of the Australian Communist Party membership 
which is resident in the State of Victoria is utterly 
unrepresentative of the party and that the Crown witnesses 
from other States were uninformed of any criminal activities 
by Communists there, or else that the Commonwealth 
Government has declared an emergency which does not exist, 
sees infamous criminality where there has been in fact 
but political and industrial opposition - vexatious, 
because effective'.
B.C. Fitzpatrick, The Unnecessary Police State Bill, 
Australian Council for Civil Liberties, Melbourne 1950, 
pp. 9-10.
23. In view of the extraordinary coincidence of timing, it is 
difficult to avoid the suspicion that Menzies had received 
inside information that Lowe's Report would not be of 
great assistance to the passage of his Bill, and that he 
had accordingly decided to 'get in first'.
24. Both Premier Hollway and H.E. Holt, M.H.R., made Press 
statements to the effect that the Report confirmed the 
recitals of the C.P. Dissolution Bill. H e r a l d, 29 April 
1950; A g e, 1 May 1950.
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Affairs - 'The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism' - and 
to the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Espionage, 
but he declined to quote from Commissioner Lowe's findings on 
the Communist position in Australia, or even to make mention 
of his inquiry. The Lowe Report may nevertheless have been of 
advantage to Menzies in the creation of a public atmosphere 
favourable to drastic action against the Communists, because 
on the whole the Press gave a slant to the findings which 
made them seem quite as alarming as the situation outlined in 
the preamble to the Bill.
In Melbourne, proximity of the State Election added 
more controversy to the release of the Report than would other­
wise have been the case, considering that its public impact 
had been eclipsed to a large extent by the presentation of the 
Communist Party Bill the previous day. At election meetings 
it was a major point of discussion, with L.C.P. candidates 
seeking to underline its importance and the Opposition seeking 
to belittle it. Predictably, Labour leader John Cain asserted 
that the Government's release of the Report had been carefully 
timed to distract attention from its 'dismal record of 
hopeless mismanagement of the affairs of State and from the 
personal conflicts within the Liberal Party and the Cabinet'. 
Much argument centred on whether or not Communism was in fact 
an issue in the Election. Premier Hollway appeared to be 
disenchanted with the suggestion by the Argus that Menzies'
Bill had shifted the debate into the Federal arena, and that
9  f iit was now a 'dead issue' for Victorian electors.
Interest declined rapidly after the Hollway 
Government was returned to office on 13 May; and the focus 
of attention was soon directed squarely onto the Parliamentary 
debate in Canberra. On the whole, despite their sensational 
interpretation of the findings, neither politicians nor Press 
expressed an urgent demand for any Government action on the 
Report. The call by Mr. Keon, M.L.A., for action on the 1948 
B.W.I.U. ballot (made while the Commission was still sitting) 
went unheeded; ^  and the Victorian Opposition Leader's 
reiteration of his request for the introduction of the 1948
25. Age, 3 May 1950.
26. Argus, 5 May 1950.
27. V.P.D., vo1. 231, 19 October 1949, p. 2968.
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legislation against Communists had lost most of its sting 
since the formulation of a Federally-based bill. Speakers 
for the Labour Party in the Victorian Elections did not 
believe that action by the Hollway Government was a possibility 
worthy of consideration: they had branded the Commission
as a political 'stunt" whose significance for Mr. Hollway 
ended with his electoral victory. Before the Election 
Hollway promised that Communists in the State Public Service 
would be dismissed as an immediate result of the Commission's 
Report;^8 and his Attorney-General, ignoring one of Lowe's 
most definite findings, told a public audience at the Malvern 
Town Hall that Communists 'should not be allowed to serve in 
juries, in the University or in the teaching s e r v i c e s ' B u t  
these sentiments faded along with election-time excitement. No 
person or organisation was prosecuted, no protective law was 
recommended or considered by Parliament. And no newspaper or 
political party voiced any complaint about the inactivity.
Lowe's Report slipped into an obscurity which nothing, 
it seemed, could alter. It was scarcely mentioned by the 
opponents of the Communist Party Dissolution Bill, either in 
the Parliamentary debate, or during the 1951 Referendum 
campaign when Menzies sought a popular mandate for the 
Constitutional powers necessary for him to make his Bill law. 
L.C. Webb in his Communism and Democracy in Australia observes 
that the disregard of the Report by campaign leaders and 
newspapers was 'a revealing commentary on the atmosphere of 
referendum campaigns'.^  More than this, however, it was a 
meaningful comment on the nature of Lowe's findings. The 
Report, a document which according to Webb should have been a 
'valuable aid to those seeking to assess the significance of 
Communist activity in Australia',31 had to be overlooked by the 
Bill's supporters because it failed to conform to their
28. Argus, 1 May 1950.
29. Age, 2 May 1950.
30. L.C. Webb, Communism and Democracy in Australia - A Survey 
of the 1951 Referendum (Melbourne 1954), p . \J
31. I b i d, p . 14 .
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picture of a political party which threatened the survival of 
Australian democratic institutions. In the Australian 
political environment of the early 1950's, no respectable 
person would dare to argue that the Communist Party was a 
political force of such insignificant proportions that it 
could be discounted; Mr. Menzies' opponents did not really want 
to question his assumptions about it. In the Parliamentary 
debate on the Bill its Preamble was not an issue; Labour 
speakers were willing to argue only against certain arbitrary 
provisions which they claimed violated the fundamental rightso pof citizens under common law. Likewise, during the Referendum, 
'No' campaigners were intent to oppose Menzies' methods rather 
than to question seriously the dangers of Communism. Thus the 
only source of opposition to the Bill which found the Lowe 
Report useful to their cause was the Communist Party itself, 
which quoted his findings as proof of its own political 
respectability. 3^
Nor did the dramatic advent of the Petrov Conspiracy 
and the 1954 Royal Commission on Espionage do much to revive 
memories of the Victorian inquiry into Communism. The Petrov 
Commissioners themselves may have made use of Lowe's Report:
32. See Fitzpatrick, The Unnecessary Police State Bill, pp. 
16-19; H.M. Storey, 'The Anti-Communist Bill in the House 
of Representatives', Australian Quarterly vol. 22, no. 2 
(June 1950), p. 22.
33. In his final radio broadcast during the Referendum
campaign, Sir Arthur Fadden did make a reference to the 
Royal Commission Report. He spoke of a Communist Party 
pamphlet, produced for the campaign: 'It is shot through
with the most improbable of fraudulent assertions. It 
states, for example, that Sir Charles Lowe, Royal 
Commissioner appointed by the Victorian Government to 
investigate Communist activities, reported that "there was 
no sabotage, no espionage, no treason, no strikes prompted 
or inspired by Communists for the purpose of disrupting 
industry or essential services". As every intelligent 
voter knows, the reverse was the case'.
See M.H. Ellis Collection, National Library of Australia. 
This is the only reference to the Report by a supporter of 
the Bill that I have been able to unearth. Articles in 
the Australian Quarterly at the time, chiefly critical of 
the Bill, likewise make no mention of the Commission's 
findings.
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Newman Rosenthal claims that they found it 'invaluable1 as a 
checklist of names of Australian Communists.^  But there was 
little comment of a public nature on the earlier Commission. 
During the course of Menzies' negotiations with the Judiciary 
in quest of three Judges to act as Commissioners for the 
Petrov affair, the Press suggested that Mr. Justice Sholl would 
be a likely choice in view of his experience 'in this type of 
Commission';^  but nowhere was a comparison made between the 
current political situation, and that which Lowe had found to 
exist in 1949.
The controversial nature of the Petrov proceedings
did mean, however, that public attention was re-drawn to Lowe's
mode of conducting the 1949 inquiry. In the House of
Representatives debate on the Petrov Commission in October 1955,
Dr. Evatt referred to Lowe's approach as contrasting favourably
with the conduct of the later one. Brian Fitzpatrick, too, in
a pamphlet critical of procedures in the Espionage inquiry,
applauded the conduct of the Victorian inquiry. 'The
atmosphere of [Lowe's| courtroom was different: the precincts
were not littered with Security men, and although one perceived
that Sharpley's sponsors were sternly resolved to defame as
many left-wingers as might be, at the same time one did not
17suspect the Commissioner of righteous indignation'.
In the same pamphlet, Fitzpatrick, who probably felt 
a degree of personal bitterness, noted the damage done by both 
the 1949 and 1954 Royal Commissions 'to institutions, citizens,
O Oand accepted personal rights and standards of social ethics'.
In the case of the Victorian inquiry, an interesting comment on 
its capacity to damage is offered in the behaviour of Patrick 
Kennelly, M.L.C.: as already noted, he made a statement to
Parliament alleging the innocuousness of the evidence being 
presented to the Commissioner, and yet it was only three days
34. Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 135. Dr. John Burton, in the A.B.C. 
television documentary on Evatt ('Like a Summer Storm') 
seems to confirm Rosenthal on this.
35. Age, 27 April 1954, p. 3.
36. c . p . D . , vol .  H.oP.R. 8 ,  I? October  p
37. Fitzpatrick, The Royal Commission on Espionage, p. 5. See
also W.J. Brown, The Petrov Conspiracy Unmasked, (Sydney 
1956), p. 133: 'Mr. Justice Lowe ... stands out in
shining contrast to the Petrov Commissioners'.
38. Ibid.
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earlier that he had announced the A.L.P.'s intention of 
withdrawing John Bennett from its election campaign because 
he had featured in that evidence. A mood of fear and suspicion 
was beginning to grip the community, one sign of which was the 
sense of urgency conveyed by people who wrote to the Press 
seeking to dissociate themselves from persons of the same name 
who were mentioned at the Commission. The external political 
environment was sufficiently hostile that having any connection 
with the inquiry could harm individuals and organisations 
irrespective of Lowe's efforts to ensure that proceedings 
followed judicial lines.
The story of the Commission is thus a two-sided coin: 
on the one hand it concerns the events inside the courtroom, 
where Lowe's legalistic approach to the evidence and his 
protective impulse towards accused witnesses prevented the 
inquiry from developing into a witch-hunt; on the other hand, 
it concerns the outside effects of the proceedings, something 
altogether different. Communist Counsel Ted Laurie has said 
that in the Party's opinion the only serious injustice it 
suffered during the Commission was at the hands of the Press.^ 
It was the publicity given by newspapers to the accusations 
of anti-Communist witnesses which translated a fairly-conducted 
inquiry into an instrument disruptive of the personal lives 
and careers of individual citizens.
It is difficult to obtain a comprehensive picture of 
the effects of the Commission in this respect; much of the 
story remains unknown except to the friends and associates of 
affected persons - many of whom have no desire to re-publicise 
their injuries. The real extent of the impact on Melbourne's 
community can only be guessed at through the isolated examples 
which have come to light, such as those already referred to: 
the sacking of suspected Communist journalists, and the fact 
that certain Labour Party men were deprived of their 
opportunity to stand as candidates in the Federal Election. 
During the Commission's proceedings, the Herald published a 
photograph of the 'Toorak home' of a woman whom the inquiry was 
told had contributed to Communist Party funds; later, the 
windows of the house were smashed by 'hooligans'.^  Ted Laurie,
39. Interview with Ted Laurie, Melbourne, 11 October 1971.
40. Herald, 23 June 1949; Guardian 4 August 1949.
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who spent the better part of a year conducting the Communist 
case in the Commission, found subsequently that no Melbourne 
solicitor was willing to brief him. A businessman named as a
Communist Party 'contact1 lost a valuable contract with G.J.
41Coles, and had to reconstruct his business in another name.
After allegations were made at the Commission about the 
Communist affiliations of members of the Victorian State School 
Committees' Association, its President told the Press that the 
organisation had subsequently 'lost' these members. Some 
witnesses appearing at the inquiry to answer allegations, 
testified to the fact that their careers had suffered as a 
result of being named; Keith Eden, for instance, a member of 
Actors' Equity, claimed that he had been 'victimised' in his 
job as a radio actor. 3^
On a less tangible plane, Mean jin's troubles with its 
Printer^ were perhaps symptomatic of a general contraction of 
the cultural and intellectual horizons in Melbourne, and indeed 
Australia. Many 'liberal' and left-wing writers saw the 
Commission as representing a mood of political intolerance and 
narrow-mindedness which was increasingly permeating Australian 
cultural life at the end of the 1940's; some of them, finding 
their creative talent oppressed, or even simply unable to get 
jobs, departed the country. This atmosphere is well depicted 
in George Johnston's novel Clean Straw for Nothing, where a 
journalist, 'suspect for the extreme liberalism of his political 
views' was sacked from his position on a leading Sydney newspaper 
after the editor received two anonymous telephone calls giving 
fictional accounts of the journalist's undercover activites on 
behalf of the Communist Party. '... it was a time of prevalent 
suspicion, and almost any nonconformity was suspect; these were 
a people disillusioned and disturbed and somebody had to be
41. Interviews with Ted Laurie, Melbourne, 1 June 1971 and 11 
October 1971. Laurie seemed reluctant to provide me with 
other examples of people adversely affected by the 
proceedings, although he assured me that there were many 
such cases.
42. Herald, 27 September 1949, p. 9.
43. RCT. 6076.
44. See Chapter 1, p. 30, footnote 45.
45. This is based on contributions made in a seminar given by 
me at the Australian National University on 10 December 
1971 - particularly on information provided by Dr. R. 
Gollan and Professor C.M.H. Clark.
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blamed for what was going wrong: it was a time of irresponsible
accusations and superficial examinations ...1, writes 
Johnston.48 The Commission, of course, was only one 
manifestation of this thrust against un-Australianism.
The Communist Party bore the brunt of the Commission's 
effects, although the downward swing in its fortunes from 1949 
onwards was only partially a result of the proceedings. True, 
the Party was stimulated to more vigorous political activity 
by the general anti-Communist offensive, and by the Commission 
in particular; and according to Rex Mortimer 'some gains were 
registered among militant workers and left-wing democrats' as 
a result.4  ^ But this was probably much outweighed by the 
damage inflicted on the Party through the public identification 
of a large number of Communists and their sympathisers. The 
Party probably felt that its forcible exposure at the inquiry 
brought much closer the threat of dissolution through anti- 
Communist legislation. In The Hard Way, Frank Hardy describes 
the atmosphere in the Party as bordering on panic, claiming that 
its leaders had received information that 'some frame-up might 
be attempted to prop up the shaky edifice Sharpley had tried 
to build', such as a plant of arms and ammunition, perhaps at 
the Eureka Youth Camp. Hardy himself apparently feared that 
Sharpley would inform the Security Police about the manuscripts 
of his near-completed Power Without Glory, which he accordingly 
hid.48
It is a hard task, and probably an unnecessary one, 
to isolate the Commission's detrimental effects on the Party 
from those which were a result of the wider situation of 
political polarisation in the late 1940's, in which the 
Communists were pursuing increasingly 'leftist' policies, and 
the governmental response was becoming correspondingly harsh. 
During this period the Party began to lose a substantial part 
of its middle-class membership, and other 'respectable' under­
cover members and suporters distanced themselves from its
46. George Johnston, Clean Straw for Nothing (Fontana 1971), pp. 78-80.
47. R. Mortimer to V. Rastrick, 30 January 1972.
48. Frank Hardy, The Hard Way (London 1961), pp. 122-3.
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activities.^ In his biography of Ben Chifley, L.F. Crisp 
writes: the 1949 Coal Strike was a turning of the tide
for Communism in Australia. Coupled with the educational 
value of the Victorian Royal Commission on Communism of the 
same year, it really alerted many unionists, perhaps for the 
first time, to the need for real resistance'. The 
Commission's proceedings, if not the Report, were doubtless 
'educational' in the sense implied: they gave considerable
publicity to Communist activities in the industrial sphere; 
and the Industrial Groupers used Sharpley's union allegations 
extensively in their propaganda during the early 1950's. 5 
But Crisp is correct in claiming the major cause of the 
Grouper offensive and the resulting set backs in Communist 
trade union influence to be the Party's strike tactics of 
1948-49, which alienated much of its rank and file support.
The first important Industrial Group victory was in the 
Ironworkers' Union in 1950, and had no direct connection with 
the Commission, since the ballot issue arose mainly in N.S.W.
The impact of the Lowe inquiry in the battle for the trade 
unions, such as it was, derived principally from the 
juxtaposition of the proceedings against the simultaneous 
occurrence of the Coal Strike and other instances of 'Communist- 
inspired' union aggression. Press publicity given to the 
testimony of Sharpley and his supporters merely underlined for 
the public benefit the essential correctness of the stand 
being made by anti-Communists in the unions.
The major impact of the Commission, however, was not 
upon committed anti-Communists, within the unions or without, 
but on the political Left. Evidence against the Party which 
was publicised in the proceedings certainly came as a shock 
to many of its fringe supporters; and in particular, to those
49. See A. Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia (Hoover
Institution Studies 1969) Chap. 5"; Introduction of John 
Playford's P.H.D. thesis, Doctrinal and Strategic Problems 
of the Communist Party of Australia, 1945-62. (A.N.U.)
50. L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley (Melbourne, 1961), p. 366.
51. In a letter to me dated 2 March 1972 , B.A. Santamaria 
said that Sharpley's allegations (as contained in his 
booklet I Was a Communist Leader) were 'extensively read' 
by National Civic Council members, upon whom they made a 
'deep impression'. The Commission's findings, on the 
other hand, 'were not regarded as giving great assistance. 
They served to publicly identify a number of C.P.A. 
members, but for most of those engaged in the fight in the
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'liberal-minded' citizens who, while not actually sympathetic 
to communism, had long accepted an image of Australian 
Communists as selfless idealists, pure if misguided in their 
motives, and dedicated to securing a fair deal for the 
workers.^ Lowe's Report was inconclusive on many points, 
but his finding that the ballot-rigging charge in the B.W.I.U. 
was proven, combined with 'circumstances of suspicion' in a 
number of others, must have severely shaken the Party's moral 
authority within the Left, so carefully won during a decade 
of Communist hegemony in the unions. After the Commission, 
it became very difficult for the Party to promote itself 
successfully as the guardian of working class interests. The 
evidence had suggested that like other political organisations 
it was concerned with power, and that it was prepared to use 
underhand means to achieve it - a disturbing revelation to 
many Left-wingers already disenchanted with Communist 
industrial policies. Thus, by helping to isolate the Party 
from its fringe support, the Commission can be seen as an 
important contributing factor in the diminution of Communist 
strength in Australian politics after 1949.
On another level of the community altogether, the 
attitudes of the Victorian Supreme Court may have been affected 
by its experience with the Communism inquiry. Brian Fitzpatrick, 
stating the position in strong terms, believed that the 
Australian Judiciary was 'notable among the sufferers' of both 
the 1949 and 1954 Commissions. It had come in for a 
considerable amount of criticism, he said, because the four 
Judges involved lent themselves to political inquisitions
5 3against the will and counsel of many of their colleagues.
Whether Lowe and his fellow Judges were disturbed by the 
political controversy engendered by the 1949 proceedings cannot
51. cont.
unions, these persons were already known'. In his chapter 
'The Movement; 1941-60 - An Outline' Henry Mayer (ed.) 
Catholics and the Free Society (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1961)
Santamaria used Sharpley's pamphlet for five of his 
thirty-seven footnotes.
52. Based on the contributions made by D.W. Rawson in seminar, 
10 December 1971, Australian National University.
53. Fitzpatrick, op. cit.
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be known, but certainly a hardening of the Supreme Court's 
attitude to Royal Commissions was evidenced in the following 
years. In 1952 it adopted a resolution which expressly 
disapproved of the practice of a Supreme Court Judge 
participating in such an inquiry except when it concerned a 
matter of 'national importance arising in times of national 
emergency'. The resolution provided that if a Judge was asked 
to act as a Commissioner, 'he will not commit himself to 
accede to the request before he has reported the facts and 
they have been considered by a meeting of the Judges'.“^  The 
Court apparently did not consider the Petrov affair as coming 
within their understanding of a national emergency, because 
it refused to provide a Commissioner in response to the 
Federal Government's request, and forced Mr. Menzies to look 
to other States for his investigators of Communist espionage.
In spite of Ernest Lawn's claim that Lowe had no objection 
to acting on Royal Commissions,-^ one wonders whether the 
Communist Party inquiry, his last, proved to be too close to 
the 'mire of party politics' for his liking - or indeed, to 
that still more perilous morass, the anti-Communist witch-hunt.
This brings us in conclusion to the most intriguing 
and seminal question raised by Lowe's Commission: why did it
present such a marked contrast with the style of proceedings 
of its prototype in America, and its later Australian counter­
part, the Petrov Commission? The ingredients for a witch-hunt 
seemed to be present: the public temper in Australia in 1949
was probably as intensely anti-Communist as at any time before 
or since; there was apparently no shortage of witnesses 
willing to accuse the Party publicly; and the legal counsel 
chosen to present the case 'for the Crown' were all strong 
opponents of Communism. Why then did the Commission fail to 
make that thorough search and exposure of Communists and their 
Left-wing friends that so many anti-Communists at the time 
considered necessary? Why were defendants at the inquiry 
treated like 'good citizens and good Australians'?
Everything seems to point to the conclusion, already
54.
55.
See Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 95. 
See chap. 2, p. 67.
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suggested at several stages in this thesis, that the influence 
exerted by Commissioner Lowe was paramount. The Hollway 
Government may have appointed Lowe as its specific choice for 
the position, but once the latter had received his Commission, 
the Government could play no further part in determining the 
nature of the inquiry. And as Commissioner, Lowe enjoyed a 
total discretion in deciding what would happen within his 
courtroom, for he was circumscribed by rules of neither 
procedure nor evidence. The manner in which assisting Counsel 
chose to pursue their case against the Party contributed to 
the relatively gentle atmosphere, but one is left with the 
impression that their reticence in compelling the attendance 
of political suspects was a product of their understanding 
that in a Commission modelled so closely on judicial principles, 
the amount of damning evidence they were likely to extract 
would not justify the time and effort involved in the 
examination of such witnesses. It is a possibility worthy of 
consideration that Lowe's legalistic approach, and his 
antipathy to the rough-handling of witnesses, accorded with 
assisting Counsel's own idea of proper procedure for the 
inquiry. But a careful reading of the Transcript reveals that 
it was Lowe, not Mr. Sholl, who checked their witnesses from 
over-indulging in hearsay evidence and the 'naming of names'; 
and in the case of the Communist and 'fellow-traveller' 
witnesses, assisting Counsel showed a preference for an 
intimidatory line of interrogation which Lowe on occasion saw 
fit to caution. Furthermore, it was Lowe who laid the basis 
for a judicial style of proceedings by granting the Communist 
Party the right to defence counsel with freedom to present a 
separate case, and by giving accused witnesses the right to 
answer their accusers. Whatever their view of the rules 
adopted, assisting Counsel were obliged to observe them if they 
wanted the Commissioner's ear for their arguments against 
Communism.
Lowe's success in conducting an inquiry which avoided 
the excesses of a political inquisition was in large part a 
product of his deep-seated respect for the judicial process.
But one should not overlook the effects of his personal 
character: a fundamental humanity, which enabled him to treat
Communist Counsel and their witnesses as ordinary citizens
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rather than political suspects; and an ironic sense of humour, 
which was so often exercised to ease the tension between 
opposing sides.
Granted that the Sharpley revelations were less 
explosive than those of Petrov, one still wonders whether the 
outcome of the Victorian Commission might have been vastly 
different had it been conducted by Commissioners of the 
calibre of Justices Owen, Ligertwood and Philp, and had 
Security chosen to involve itself minutely in the preparation 
and presentation of the evidence. It remains for another to 
undertake an analysis of the differences which the personal 
approach of the Commissioners and the role of A.S.I.O. made 
in the case of the Petrov inquiry. It is to be hoped that 
this study has paved the way for that most vital of tasks in 
twentieth-century Australian history.
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APPENDIX (A)
An Act relating to a Royal Commission to inquire 
into and report upon the Origins, Aims, Objects and Funds of 
the Communist Party in Victoria and the Operations and 
Activities in Victoria of that Party and Members thereof and 
Organizations and Persons associated therewith.
[l9th May, 1949 .j
Be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty by and 
with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and 
the Legislative Assembly of Victoria in this present 
Parliament assembled and by the authority of the same as 
follows (that is to say):-
1. This Act may be cited as the Royal Commission 
(Communist Party) Act 1949.
2. The Governor in Council may issue a Commission to, 
and appoint as sole commissioner, a Judge of The Supreme 
Court of the State of Victoria (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Commissioner") to inquire into and report upon the 
following matters, namely
The origins aims objects and funds of the Communist 
party in Victoria and the activities and operations in 
Victoria of that party and of members thereof and of 
organizations and persons associated therewith and, in 
particular -
(a) whether that party by its constitution or 
propaganda, or any of its members or any of 
such organizations or persons by propaganda 
or otherwise, advocates or encourages the 
overthrow by force or violence of established 
government;
(b) whether the activities or operations of that 
party or any of its members or any of such 
organisations or persons are or have been 
designed to effect or accomplish, or are or
have been directed at effecting or accomplishing - 
(i) the overthrow or disruption of 
representative or democratic 
institutions;
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(ii) the subversion of law and order;
(iii) the attainment of social economic 
industrial or political ends by 
force violence intimidation or 
fraudulent practices;
(iv) the dislocation or disruption of
services safeguarding, or essential 
to the maintenance of, the life 
health and welfare of the community;
(v) the dislocation disruption or
retardation of industrial production;
(vi) the indoctrination of children and 
young people with beliefs or ideas 
calculated or likely to result in 
activities and operations of the 
nature hereinbefore referred to.
3. (1) For the purposes of and in relation to the inquiry
and report aforesaid the Commissioner shall have all such 
powers rights and privileges as are vested in The Supreme 
Court of the State of Victoria or any Judge thereof in or in 
relation to any action or trial, and particularly in respect 
of -
(a) compelling the attendance of witnesses;
(b) compelling witnesses to answer questions 
which the Commissioner deems to be relevant 
to the inquiry;
(c) compelling the production of books documents 
and writings;
(d) punishing persons guilty of contempt or of 
disobedience of any order or summons made or 
issued by the Commissioner -
and any order of the Commissioner shall be executed by the 
proper officer of The Supreme Court of the State of Victoria 
as if it were an order of such Court.
(2) For the purposes of and in relation to the 
inquiry and report aforesaid the Commissioner shall have the 
same protection and immunity as a Judge of The Supreme Court 
of the State of Victoria in or in relation to any action or 
trial.
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4. (1) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed -
(a) to limit any prerogative right of the Crown; or
(b) to diminish the protection which is afforded to 
any witness before a commission under the 
Evidence Act 1928.
(2) This Act shall be read as in aid of and not in 
derogation from any Act law rule or practice relating to the 
appointment of commissioners or their powers and functions.
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APPENDIX (B)
ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Transcript 
Pages
Acheson, W.R. 9723 to
Andrews, R.E. 4347 to
Armstrong, H. 8488 to
8500 to
Baldwin, P.G. 7722 to
Barrington, C.C. 8628 to
Barter, F. 5631 to
Bell, I. 5637 to
Bennett, John E. 2298 to
Bennett, S.J. 4173 to
Bent, P.E. 4 312Ato
Bevan, J.W. 8274 to
8384 to
Blair, J.H. 3580
3616
to
Brennan, J.M. 4159 to
Brophy, J .J . 4283 to
Brown, I.M. 5626 to
Brown, J .J . 7026 to
Buckle, E. 4112 to
Burgess, D.P. 8799 to
Cameron, J.E. 6962 to
Campion, C.J. 3954 to
3986 to
Carleton, M. 4874 to
Chandler, J.C. 62 0 6Bto
9427 to
9463 to
9585 to
9652 to
Charlesworth, F.W .9645 to
9657 to
Connell, J.A. 7614 to
Constantine, L.M. 8992 to
Courtnay, F. 8453 to
8522 to
8534 to
9734 Crawford, M.M.
4362 Cresswell, W.C.
8498
8522
Crow, M.S.
7807 Cullen, A .C .
8630 Currie, N .A.
5637 Dace, S.W.
5639 Dawes, E.
2316 Dean, J.
4177 Diamond, R.
4334
8310
8310
3581 Dinnell, W. 
Dobbin, A.H.
4168
4300 Eden, K.D.G.
5627 Ellis, C.E.
7285 Ellis, M.H.
4118 Farrall, F.T.
8810
Fearn, N.F.
6965A Fitzpatrick, B.C
3967
3992 Flockart, C.P.
4887 Friend, R.G.
6226
9456 Garvey, W.H.
9582
9599 Gibson, R.S.
9653 Goller, G.M.
9651
9673
Gooding, S.
7615 Hansen, E.W.J.
9009 Hatwell, A . J .
8488 Heinze, B.W.
8527 Hellier, L.J.L.
8538 Henderson, G.B.
Transcript 
Pages
8111 to 8129
8344 to 8359
8790 to 8792
8810 to 8871
2458 to 2475
9718 to 9723
7613 to 7614
4150 to 4159
8331 to 8341
4697 to 4705
4887 to 4894
9059 to 9134
9138 to 9198
9203 to 9215
4907 to 4912
7807 to 7834
6058 to 6084
4765 to 4812
110 to 681
5980 to 5988
7167 to 7179
4363 to 4369
2325 to 2338
4515 to 4519
5731 to 5735
3096 to 3106
6284 to 6292
6441 to 6930
1598 to 1601
2475 to 2479
1552 to 1591
9784 to 9788
9599 to 9645
7614
3718 to 3903
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T ranscript 
Pages
Henry, J.E.A. 5936 to 5979
5989 to 6027
8164 to 8196
Hill, E.F. 7293 to 7561
7615 to 7630
Hollingworth, J. 3031 to 3035
Hordern, B.L.D. 5823
6258 to 6284
Hudson, Keith F. 4705 to 4765
Hudson, Kenrick,
F.V. 4575 to 4630C
Hughes, A.A. 1693 to 1741
2385 to 2387
Hunt, C.H. 4049 to 4051
4147 to 4148
Ind, A.A. 4060 to 4062
Johns, E.L. 7838 to 7888
Johnson, F.T. 8197 to 8242
Jones, B. 6226 to 6234
Junck, G. 4902 to 4906
Kennedy, P . 4812 to 4874
Kennett, R.D.W. 7986 to 3004
Kerby, N. 2879 to 2894
3035 to 3053
Kimpton, A.N. 4068 to 4074
Lannan, J.R. 4003 to 4030
L a w , H .Z . 4342 to 4346
Lazarus, J.M. 7580 to 7597
L'Estrange, L.F. 3994 to 4002
Lewis, N.G. 3586 to 3593
Lloyd, W.T. 4374 to 4515
Logan, H. 5627 to 5630
Long, C.F. 1602 to 1606
Loughnan, C.A. 2480 to 2485
Lynch, R.D. 8792 to 8799
McClintock, A.R. 8129 to 8145
8242 to 8247
MacDonald, I.C. 2269 to 2286
McEwan, J . S . 8938 to 8946
Transcript 
Pages
McGillick, T.C. 4980 to 5124
5197 to 5257
5357 to 5364
Mclnnes, M.J. 5640 to 5645
5667 to 5672
McLean, A.E. 5645 to 5664
5672 to 5730
MacLennan, D.A. 2899 to 2928
3015 to 3016
3689 to 3708
McMahon, M.J. 4300 to 4312A
McVeigh, L.T. 4052 to 4057
Malone, J.P. 8877 to 8888
8891 to 8938
9744 to 9748
Martin, J.C. 4177 to 4181
Martin, R.S.W. 5735 to 5756
Maxwell, L.R.O. 9379 to 9406
M a y , D . 9776 to 9779
Mercier, L.St.V. 5 8 8 8Ato 5890
Merrifield, S. 2439 to 2457
6143 to 6169
Meyer, F.J. 8540 to 8560
8563 to 8626
8630 to 8790
9734 to 9743
Middleton, G.C. 9655 to 9657
Miller, A . T . 4251 to 4282
Molloy, J.P. 5895 to 5896
5916 to 5927
Morgan, J. 9153 to 9154
Morris, G. 6170 to 6206B
Morrish, L.F. 4532 to 4574
Moss, C. 1628 to 1650
16 5 9Ato 1675
Moy, Dorothy 9776 to 9779
Murphy, J. 4 127Bto 4173
Musgrave, G.R. 4058 to 4060
Negline, D.B. 5757 to 5774B
8062 to 8111
Nicholls, J.P. 7602 to 7612
9753 to 9764
0'Dwyer, J.P. 2929 to 2938
3708 to 3717
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Pages
Peach, R. 4631 to 4696
Pierce, V.M. 4048 to 4049
Pitt, S.L. 5789 to 5797
5805 to 5807
8004 to 8062
Pulford, H.F. 8247 to 8249
Rawling, J.N. 2487 to 2553
2577 to 2615
2813 to 2876
3082 to 3096
3106 to 3564
Redfern, K.D. 4118 to 4128
Reed, H.J.S. 3624 to 3635
Rodgers, J. 2373 to 2382
2388 to 2438
2554 to 2576
3594 to 3614
3617 to 3623
3647 to 3686
Rogan, J.F. 3967 to 3986
4148 to 4149
Rogers, F.E. 1651 to 1659
Roulston, J.F. 8 310Ato 8330
Russell, L.R. 3904 to 3949
3992 to 3994
4334 to 4342
Ryan, W.T. 5890 to 5894
5903 to 5916
Samson, J. 7911 to 7986
Satchell, J.S. 3614 to 3615
Saunders, J. 7639 to 7666
7674 to 7721
Savage, A.E. 3054 to 3081
Scully, T.F. 3016 to 3030
4912 to 4914
Seelaf, G. 9026 to 9057
Sharpe, F. 7889 to 7903
8254 to 8273
Sharpley, C.H. 682 to 1352
1675 to 1692
1758 to 2268
2288 to 2297
2317 to 2324
2339 to 2392
2618 to 2812
5808 to 5888
Transcript 
Pages
Smith, L.J.S. 1406 to 1417
1483 to 1521
Southwell, C.M. 9221 to 9257
9262 to 9307
Stafford, J.A. 1417 to 1422
1594 to 1597
Stirling, R.F. 3582 to 3586
3616 to 3617
Street, B.W. 4168 to 4172B
Stubbs, T.L. 5617 to 5625
Taylor, R.G. 1742 to 1757
Tennant, A. McN. 9307 to 9327
9332 to 9353
9406 to 9407
Thomson, D.D. 6084 to 6089
Tierney, H.M. 4062 to 4068
Toakley, A.H. 6965 to 6967
Tredinnick, W.H. 7563 to 7572
Tregear, W.H. 6937 to 7025
Voumard, L. 7572 to 7580
7597 to 7601
7666 to 7674
Ward, J. 2940 to 3014
3567 to 3577
Waters, R.J.G. 1362 to 1399
1424 to 1475
1522 to 1551
1592 to 1594
Watson, A.W. 1610 to 1626
Webb, J .U . 4894 to 4902
4915 to 4922
Whitcombe, E.A. 8950 to 8992
9075 to 9076
9673 to 9715
White, H.S. 1399 to 1406
1475 to 1483
White, J. 1607 to 1609
Whitfield, C.T. 9358 to 9378
Williams, S.J. 8359 to 8383
8392 to 8428
Willman, C. 8429 to 8452
8468 to 8469
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Wilson, P.B. 5775 to 5789
6091 to 6142
Wood, G.M. 9014 to 9026
Woodhouse, D.F. 4031 to 4046
4074 to 4111
4128 to 4146
Mrs. X 5125 to 5196
5258 to 5336
5364Ato 5616
6027 to 6058
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